Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix C: Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Coalitions for Defending Against Regional Challengers Armed with Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix C: Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Coalitions for Defending Against Regional Challengers Armed with Weapons of Mass Destruction
Pages 83-103
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From page 83... ...
Next, the paper identifies how the problem of nuclear deterrence of WMD-armed regional challengers differs from the one faced by the United States during the Cold War. By examining some of the political and military features of a confrontation with a WMD-armed regional challenger, the paper then highlights why it would be strongly in the U.S.
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From page 84... ...
The paper goes on to explore the incentives and disincentives that regional states and others could have for joining such a coalition and supporting its nuclear deterrence strategy. Finally, the paper discusses some practical steps that can be taken to speed the implementation of a coalition nuclear deterrence strategy should a WMD-backed regional challenge arise.
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From page 85... ...
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH REGIONAL PROLIFERATORS For the foreseeable future, nuclear deterrence will play an essential role in dissuading or moderating challenges to U.S. vital interests from aggressive WMD-armed regional states.
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From page 86... ...
The second alternative to deterrence through nuclear retaliation is to depend instead upon defenses against WMD attacks that can prevent intolerable levels of damage. Three complementary paths can be taken: prevent such weapons from being launched, interdict them as they travel toward their targets, and protect the targets against WMD that arrive in their vicinities.
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From page 87... ...
In time, defenses against WMD may evolve that can limit damage to levels that, although very painful, would not be militarily or politically decisive. If so, it should become even easier to deter WMD attacks, since a proliferator should be less inclined to risk nuclear retaliation for WIND attacks Mat do not promise to be either militarily or politically decisive.
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From page 88... ...
Thus, if a new proliferator forces a conflict with the United States to the nuclear level, it will be at an even greater disadvantage than when fighting the United States at the conventional level. Third, though painful to contemplate, the United States can survive the kinds of WMD attacks that could be made by any new proliferator.
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From page 89... ...
These differences suggest that nuclear deterrence of 37VMD use by regional proliferators poses risks of a smaller magnitude than nuclear deterrence did in the past and, correspondingly, could be more credible and effective. Several other differences suggest that the risk of any nuclear use may be somewhat greater in the future and that being well prepared politically to implement a nuclear deterrent strategy will be more difficult than during the Cold War.
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From page 90... ...
Still, preparations for general defense contingencies by these other alliances led to the development of institutional arrangements that could allow consultations and joint planning and support for nuclear deterrent actions, if the need were to arise. Since the end of the Cold War, however, skepticism about the continuing need for alliances has increased.
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From page 91... ...
Why risk nuclear retaliation to achieve less than a decisive blow against the intervention capabilities of the United States and its possible partners or against their will to brave further damage?
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From page 92... ...
Finally, longer-term political reactions to its singular role in this disaster could have adverse consequences for the United States and thus for others. To the extent that this painful experience led the United States to retreat from its role as general underwriter of peace and stability overseas, states might conclude that they would need their own weapons of mass destruction.
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From page 93... ...
Thus, to the extent that the United States implements a nuclear deterrence strategy against WMD-armed regional aggressors unilaterally, it will have to bear single-handedly the many heavy burdens of a failure of the strategy, with all its consequences. The alternative to implementing nuclear deterrence against a WMD-armed regional aggressor on a unilateral basis is to do so with the active involvement of a coalition.
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From page 94... ...
leadership and for readerships in the other nuclear-armed states that might want to resist strong domestic political pressures for nuclear retaliation. Involving the coalition explicitly in the implementation of the nuclear deterrence strategy that would help to protect it from the challenger's WMD strikes has additional benefits beyond its most important role of distributing the responsibility for potentially awful outcomes.
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From page 95... ...
The precedent set in providing deterrent cover for regional states could help to assure them that future needs for deterrence of VVMD-backed threats would be met, thus reducing concerns that they need their own WMD-based deterrent forces. The international mechanisms employed, and the policies and actions taken, could become a model for responsible future implementations of extended nuclear deterrence.
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From page 96... ...
intervention would thus give value to WMD strikes aimed at halting, impeding, or avenging that support. Further, regional states offer sensitive targets, such as capital cities, that would be easier to hit than U.S.
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From page 97... ...
The possibility of sharing such protection could easily be both a powerful attraction, and a domestic political prerequisite, to coalition membership by regional states. Fourth, the United States could be expected to win any dispute over a vital interest.
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From page 98... ...
Thus, it is important to identify the kinds of arrangements that could be needed and to make whatever advance preparations are reasonable. Advance preparations can help a future coalition implement a joint nuclear deterrence strategy quickly and smoothly.
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From page 99... ...
Any necessary use of extended nuclear deterrence to suppress that threat should not be confused with other issues that divide the international community. Finally, as with the specific decisions involved in actually implementing an extended nuclear deterrence policy against a WMD-backed regional challenge, not every state can be involved in every aspect of the advance preparations needed.
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From page 100... ...
They should certainly highlight the importance of having the coalition members present a united front in any declarations regarding nuclear retaliation. A fourth category of advance preparations might explore different philosophies and conditions that could guide nuclear retaliation.
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From page 101... ...
The need to provide aid to a surrendered opponent should be a factor in coalition decisions on the magnitude and character of any required nuclear retaliation. Looking back over these six categories of advance preparations, it seems likely that an aggressive and widely visible effort to pursue them all could create great concerns for the public and governments of potential coalition members.
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From page 102... ...
Given a shared understanding of the fundamental requirements of a joint nuclear deterrence strategy, it should be possible to make detailed preparations quickly in the event that a challenge from a WMD-armed renegade begins to emerge. CONCLUSIONS The main conclusion of this paper is that, in any future confrontation with a WM:D-armed regional challenger, the United States and potential coalition partners will have strong incentives to involve each other in implementing jointly an extended nuclear deterrent strategy to deter the challenger from initiating the use of VVMD.
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From page 103... ...
The United States has faced the challenge of balancing these two considerations for decades, as part of the extended nuclear deterrence strategy for NATO. There, although the United States has the final say over any use of its weapons, allied groups provide political and military inputs for planning in peacetime and, time permitting, consult on possible nuclear weapons use in wartime.
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