The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (1997) / Chapter Skim
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1 WHY CHANGE U. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY?
1 WHY CHANGE U. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY?
Pages 11-32
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From page 11... ...
Stimson Center and the international studies of the prospects for the elimination of nuclear weapons conducted by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons have attracted particular notice.4 With the benefit of those studies and others, and the committee's own intensive re-examination of these matters including wideranging discussions of nuclear weapons issues in the continuation of its longstanding series of meetings with counterpart groups in Russia, China, and Europe the committee now offers a new assessment of the implications of the end of the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union for the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
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From page 12... ...
These risks included the danger that the nuclear arms competition might continue without limit, endlessly adding to destructive potentials, constantly risking some destabilizing imbalance, and forever tempting additional countries to acquire nuclear weaponry for purposes of protection, or status, in a world of nuclear-armed camps. Above all, the risks included the danger that an accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized launch of one or a few nuclear weapons, or some other escalatory dynamic arising out of political crisis or regional conflict, could lead to full-scale nuclear war and the unimaginable disaster that this would represent for civilization (see Box 1.2~.5
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From page 15... ...
NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY? 15 Over the course of the Cold War, the two sides negotiated a series of arms control agreements to try to limit the direct dangers of their nuclear confrontation, and they were leaders in the construction of other agreements, with wider participation, intended to restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries.
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From page 16... ...
· The relative importance of regional conflicts has increased in the aftermath of the Cold War, but for conflicts of this type the practice of nuclear deterrence by the United States or Russia or the other declared nuclear weapons powers is likely to be unnecessary, irrelevant, ineffective, or even harmful in some cases.8
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From page 18... ...
Although the practice of nuclear deterrence by the United States, Russia, and the other declared nuclear weapons states can, in some instances, help inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons (by reassuring allies that they will be protected without needing to acquire their own nuclear weapons) , in other circumstances the practice of nuclear deterrence is likely to aggravate proliferation dangers (by causing nonallies to feel threatened, by lending respectability to reliance on nuclear deterrence, and by undermining the credibility of the nuclear weapons states in their opposition to proliferation)
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From page 19... ...
The first part of the program is a near- to midterm set of mutual force reductions together with accompanying changes in nuclear operations and declaratory policies and with measures to improve the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials worldwide to diminish further confrontational and potentially destabilizing aspects of force postures, to reduce the risks of erroneous, unauthorized, or accidental nuclear-weapons use, and to help curb the threat of further nuclear proliferation. The second part of the program is a long-term effort to foster international conditions in which the possession of nuclear weapons would no longer be seen as necessary or legitimate for the preservation of national and global security.
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From page 21... ...
NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY? 21 nuclear attacks.9 (Past and current U.S.
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From page 22... ...
Commentators including high-level figures such as former Minister of Defense Rodionov have stressed that, if NATO moves toward Russian borders, Russia might move nuclear weapons westward. This emphasis on the military utility and policy relevance of nuclear weapons, if maintained at a high rhetorical pitch, may make it difficult for Russian policymakers to pursue further deep reductions, unless the reductions can be portrayed as "correcting" inequalities of past agreements as the Russians argue that START III should "correct" START II.
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From page 23... ...
Strengthening the consensus against nuclear proliferation, finding ways to engage the three undeclared nuclear weapons states in arms reductions, increasing the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials worldwide, and dissuading those few countries still bent on acquiring nuclear weapons must be top U.S. priorities.
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From page 24... ...
In an era in which the hostility of the U.S.-Soviet relationship made it seem imprudent to rely on good intentions to preclude nuclear attack and in which, early on, invulnerable basing modes for significant parts of each side's nuclear forces made it impractical to execute a disarming first strike if conflict seemed imminent, the apparently inescapable impotence of defense reinforced inclinations to rely on deterrence through the threat of retaliation. No more effective alternative was apparent.
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From page 25... ...
The dilemmas of secrecy, wherein the adversary needs to know something of the plans for retaliation in order to be deterred, but must not know too much lest this enable him to take countermeasures that would reduce the retaliation's effectiveness and, hence, the effectiveness of the threat also arise. Finally, there is the dilemma, discussed earlier, that the assertion by some countries of a need and right to practice nuclear deterrence may eventually encourage additional countries to assert the same need and right, leading to proliferation of nuclear weapons and, hence, a more dangerous world.
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From page 26... ...
The result was a nuclear arms race in which the numbers, sophistication, and alert levels of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces grew to levels difficult to comprehend by anyone other than those who were involved in the process and often incomprehensible even to them.~4 THE CASE FOR POST-COLD WAR REDUCTIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS This committee has concluded that the continuing dilemmas and dangers of nuclear deterrence as practiced in the past by the United States can and should be alleviated in the post-Cold War security environment by confining such deterrence to the core function of deterring nuclear attack, or coercion by threat of nuclear attack, against the United States or its allies.
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From page 27... ...
The committee assumes that some although it is hoped not all other nuclear weapons states will similarly consider it necessary to retain some nuclear weapons for "core deterrence." The size and scope of the efforts deemed necessary to fulfill the core function, however, presumably will shrink in parallel with what the committee hopes is the declining plausibility, over time, that any state would consider mounting a nuclear attack against anyone. There are strong reasons to make every effort to hasten the arrival of international conditions in which threats of nuclear attack are simply no longer thinkable.
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From page 28... ...
Third, continued actions by the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals and the roles and missions assigned to the arsenals will help induce the other declared and undeclared nuclear weapons states to join the arms control process. At the levels planned under the NPR, for example, under which it is estimated that the United States and Russia each would retain a total of about 10,000 nuclear warheads, deployed and in reserve, the other nuclear powers have little motivation to submit their much smaller arsenals to any form of control.
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From page 29... ...
In addition, substantial adjustments can be made in the operational practices governing existing nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers can also achieve higher standards of security for their nuclear warheads and for fissile materials worldwide.
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From page 30... ...
Chapter 2 reviews current U.S. nuclear weapons policy, U.S.-Russian nuclear relations, and the problem of global nuclear proliferation, laying the foundation for Chapter 3's recommendations for a regime of progressive constraints.
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From page 31... ...
2. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991)
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From page 32... ...
18. Given the years required for a hypothetically hostile Russia to reconstitute conventional forces capable of challenging the United States and its allies, the time should be sufficient for compensating action.
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