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Proliferation Concerns Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union (1997) / Chapter Skim
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A: OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL REGIMES
Pages 123-131

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From page 123...
... The treaty, which now has 185 parties, calls for member states to restrict nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and accept controls in the form of IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities while at the same time undertaking to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for those who abide by the treaty's provisions. As the Cold War intensified, each of the superpowers became suspicious of the intentions of its adversary regarding the development of chemical warfare 123
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From page 124...
... An essential component of all international efforts is the network of national policies and laws that reflect the international consensus on transfers of dangerous material and sensitive technologies, with the individual countries applying the consensus in controlling their own trade and related activities involving such items. In addition, the United States and other countries, acting alone or in concert, undertake initiatives outside the framework of the established international regimes in addressing threats of proliferation of advanced weapons systems.
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From page 125...
... At the same time, the nuclear weapons states are obliged to engage in negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and to reduce the levels of nuclear weapons. All parties are required to ensure that exports of sensitive nuclear material and equipment will be subject to IAEA safeguards in the recipient state, whether or not the recipient is a party to the treaty.
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From page 126...
... nonproliferation efforts, into its guidelines. The new dual-use control arrangement contains its own guidelines prohibiting the transfer of controlled items for use in a non-nuclear weapons state in a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity or when 2 This information is from U.S.
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From page 127...
... criminal sanctions, including extradition, against persons who misuse or threaten to misuse nuclear material in international transport to harm the public. Agreed minimum standards for physical protection of nuclear material in facilities are published in IAEA document INFCIRC/225, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials." This document has been revised several times.
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From page 128...
... The Australia Group In 1990, the Australia Group expanded its efforts to include items related to biological weapons. It has recommended export control lists of microorganisms and toxins and of equipment that can be used in the production of biological warfare agents.
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From page 129...
... Members implement their commitments in the context of their own national export control laws. The MTCR was originally designed to restrict transfers of missiles able to carry payloads of at least 500 kilograms to a range of at least 300 kilometers, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, space-launch vehicles, sounding rockets, unmanned air vehicles, and remotely piloted vehicles.
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From page 130...
... However, collective examination by its members of past decisions is to provide incentives for individual states to exercise prudence in their unilateral export decisions concerning items on the organization's lists. Since admission of new members requires consensus, the American policy that prospective members must show a record of export restraint with regard to North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Iraq in addition to meeting the formal Wassenaar criterion of acceptable national export controls and adherence to the other international control regimes makes this the de facto standard.
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From page 131...
... Such consultations frequently influence export control decisions. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND THE SUCCESSOR STATES Russia and some of the other countries of the former Soviet Union recognize that their adherence to the international control regimes is important if they are to become respected participants in international security discussions and international trade activities.
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Key Terms

  • nuclear material
  • chemical weapons
  • physical protection
  • international regimes
  • export controls

  • iaea safeguards
  • national export
  • nuclear nonproliferation
  • fuel cycle
  • western countries

  • control regimes
  • international control
  • international transport
  • recipient state
  • nonproliferation regime

  • biological weapons
  • control provisions
  • nuclear energy
  • nuclear explosion
  • control list

  • weapons regime
  • nuclear arms
  • wassenaar arrangement
  • nuclear explosive
  • missile technology

  • trigger list
  • weapons states
  • international community
  • conventional arms
  • sensitive technologies


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