The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (1997) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Pages 1-10
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From page 1... ...
THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE REASONS FOR FURTHER CHANGE The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) , signed in 1991 as the Cold War was ending and now being implemented by both the United States and Russia, will reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by the two countries from 13,000 and 11,000, respectively, to about 8,000 each.
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From page 2... ...
In addition, continued actions by the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to reduce the roles assigned to those arsenals are needed to help bring the other declared and undeclared nuclear weapons states into the arms reduction process and to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. The effectiveness of that regime depends on the full support and cooperation of a large number of nonnuclear weapons states in the maintenance of a vigorous International Atomic Energy Agency with the inspection powers and resources to do its job, in the implementation of effective controls on the transfer of sensitive technologies, and in the creation of transparency conditions conducive to building
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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE PAST AND FUTURE During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was the bedrock of U.S strategy for preventing both nuclear war and major conventional war because a more effective alternative was not apparent: the adversarial U.S.-Soviet relationship made it seem imprudent to rely on good intentions to preclude nuclear attack or massive conventional assault; the character of nuclear weapons and the diverse means for delivering them meant that attempts to defend the United States or its allies against nuclear attacks on their populations could be overcome with much less effort than would have to be invested in the defenses; highly survivable basing modes for significant parts of each side's nuclear forces made it impractical to execute a disarming first strike even if conflict seemed imminent; and concern about the powerful conventional forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (and, in Asia, those of China and North Korea) motivated the United States and its allies to adopt a first-use-if-necessary nuclear posture to deter large-scale conventional attacks.
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From page 4... ...
A TWO-PART PROGRAM OF CHANGE If only the core function of nuclear weapons retains validity, fundamental changes in the nuclear force structures and operational practices of the major nuclear powers become both possible and desirable. Accordingly, the committee has concluded that the United States should pursue a two-part program of change in its nuclear weapons policies.
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From page 5... ...
· Second, further reductions will bolster the nuclear nonproliferation regime. U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions will not in themselves dissuade a state bent on acquiring nuclear weapons; today's undeclared nuclear powers and would-be proliferators are driven above all by regional security concerns.
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From page 6... ...
Operational doctrine regarding the magnitude and timing of any actual retaliation in response to a nuclear attack should be revised. The United States should adopt a strategy that would permit much more selective targeting options and that would be based neither on predetermined prompt attacks on counterforce targets nor on automatic destruction of cities.
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From page 7... ...
Verifying numbers of nondeployed and nonstrategic warheads, in particular, would require transparency measures regarding the production, storage, and dismantling of nuclear warheads, as well as a mechanism for exchanging and verifying information about the location and status of warheads. Since nuclear weapons can be small and portable and not easily detectable by technical means, however, a regime that would provide high confidence of locating a small number of hidden warheads would be extremely difficult to achieve.
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From page 8... ...
The achievement of U.S.-Russian reductions to a mutually agreed level of about 1,000 total warheads each should not represent the final level for nuclear arms reductions. There will still be powerful reasons to continue down to a level of a few hundred nuclear warheads on each side, with the other three declared nuclear powers at lower levels, or with no remaining nuclear forces.
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From page 9... ...
It would reduce the likelihood that additional states will acquire nuclear weapons. Although the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty currently enjoys almost universal adherence, the nuclear weapons states cannot be confident of maintaining indefinitely a regime in which they proclaim nuclear weapons essential to their security while denying all others the right to possess them.
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From page 10... ...
Alternatively, nations might find it preferable to bypass the intermediate step involving an international agency and proceed directly to negotiations to prohibit nuclear weapons either globally in a single agreement or in steps involving successive expansions in the number and geographical scope of nuclear weapon free zones. It will not be easy to achieve the conditions necessary to make a durable global prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons both desirable and feasible.
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