Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Pages 1-9
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and allied security interests have stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Current deterrence objectives include the following: To deter attack on the United States and its allies by external forces ranging from the armed forces of hostile nations, including "rogue" nations and diverse regional powers, to national or multinational terrorist groups acting with such nations' active or tacit support or encouragement; To deter similar attacks on allies with whom we have mutual security treaties; To deter aggression against our own and our allies' vital interests and security in areas where we have agreed those interests and security are at stake; such threats may be made against free use of the seas, airways, and space, and against key sources of vital resources essential to our and our allies' security and welfare, or they may result from the consequences of disasters to humanity caused by international or civil conflicts; To deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; and To deter the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in military conflict, especially when our own and our allies' vital national security interests are at stake.
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However, the potential or actual use of effective military force will underlie all deterrence efforts-even deterrence of actions in the economic and political areas should they appear sufficiently threatening to our security. ENDURING PRINCIPLES IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY Despite the changed international climate and the diffuse quality of our current security concerns, many of the principles that supported earlier deterrence strategy endure.
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DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES Weapons of Mass Destruction With the heightened emphasis on deterring proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, there has been a tendency to think about nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons all together under the "weapons of mass destruction" rubric. However, nuclear weapons remain unique in their vast and instantaneous destructive power.
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These issues involving nuclear weapons in the deterrent role await resolution as international relationships in the post-Cold War world evolve. However, nuclear weapons, at whatever numbers our treaty commitments allow, will remain a cornerstone of U.S.
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Increase the ratio of offensive to defensive capability in naval forces. The high level of command integration, the technical capability, and the global reach of the forces of the former Soviet Union dictated the balance among offensive and defensive capabilities of U.S.
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This includes enhancing the aspects of naval intelligence germane to deterrence; incorporating deterrence into training at many levels, ranging from training and curricula in the war colleges to training in planning and operations especially relevant to deterrence; and budgeting to make certain that the deterrence aspects of the naval forces are adequately planned and supported. Naval force planning activities should also include participation in arms control initiatives to ensure that impacts of agreements affecting naval forces' deterrent capabilities are accounted for.
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Timing. The extent to which the response can be appropriately timed to anticipate hostile moves on the opponent's part, to bring the requisite deterrent force to bear when it is needed at the place where it is needed, and to communicate intent and capability within the opponent's planning cycle.
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Decision aids should incorporate the capacity for decision making and for representation of values and patterns of influence among all the participants; in particular, they should be able to represent the uncertainties in value systems and reasoning patterns, they should avoid stereotypes (such as "the Arab mind" or "the Chinese mind") , and they should be capable of building strategies that cover the most important possible variants in understanding an adversary's rnindset; Decision aids should not be expected to foretell with confidence the outcomes of ongoing or contemplated deterrence actions, because the precise unfolding of events depends on many elements of chance and many unknowns; Decision aids should be used for training, learning, and practice; Decision aids should be used for analysis, to help identify gaps and uncertainties in our understanding of situations and of participants in events applicable to hypothetical situations, as practice and learning devices, or to real situations; and Decision aids should explicitly portray for their users the levels of confidence in the information and representation of the values on which the decision aids are based.
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Learning how other countries use models and games in situations applicable to deterrence the issues, opponents, and outcomes they consider; Keeping abreast of activities in the various institutes for conflict resolution supported by U.S. universities, foundations, and corporations, as a source of input for the Navy Department's models, simulations, and games relevant to deterrence; and Incorporating post-Cold War deterrence explicitly into Naval War College curricula, to obtain the benefit of the students' thinking and to train future leaders.
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