The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy (1997) / Chapter Skim
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4 PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
4 PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Pages 85-98
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From page 85... ...
A1though the reductions recommended in Chapter 3 are logical steps on the path toward comprehensive nuclear disarmament, the final step of banning nuclear weapons should only be undertaken in circumstances such that, on balance, it would enhance the security of the United States and the rest of the world. The committee uses the word "prohibit" rather than "eliminate" or "abolish" because the world can never truly be free from the potential reappearance of nuclear weapons and their effects on international politics.
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From page 86... ...
It is consequently important to put an end to this state of affairs: the long-promised complete nuclear disarmament appears to be the most appropriate means of achieving that result.2 Moreover, the current lack of a serious commitment to comprehensive nuclear disarmament undermines the authority of the United States and other nuclear weapons states in combating proliferation and responding to violations of the NPT. It would be easier to marshal decisive international action against countries
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From page 87... ...
In the advisory opinion cited above, the ICJ unanimously agreed that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is strictly limited by generally accepted laws and humanitarian principles that restrict the use of force.3 Accordingly, any threat or use of nuclear weapons must be limited to, and necessary for, self defense; it must not be directed at civilians, and be capable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets; and it must not cause unnecessary suffering to combatants, or harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives. In the committee's view, the inherent destructiveness of nuclear weapons, combined with the unavoidable risk that even the most restricted use of such weapons would escalate to broader attacks, makes it extremely unlikely that any contemplated threat or use of nuclear weapons would meet these criteria.
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From page 88... ...
It is not unreasonable to believe that a continuation of the trends mentioned above, together with the development of more robust collective security arrangements, the maintenance of modern and capable conventional forces, and the deterrence provided by the capacity of major states to build nuclear weapons, could be capable of deterring large-scale war among the major industrial powers just as effectively as the current system and with fewer risks. After considering these risks and benefits, the committee has concluded that an essential long-term goal of U.S.
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From page 89... ...
If, on the other hand, the major powers enjoy good relations, if their decision making processes and military deployments are reasonably transparent, if they have confidence that other states will abide by international norms, and if they are willing and able to take collective action to counter aggression, the prospects for prohibiting nuclear weapons will be greatly improved. The committee does not wish to imply that comprehensive nuclear disarmament would require the creation of a global utopia, but neither would it deny that a substantial positive evolution in international politics will be required.
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From page 90... ...
A comprehensive nuclear disarmament treaty could, for example, require parties to enact laws obligating citizens to report any information about possible violation of the treaty to the international inspection agency and make it illegal for states to retaliate against whistle blowers. Such measures could be particularly valuable in uncovering activities that are difficult to detect, such as the concealment of nuclear weapons or weapons materials.
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From page 91... ...
It seems more likely that the potential for cheating or breakout would be regarded as cause for significant concern, in which case the disarmament regime would have to incorporate safeguards to deter and deal with these possibilities. Safeguards might include security guarantees that pledge states to aid victims of nuclear attack or to punish nations that attempt to build, brandish, or use nuclear weapons; international nuclear or conventional forces of sufficient strength to deter, prevent, or punish the use of nuclear weapons; or preparations to rebuild national nuclear forces should the verification system detect violations.
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From page 92... ...
This discussion illustrates the importance of ensuring the stability of a comprehensive nuclear disarmament regime. If, in a crisis or other foreseeable circumstances, a prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons created incentives to cheat or strong pressures to rearm, the risk of nuclear war could be higher under disarmament than with small national arsenals.
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From page 93... ...
One possible path for managing the transition to comprehensive nuclear disarmament would involve having an international agency assume joint or full custody of the arsenals remaining during the transition to prohibition. A1ternatively, nations might find it preferable to bypass the intermediate step involving an international agency and proceed directly to negotiations to prohibit nuclear weapons either globally in a single agreement or in steps involving successive expansions in the number and geographical scope of nuclear weapon free zones.
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From page 94... ...
This method is roughly analogous to the physical control maintained by the United States over nonstrategic weapons placed under the operational control of European NATO commanders. A third method would be to transfer ownership and operational control of all remaining nuclear weapons to an international agency, which would be under the authority and command of the United Nations Security Council.
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From page 95... ...
One route would be to convene an international conference of the five nuclear weapons states with the goal of agreeing to eliminate their nuclear arsenals according to a specified schedule. A convention among the nuclear weapons states, supplemented by the provisions of the NPT, would establish a worldwide legal framework prohibiting nuclear weapons.
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From page 96... ...
By negotiating additional NWFZs that include regions of potential conflict between nuclear-armed states and, ultimately, all nuclear-armed states, a global prohibition on the possession or use of nuclear weapons could be achieved in a piecemeal fashion. The committee cannot predict when, whether, or under what conditions the nuclear weapons states and undeclared states would be willing to accede to a regime that, under any of the proposals suggested above, would require the elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
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From page 97... ...
As difficult as this may seem today, the process of reducing national nuclear arsenals to a few hundred warheads would lay much of the necessary groundwork. For example, the stringent verification requirements of an agreement on very low levels of nuclear weapons and fissile materials might by then have led to some new or expanded international agency with vigorous powers of inspection.
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From page 98... ...
6. In this context, "weapons-usable fissile materials" are materials that could be used in a nuclear weapon without further enrichment or reprocessing.
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