Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix G.2: Decisioin Modeling as an Aid to Strategic Planning and Crisis Action
Appendix G.2: Decisioin Modeling as an Aid to Strategic Planning and Crisis Action
Pages 141-152
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From page 141... ...
The decision models are not the familiar abstract constructs of utility theory, but rather natural-language models expressed in diagrams and tables that can be discussed in group settings and used to guide or generalize from political-military crisis games. Although the methodology requires background use of logic and mathematics and should be guided by serious analysts, it largely involves concepts and reasoning understandable by individuals with backgrounds as diverse as law, international relations, physical science, psychology, or military planning.
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From page 142... ...
The relevant behaviors of historical leaders can be found in all cultures, albeit with different frequencies. For example, the Arab world has produced Anwar Sadat and Saddam Hussein, and the Western world has produced George Bush and Adolph Hitler.
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From page 143... ...
To develop alternative images of the opponent's reasoning, one can use a combination of essay writing, attribute lists, influence diagrams, and cognitive maps. In one image, for example, the opponent may be pragmatic and incrementalist; in another, he may be exceedingly ambitious and frustrated; in yet a third, he may feel cornered, surrounded by enemies, and desperate.
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From page 144... ...
Identifying the Factors Affecting Judgments and Decisions Suppose we have used methods such as the cognitive maps, attribute lists, and other devices to develop strong alternative mental images of the opponent. The next step is identifying the factors (i.e., variables)
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From page 145... ...
very bad, bad, marginal, good, or very good? In the summer of 1990 as Saddam Hussein contemplated this matter, it is likely that he considered the risks would result from two principal possibilities: the possibility that the United States would defend Kuwait directly and immediately, and the possibility that even though the United States didn't defend Kuwait itself, it would deploy forces into Saudi Arabia and change the balance of power in the region We do not know that Saddam thought about the problem this way, but it is likely that these possibilities were on his mind explicitly or implicitly.
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From page 146... ...
Pragmatic and once burned, now cautious Still risk taking in some situations Grandiosely ambitious Paranoid tendencies with some basis Concerned about reputation and legitimacy in Arab and Islamic worlds Concerned only about being respected for his power Sensitive to potential U.S. power not immediately present ·.
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From page 147... ...
For each image of the opponent, we can develop what can be called judgment tables and decision tables. Judgment tables represent how the opponent might look at each of several factors and reach an overall judgment about, say, the most likely or worst-case outcome of a given option.
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From page 148... ...
The point here is that we cannot only construct formal models to reflect best-estimate notions about how the opponent is and may in the future be reasoning; we can also construct alternative models to reflect fundamental uncertainties about the nature of that reasoning. The principal question, of course, is whether we have to consider an inDmite number of such alternative models.
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From page 149... ...
High or Very High Very High Table G.2.4 Model 2's Assessment of Saddam's Options, Late July 1990 OPTION C ~RISKS OPPORTUNITY | NET ASSESSMENT OF OPTION Bad 1. Coerce Kuwait Very Bad Bad Very High Marginal 2.
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From page 150... ...
FACTORS TENDING TO INCREASE RISK TAKING Since risk-taking propensity is such an important issue in determining the probability of aggression, it is worthwhile to review major factors tending to increase a willingness to assume risk (Figure G.2.3~. Starting at the top and moving clockwise, we see first the previously mentioned role of the current situation.
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From page 151... ...
; and , ~, - 7 The perception that military action is likely to pay off, may pay off handsomely, and involves risks that are not outrageous and perhaps only marginal. Importantly, national leaders have their own standards in evaluating current situations and the outcomes of various options.
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From page 152... ...
That is, utility theory is a poor way to represent such reasoning even though one can look at behavior and infer effective utility functions. CONCLUSIONS The methods described here could be profitably used routinely in a wide variety of national security planning contexts such as studies of plausible contingencies, peacetime crisis gaming, high-level gaming in the presence of strategic warning, and the development of better intelligence assessments.
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