Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force Volume 3: Information in Warfare (1997) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
5 INFORMATION WARFARE
5 INFORMATION WARFARE
Pages 76-93
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 76... ...
The tactics to minimize observables not only will include decisions to radiate or not, in the conventional sense, but also must include the entire information set in every dimension and through every medium, including the ether, space, air, undersea, and cyberspace. While minimizing its own information vulnerability, the Navy Department will need to defend its information infrastructure and information content against attack, using both passive and active means.
|
From page 77... ...
be accomplished with IW; and · Invest in specific technology applications, including those that can support countermeasures and defensive capabilities, offensive capabilities, and intelligence support activities, as detailed in this chapter. INFORMATION WARFARE IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT Because of the fundamental changes in the worldwide information environment described in this study, it is crucial that the warfighter have a clear vision of what he can and cannot do in the information dimension in terms of warfare activities.
|
From page 78... ...
Protection includes developing and applying technological and/or procedural fixes to vulnerabilities, creating and enforcing information policies and management standards, applying reasonable personnel security policies (such as background checks, two-person software upgrade control procedures, and restrictions on possible actions) , and protecting the physical environment of critical resources (through the use of gates, guards, locks, and emergency support facilities)
|
From page 79... ...
The key to a robust and resilient defense is the knowledgeable application and management of the defensive components: the warfighter must be in charge of this process, must feel responsible for the results, and must have the appropriate capabilities and personnel to support the defensive posture. Second, the warfighter must have the ability to attack and deny the enemy the advantage of those elements of the adversary's information content and infrastructure that are fair game.
|
From page 80... ...
Additional information of value to the attackers includes an understanding of the timing required for successful attacks, what actions would be required to prevent immediate reconstitution of the target, and the ability to predict effects with some degree of certainty. These are nontrivial requirements.
|
From page 81... ...
Assessment of defensive posture is critical to developing a further ability to manage information vulnerability, and it would conceptually provide the operator with the ability to minimize, obscure, or manipulate what his detected information vulnerability appears to be. A capability to work toward would be to have a workstation (virtual or otherwise it may be that the most useful way to interface with this data would be through a virtual reality interface)
|
From page 82... ...
Another primary capability that is critical to the warfighter, but that may be less important to other entities and thus not likely to receive an equitable amount of technology investment, is the capability to perform real-time defensive posture realignments, including triage of both information infrastructure and content as necessary (analogous to cutting off a finger in order to save an arm)
|
From page 83... ...
A subversive attack would be multidimensional an attack that combined attacks against the various elements of the information infrastructure, such as telecommunications providers, the power grid, the logistics information network, and the news media. A coordinated attack against these entities could conceivably cause widespread disruption of service, unstable support systems, public infrastructure breakdown (such as disruption of subway systems)
|
From page 84... ...
Potentially useful technological thrust areas include weapons for nonpersistent network interruption, which in theory would allow the United States the ability to deny an adversary the use of parts or all of a network without physically damaging it, and for a controllable period of time. Information Content Weapons Information content weapons are those designed to go after information itself at its source, while it is in transit, or while it is being processed or displayed.
|
From page 85... ...
To complicate matters, the functional entities represent shared interests that may in addition share physical infrastructure elements with other functional entities. This introduces the phenomenon of nonlinear cascading effects, whereby an attack on one functional entity may have an impact on other functional entities or an attack on a physical infrastructure element may affect multiple functional entities; the challenge of confining damage and affect is thus magnified, but so is the ability to target systems with predictable effects.
|
From page 86... ...
A complicating factor is that many of the physical entities that underlie the intricately interconnected information infrastructure support not a single function but many functions. An attack must be designed to take this interconnectedness into account, perhaps even exploiting this feature.
|
From page 87... ...
Quantifying the overall effectiveness of an IW attack is a complex task and will probably not result in unambiguous answers. For example, in a conventional weapons attack on a communications switching facility the results may be quantified in terms of degraded performance the number of circuits still available and the period of outage or the level of noise on the remaining circuits.
|
From page 88... ...
A model could represent an entire simple network a small number of networked computers or it could represent a single module in a more complex system one air defense battery in a country' s air defense network. The information input into the module could represent information input from a keyboard, data obtained from remote sensing devices (such as an early warning radar)
|
From page 89... ...
The intricacies associated with information warfare simply add one or more dimensions of complexity to this situation. GETTING THERE The Navy must be able to perform assigned missions in the year 2035 with appropriate technologies, procedures, and capabilities.
|
From page 90... ...
Using information operations in ways that are neither clearly offensive nor defensive in nature to support using other tools, technologies, and procedures or to achieve desired mission outcomes. Performing these operations is complicated by the following elements: · The borders of information technology will not stop at the ship's hull, but continue past the hull to locations that the warfighter will have neither control over nor possibly even knowledge of; · Cooperative engagement resources, such as the arsenal ship, must be included in the comprehensive offensive and defensive posture assessment; and · The increasing incorporation of information technology into every facet of operations can be expected to include wearable computers, personal protection measures (to include medical developments, such as "smart" skin applications)
|
From page 91... ...
As with any road map, it is important to know not only what the desired end point is, but also where you are starting from. Critical elements of the current posture that will affect any attempt to meet the Navy's goals in developing a competent information operations and warfare capability are discussed briefly below.
|
From page 92... ...
Regarding offensive capabilities, the lessons learned from various exercises indicate a serious disconnect between prioritized operations and available weapon systems. Regarding defensive capabilities, the practice to date has been one of installing patchwork information security fixes in what has been termed a "fire and forget" mode.
|
From page 93... ...
There are technology thrust areas that, if pursued, would provide the Department of the Navy with significant capabilities in information operations and information warfare. These technology thrust areas are based on the estimated evolutionary path of the global information environment in which the Navy Department will operate.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.