Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix J: Controlling Instabilities Caused by Rouge Governments
Appendix J: Controlling Instabilities Caused by Rouge Governments
Pages 215-219
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From page 215... ...
Also, the capability of the United States to actually defeat or neutralize an enemy retaliatory attack will weigh heavily on the decision of whether the United States can build a coalition and respond in the first place. A DEFENSE IN DEPTH Surely the United States will make every effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
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From page 216... ...
The last barrier is in "passive defense." So, we see that active defenses play an important role in the complex dynamics of who is deterring whom: They play a role in limiting damage if the rogue nation employs weapons of mass destruction in retaliation because the United States responded by large-scale military actions. · Active defenses also play a role in the decision process by the rogue government as to whether or not to launch a retaliatory attack in retaliation to the U.S.
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From page 217... ...
Interceptors could be based on ships in the upper reaches of the Persian Gulf and the eastern reaches of the Mediterranean Sea. A simple survey on a globe reveals that a footprint of something like 1,000 km is required to cover Iran and Iraq from these sites.
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From page 218... ...
· At the tactical level- The operational concept must define how to accomplish "dynamic engagement control." This involves the interaction of sensors, assessors, controllers, and shooters to make the time loops for engaging the target as short as possible, so that we have "iron" on target prior to dispensing. · At the operational level At this level, some "joint integrator" must address how these defense batteries on ships operate in concert with other types of defense batteries to achieve the overall operational objective no enemy ballistic missiles can exit a designated area.
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From page 219... ...
Also, we must address the question of maintaining the intent of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 in the presence of these theater missile defenses; the intent of the treaty, stated broadly, is to provide effective measures to limit the capability to defend the territory of each country the United States and now Russia.
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