Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix E: Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence
Appendix E: Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence
Pages 113-122
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From page 113... ...
national security strategy, but perhaps it can be achieved by a combination of actions ranging from preventive diplomacy to military deterrence by means of modern conventional weaponry. Few would disagree that conventional forces will play a greater part in deterrence in the future.
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From page 114... ...
Under this doctrine, the United States deterred direct attack upon itself with strategic nuclear forces, while extending protection to its Cold War allies and friends by promising to escalate a war to the nuclear level if they were in danger of defeat by Soviet-led forces, even if this entailed first use of nuclear weapons by the United States. Extended deterrence was achieved via the "seamless web" of conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear forces.
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From page 115... ...
NUCLEAR VS. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE Nuclear Deterrence Deterrence emerged in its modern form in We 1930s in the context of We newfound capability to attack the whole of an enemy's civilian population and 4Following on John Mearsheimer's examination of conventional deterrence in historical context and on the NATO-Warsaw Pact front (John J
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From page 116... ...
Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through...." Accordingly, "tt~he only defense is in offense, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves."6 On the basis of arguments like these, Britain engaged belatedly in the creation of a bomber-heavy air force that, it hoped, would serve to deter rather than actually fight a new world war. As it turned out, both sides in World War II resorted early to urban bombing.7 Conventional bombing could be defended against to some extent; the prospect of strategic conventional bombing did not deter war, nor was strategic bombing by itself able to secure the defeat of the opposing side (even though, eventually, the f~re-bombing of Dresden and Tokyo, and the devastating thousand plane raids, approached nuclear strikes in the magnitude of damage they inflicted)
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From page 117... ...
coalesced a good deal of thought in the defense community that holds that, since He collapse of He Soviet Union, the United States possesses overwhelming conventional power. For that reason, Aspen argued, He United States would benefit from He worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons, if it were possible.9 At He same time, Here is growing interest In the proposition Hat technology may now make it possible for He United States to achieve deterrence using conventional forces and weapons alone.l° A number of significant Improvements have been made In He technology of conventional weapons In recent years, notably In accuracy, steals, Intelligence, and information support.
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From page 118... ...
resolve to use conventional as opposed to nuclear weapons is probably much more palpable to such leaders. An important concern with conventional deterrence is that it has not always worldly in the past, and it is not obvious even now that conventional force can have deterrent power that approaches that of nuclear weapons (although, as noted, the threat to use overwhelming conventional force may be much more credible)
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From page 119... ...
move to conventional deterrence might induce nuclear disarmament and prevent nuclear proliferation, but it is also plausible that nuclear disarmament by these powers would encourage or reward nuclear proliferation by rogue states or by those states that now take shelter under the umbrellas of the nuclear powers. A lesson that some foreign leaders and militaries learned from the Gulf War was that nuclear weapons may be necessary in order to offset otherwise overwhelming U.S.
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From page 120... ...
The Unfed States would attempt to make its nuclear weapons fade into the background, in order not to weaken its hand unduly in advocating nonproliferation, but the nuclear force would remain in the shadows as a potent deterrent. An alternative approach would be for the United States to retain adequate nuclear weapons capability and credibility to continue to support extended nuclear deterrence by means of a policy of flexible response.
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From page 121... ...
The more capable American conventional forces are, the less important nuclear weapons seem and the less the United States will need to rely on them. However, it is optimistic to believe that the United States will retain an adequate level of conventional forces, the determination to use them, and the ability to accept casualties that normally accompany conventional conflict, such that we could safely reduce our nuclear force, to an existential deterrent.
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From page 122... ...
Some sort of hedge against an increasingly hostile international environment is also important. The Defense Department advocates retaining some nuclear forces in reserve for a nuclear hedge.
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