Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
Appendix K: Deterrence--Quo Vadis?
Appendix K: Deterrence--Quo Vadis?
Pages 220-227
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 220... ...
We have transitioned from earlier strategies where deterrence was a centerpiece to the current national security strategy theme of "Engagement and Enlargement" with its principal references to deterrence residing in a section titled "Combating the Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction." The current national security strategy also speaks of "deterring aggression." The main part of the "Combating .
|
From page 221... ...
are an alternative to nuclear weapons, illustrate some of the current thinking, as does Charles Allan's excellent Washington Quarterly 1994 article, "Extended Deterrence." Other trends brought on by the demise of the bipolar world that bear on any new approach to the practice of deterrence include: . Less predictability of the international scene and a recognition of the need for longer-range policy focus and better integration of the political, diplomatic, economic, and military elements of foreign policy; Fewer distinctions between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons; The insufficiency of any single conventional or nuclear system as a deterrent; and Self-deterrence from using nuclear weapons.
|
From page 222... ...
The fostering of an international belief that the first use of nuclear weapons will inevitably and irrevocably result in the user losing everything he/she cherishes; A plan of action to be used if the nuclear "threshold" is crossed; Possession of a demonstrated capability that is affordable, does not violate basic national tenets,and whose readiness for employment is apparent but does not interfere with international intercourse and the conduct of our nation's daily life; and Convincing the world that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. What does this mean for the future?
|
From page 223... ...
And, in the midst of such ambiguity, military actions may become the forced option, often without careful integration of the diplomatic and economic tools available. Deterrence may be thought of as a kind of net or fabric with the warp made up of military capabilities and the weft made up of factors such as the military balance, our national principles, negotiating history and skills, recent responses to world crises, and national will to act (Figure K.2~.
|
From page 224... ...
Although the number of nuclear weapons required to accomplish this continues to decrease through mutual agreement between the United States and Russia, the absolute lower limit of this requirement remains to be determined. The trends suggest it will be a number considerably less than ~ Millot, Marc Dean, Roger Molander, and Peter A
|
From page 225... ...
It would appear that even this relatively small number of weapons should be sufficient not only for overall deterrence but also for any Third World or rogue nation scenario, since it is hard to conceive of a situation where anything more than a few nuclear weapons would be required for terrorists, rogue nations, or Third World countries. The challenge for the first part of the 21st century is to develop similar means and international "states of mind" that deter, dissuade, and influence potential adversaries from all forms of military aggression.
|
From page 226... ...
Forward deploymentlmovement to the area of ground forces, stealth aircraft, fighter aircraft, AWACS, JSTARS, and the like is also very effective, but CONUS-based forces have low deterrent value until they move toward or to the area. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles, Patriots, nuclear-powered submarines, and sea-based TBMD have high value for deterring use of weapons of mass destruction, but Red does not believe that the United States would preempt or use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack.
|
From page 227... ...
Hopefully, back to the centerpiece where, if deterrence theory and practice are understood and used, it can ensure a structure and balance of national security forces that are optimized for a future we are only beginning to comprehend. What is needed: · Revitalize and reaffirm a national goal of deterring all forms of aggression.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.