Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix G.1: Special Challenges in Extending Deterrence in the New Era
Appendix G.1: Special Challenges in Extending Deterrence in the New Era
Pages 132-140
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From page 132... ...
What might it look like? Standard defense planning involving vital regional interests tends to focus on military capabilities that could with some confidence defeat aggression if it occurred (deterrence by denial)
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From page 133... ...
Although the tree happens to have emerged from using decision modeling methods to think about crises, conflicts, and deterrence, none of the factors in the tree is truly remarkable. The tree could have been assembled by merely combining ideas from a dozen texts and articles in international relations.
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From page 134... ...
includes the notion of identifying and weeding out "dangerous ideas" such as hatred-perpetuating stereotypes or distortions of history found in some countries' educational materials (e.g., Arab materials referencing Israel, Japanese materials misrepresenting as benign the brutal Japanese imperialism in Korea, materials claiming that recent events in Bosnia were "inevitable," or, less relevant here, American materials ignoring the mistreatment of Native Americans)
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From page 135... ...
Seek measures constraining neighbor from posturing forces for a surprise attack. Treat violation of such measures as strong evidence of hostile intent.
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From page 136... ...
Develop other mechanisms of legitimized, prompt, and competent action. Seek regional security frameworks requiring prompt political and economic sanctions making aggressors pariah states.
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From page 137... ...
1.2, any realistic assessment of prompt intervention capability quickly demonstrates that the United States should be prepared to assure that the earliest-arriving capabilities are those tailored to supplement the defenses of the target state. This might include capability for DDay Air Force and Navy attacks on ground forces, air forces, and naval forces (including small boats used for special operations units)
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From page 138... ...
Actions in violation of the agreement would not be particularly ambiguous; they would indicate hostile intentions and would be more likely to trigger appropriate responses. Unfortunately, arms control measures can also be counterproductive, especially measures proposed to avoid allegedly provocative actions in a crisis that would preclude increasing readiness to fend off attacks.
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From page 139... ...
· Develop militarily sensible arms-control initiatives tailored for the various regions of interest, focusing primarily on avoiding surprise attack and improving relations generally. · Participate as a major player in activities listed under National Security Council actions · Increase the military effectiveness of navy "flexible deterrent options." · Develop capabilities for short-warning D-Day strikes on military forces.
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From page 140... ...
Suppose further that the United States and other relevant nations were known to have capabilities and well-exercised operations plans for strategically significant military punishment of rogue states e.g., destruction of the adversary's naval forces or attacks on economic targets expected to cause few civilian casualties. Surely, such options would further enhance worries about "consequences." To be sure, military punishment options would be controversial against nations with the capability for nuclear strikes on the United States (or even regional states)
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