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Appendix F: Notes on the Band Between Existential Deterrence and the Actual Use of Force
Pages 123-131

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From page 123...
... Over time, states or their predecessors have sought ways to provide some middle ground between the threat, or example, of severe punishment and its actual employment, including gradations of punitive action, e.g., beginning with a modest fine, as well as various fo~..s of rewards for good, and especially for compliant, behavior. The power of a state to inflict capital punishment, albeit nowadays often constrained by complex procedural safeguards, may be seen as an effort to establish an "existential deterrence" to heinous crimes.
From page 124...
... 5. In the last 150 years or so, the prompt damage and injury inflicted by weapons of war greatly increased; cumulative damage and injury extended well beyond the military forces of warring parties; weapons could be delivered against military and civilian targets over ever-increasing distances and with ever-greater rapidity.
From page 125...
... In the early years of the Cold War, with Soviet conventional forces in Central and Eastern Europe thought to be greatly superior to Western forces in Germany and Western Europe, the United States relied on its atomic superiority well into the 1950s to deter Soviet encroachments. This threat of massive retaliation "at places and times of our choosing" was buttressed by a series of alliances.
From page 126...
... military buildup while avoiding, by instinct as much as calculus, a breach of mutual deterrence rules eventually led Gorbachev to seek relief by negotiation and attempts to reform the Soviet system. Crucially in the circumstances, the U.S.
From page 127...
... As significant, in the case of North Korea, the threat of an emerging nuclear capability and the formidable, if vulnerable, North Korean conventional forces arrayed along the 38th parallel, led the United States to seek a negotiated resolution of the nuclear issue. For the time being, the Korean peninsula may represent the closest instance of two-sided mutual deterrence in the post-Cold War world (the Indian subcontinent may be another such case, though not directly involving the United States)
From page 128...
... But for now the prospects for direct military engagements between the United States and Russia are remote. The United States is not prepared to challenge Russian assertions of special rights, including military ones, in the "near abroad." The effectiveness of "extended deterrence" of Russian military actions and pressures outside the former Soviet space will remain moot at least for some time to come.
From page 129...
... Containment strategies, including the use of existing alliances and newly formed coalitions, would probably be the most effective and affordable instruments to avoid or postpone direct military conflicts. But in some instances this may be easier said than done because even close allies may have different assessments of the seriousness of a threat or of the most effective ways to deal with it.
From page 130...
... They should, however, be visibly exercised. Measures to augment "existential deterrence" should include diplomacy and various inducements for parties involved to resolve issues giving rise to friction, crises, and conflict.
From page 131...
... There will be numerous aspiring powers over time, including some with at least a rudimentary ability to injure We continental United States. In the latter case, a Cold War-type of deterrence, combined with defenses and containment strategies, may be the most desirable option.


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