Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix I: Deterrence: Clash and Utilization of Value Systems
Appendix I: Deterrence: Clash and Utilization of Value Systems
Pages 201-214
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From page 201... ...
various categories of threat from various quarters using those instruments best suited to the particular situation. Some of these will not be responsive to the sort of conventional deterrent actions that we have developed for threats seen as likely during the Cold War, i.e., usually direct, cross-border aggression, sometimes indirect subversion with state support, or organized international terrorism with state support, plus readiness to respond to state-initiated nuclear attack.
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From page 202... ...
BACKGROUND During the Cold War, these threats came mostly from states whose interests and whose concepts of incentives and disincentives resembled our own closely enough for us to understand and develop deterrents likely to be effective. Thus, in the near term or over the long term, the United States and its allies were able to prevail over the Soviet-Cuban threat to the Caribbean and Central America; keep in check the North Korean conventional threat to South Korea; put an end to Iranian attacks on shipping and threats to our friends in the Gulf, and repulse Iraq's attack upon Kuwait; strengthen the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
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From page 203... ...
Hisbyollah and others continued unabated inside the zone. When increasing Israeli Defence Force casualties and a close election campaign brought the Israel government to bomb and shell targets outside the security zone, the resulting political uproar internationally led to Israel again reverting to the previous formula of containing the ongoing conflict.
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From page 204... ...
There are also transnational movements such as Islamic radicalism, narcotics trafficking, and international crime which are either new or stronger, replacing the transnational threats of communism or Arab nationalism in reinforcing national and subnational instability and threatening behavior. A reasonably accurate understanding of the impact of cultural factors on the attitudes and action of states and subnational movements has thus become still more important when it comes to designing and employing an effective set of deterrents.
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From page 205... ...
with their peculiar cultures or value system. The regional states usually have much deeper understanding than does the United States of these factors and are therefore of great help, even if their military weakness makes them seem so much less capable as to be of dubious value as participants.
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From page 206... ...
that it is most effective when it responds very quickly to the internal crisis in such situations, and when the nature of the response avoids neocolonization (significant nation building) , especially when that requires long-term commitment of major military forces.
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From page 207... ...
Questions remain about the fate of the lofty political goals and overall security for local population after IFOR leaves Bosnia given the limitations placed upon its support for basically civilian objectives (including the police function and refugee reform)
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From page 208... ...
, joint exercises, and combined operations to protect shipping and the oil installations in the Gulf against Iranian (or Iraqi) attacks, using indigenous ports and airfields and involving local forces to a limited degree, consistent with their political caution and their military capabilities.
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From page 209... ...
Iraq could have punched into Saudi Arabia or Kuwait had it moved at once in October 1994 but was obviously deterred by the daunting prospect of what would come in response, once the United States moved more military force forward and had the strong support of regional states. However, when the United States decided upon retaliation against Iraq in September 1996 because of Iraq's limited action against its Kurdish population-with no sign of a threat to the south-it displayed a lack of political and cultural sensitivity.
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From page 210... ...
policy toward Bosnia, Islamist propaganda had substantial negative effect in portraying the United States as refusing to be involved because the Bosnians under attack were Moslem.) Another case study is Somalia, where adequate knowledge of Somali culture during Operation Restore Hope was combined with overwhelming force used with restraint, close cooperation with regional states, coordinated militarypolitical-humanitarian activities, and an excellent psyops/political-action campaign (aided by regional governments.)
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From page 211... ...
The meeting between former President Carter and the late North Korean leader Kim It Sung was critical. Yet without a significant U.S.
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The United States was obliged to calculate its real interests in continuing to try and force Pyongyang's hand on its earlier limited nuclear activities, running the risk of no regional support and the danger of a conflict, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, pursuing a peaceful regional political solution that could block Pyongyang's ambitious future nuclear program but not provide an early answer to its previous activities. CONCLUSION Paradoxically, although the United States is the only superpower and enjoys overwhelming military superiority without a real threat to its security, it must arguably pay closer attention than at any time since before World War II to the interests, values, and attitudes of other countries if it is to protect its own longterm interests.
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From page 213... ...
This means constant attention by the Navy and Marine Corps to forward presence and collaborative activities with military forces of other countries, both to solidify cooperative attitudes and to enhance interoperability. Combined exercises and operations, training, common equipment, and other activities should be stressed, with local forces, as well as the presence of U.S.
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From page 214... ...
These observations could easily be extended or amplified. However, they all seem to follow the general thrust of the Regional Conflict study in arguing for a lighter, more flexible Marine Corps able to deploy even more rapidly with strong Navy support and able to understand better and work more effectively with foreign countries.
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