The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (1997) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
2 CURRENT U. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
2 CURRENT U. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
Pages 33-57
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 33... ...
, and ballistic missile defenses. The second part, on nuclear weapons policy and nonproliferation, covers the global nonproliferation regime, U.S.
|
From page 34... ...
Substantial progress has already been made in adapting the nuclear forces of the United States and Russia to the post-Cold War environment. The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
|
From page 35... ...
Much more can and should be done. Even if both START agreements are fully implemented, the level of nuclear forces will remain much higher than needed to meet the core deterrent function.
|
From page 36... ...
ballistic missile defense programs threaten to impede the arms control process by making uncertain the stability of deterrence at lower force levels. Nuclear Force Levels and the Need for Deeper Reductions After implementation of START II, the United States would have about 3,500 deployed strategic warheads, as well as a few hundred deployed nonstrategic warheads.
|
From page 37... ...
It is encouraging that Russia and the United States agreed at the March 1997 Helsinki summit that initial efforts in this direction would be part of the START III agenda. The very large numbers of nuclear warheads in today's nuclear arsenals leave little incentive to cheat, but as the numbers are reduced verification will become an increasingly important issue.
|
From page 38... ...
An improved verification regime would include a series of detailed data exchanges on the number and location of all nuclear warheads, fissile material production sites and their specifications, as well as total inventories of all fissile material stocks. These declarations would be subject to multiple random and challenge inspections of activities relating to storage and deployment, as well as to the dismantlement of warheads and the storage and disposition of recovered fissile material.
|
From page 39... ...
START I and II address only strategic weapons; they contain no limits on the nonstrategic nuclear weapons beyond the ban on landbased missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers imposed by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Even after the implementation of their reciprocal unilateral pledges not to deploy certain types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and to dismantle some fraction of them, however, it is estimated that the United States will retain about 1,000 active and reserve nonstrategic warheads.
|
From page 40... ...
and South Korean conventional forces could defeat a North Korean attack, despite the destruction that such a war would entail.7 If the United States wishes to deter or respond to nuclear attacks on South Korea, Japan, or other Asian friends or allies, nonstrategic nuclear weapons would have no essential military advantages over strategic weapons, and the symbolic advantages historically attributed to nonstrategic weapons are outweighed by the political and security costs of the deployment of such warheads. The presence of these weapons has provided allied countries with a basis for participating in nuclear planning and activity, which they regard as important to their security.
|
From page 41... ...
missiles could destroy a large fraction of Russian nuclear forces and command-and-control systems with as little as 20 minutes warning of an attack, since only a small portion of the Russian submarine and mobile missiles are on patrol or positioned to survive a first strike. Especially troubling is that Russia, in protecting against the possibility of such a sudden attack, reportedly continues to rely on its capacity to launch ICBMs and pier-side submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
|
From page 42... ...
Ballistic Missile Defenses Somewhat paradoxically, the revolution in the offense-defense relationship wrought by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons discussed in Chapter 1 is likely to be a positive development because it negates the opportunity for national leaders to think of "winning" a nuclear war. If nuclear retaliation cannot be
|
From page 43... ...
The desire to avoid this situation was the rationale behind the 1972 AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which strictly limited the missile defenses allowed to the United States and the Soviet Union in order to prevent deployment of systems that would risk promoting arms races.
|
From page 44... ...
In addition, the United States has had considerable success in its efforts to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles and technology through the Missile Technology Control Regime, which now has most potential suppliers as members or adherents. Advocates of expanded ballistic missile defense programs point to the possibility of longer-range theater ballistic missiles in the hands of potentially hostile Third World nations.
|
From page 45... ...
government on the broader questions of strategic defense is still elusive, however. President Clinton vetoed legislation from the 104th Congress supporting immediate deployment of a nationwide defense against limited ballistic missile attack, but as this study was completed similar legislation was advancing in the 105th Congress.
|
From page 46... ...
. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, British and French nuclear forces are making a transition to deploying almost all of their nucleararmed ballistic missiles on nuclear submarines.
|
From page 47... ...
The treaty forbade transfer of nuclear weapons technology and materials from the nuclear weapons states to the nonnuclear weapons states and enjoined the nonnuclear weapons states from accepting them. In return, the nuclear weapons states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons to their nonnuclear weapons state allies and acknowledged the rights of
|
From page 48... ...
Of particular importance, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus joined START I and the NPT as nonnuclear weapons states, giving up forever their claims to the nuclear weapons of the old Soviet arsenal located on their territories. All of the nuclear warheads originally located in these newly independent states have now been returned to Russia.
|
From page 49... ...
It is also the result, in no small part, of far-sighted regional leaders, bilateral nonproliferation efforts by the nuclear powers, and an increasingly robust international nonproliferation regime based on a growing worldwide aversion to nuclear weapons. The international community has also demonstrated its strong commitment to nonproliferation in cases where signatories violate their NPT pledge not to develop nuclear weapons.
|
From page 50... ...
NWFZs constitute a useful complement to the NPT by further reducing the concern that potential adversaries in a zone might develop nuclear weapons, that nuclear weapons would become a symbol of national prestige in the region, or that nuclear weapons might be introduced into the region by outside nuclear weapons states. The earliest successful NWFZ agreement was the 1959 Antarctic Treaty; other agreements put sea beds and outer space off limits to nuclear weapons.
|
From page 51... ...
A verified ban on production would cap or constrain the programs of the undeclared nuclear weapons states, which as non-NPT parties are not otherwise restrained, without requiring them to acknowledge or roll back those arsenals immediately. A cutoff would strengthen the nonproliferation regime by subjecting fissile material production facilities in all states to international inspection, thus removing another discriminatory aspect of the current regime.
|
From page 52... ...
The eagerness of Central and Eastern European states to join NATO reflects, in part, their anxiety about living alone in a nuclear-armed neighborhood. More broadly, some nonnuclear weapons states made the question of what assurances the five nuclear powers were prepared to provide an issue in the NPT extension conference.
|
From page 53... ...
positive and negative security assurances in relation to nuclear attacks will include most of the countries of the world under its umbrella. In the past, both China and the Soviet Union offered negative security assurances in the form of no-first-use pledges; that is, these nations declared that they would never use nuclear weapons first.
|
From page 54... ...
Thus, chemical and biological weapons have limited value as weapons of war both because of their relatively unpredictable effects and because of the potential for defenses against them. If a terrorist group contemplated using chemical or biological agents again as a terror weapon, it is unlikely that nuclear weapons would be either a deterrent or a tool of choice in responding to such action.
|
From page 55... ...
interest in improved missile defenses. Missiles can have serious and destabilizing political and military effects and, as the Gulf War showed, powerful psychological impact.
|
From page 56... ...
negative security assurances.
|
From page 57... ...
government officials cite the international law doctrine of "belligerent reprisal," which under certain circumstances justifies a "proportionate" military response that violates a treaty if the enemy has violated another treaty. Since first use of biological or chemical weapons is forbidden by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, a first use of chemical weapons by a country such as Libya might, under this argument, justify a response that violates another legal obligation that is, the negative security assurances protocol of the African NWFZ.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.