Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix B: Contemporary Strategic Deterrence and Precision-Guided Munitions
Appendix B: Contemporary Strategic Deterrence and Precision-Guided Munitions
Pages 75-82
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From page 75... ...
, and the means to deliver them, have matured to a level of capability, sophistication, and reliability that permits us to use them in more than limited operational roles. The United States now possesses conventional weapons that can shoulder strategic missions that is, missions engaging targets at the heart of the military, economic, and political power of an adversary once thought the preserve of nuclear weapons.
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From page 76... ...
Ultimately, these Cold War efforts toward "general" deterrence against all types of aggression failed, although the idea has resurfaced more recently. COLD WAR DETERRENCE AND THE LIMITS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS During the Cold War, U.S.
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From page 77... ...
With the existing technology, the best weapon against a nuclear weapon was another nuclear weapon and to ensure a reliable and credible nuclear deterrent the United States fielded parallel land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear forces all with varying types of weapons both strategic and tactical. With the enormous destructive capability of nuclear weapons, many theorists and policy makers tended to treat them as the catch-all deterrent against any and all aggression.
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From page 78... ...
military presence and deterrence against a Soviet threat, it did not necessarily improve our strategic deterrent options elsewhere against rogue states. We were left with a massive investment in a nuclear arsenal of limited use except in possibly deterring a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union directly against the United States.
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From page 79... ...
American use of nuclear weapons was politically improbable, and Iraq could expect the United States to deploy strategic conventional weapons in a range of missions in any case. In short, Saddam Hussein perceived no added risk for Iraq in attacking Israel and launched what missiles he could.
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From page 80... ...
In the Gulf War, the United States demonstrated that it had both the resolve and the reach to strike devastating blows against the economic, military, and political power bases of an adversary without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. CURRENT CHALLENGES As the Persian Gulf War demonstrated, in the current context of international relations, one without an overarching threat such as the Soviet Union and general nuclear war, the problem of deterrence is more complex than in the Cold War and its solutions must be more flexible.
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From page 81... ...
The United States should continue to maintain a secure and widely dispersed array of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems until we are assured that the nuclear weapons of others constitute no threat to the overwhelming strategic nuclear superiority of U.S. forces.
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From page 82... ...
In the future, both strategic nuclear weapons and strategic conventional weapons can offer us a tailored deterrence mission. Strategic nuclear weapons may now fulfill a broader, or nonspecific, deterrence mission, poised not against another state but against the threat of nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by a major nuclear power.
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