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5 Focusing Warfare Research and Improving M&S
Pages 62-69

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From page 62...
... The third reason, however, is one mentioned early in the report: that many people, particularly managers and software technologists, think of models as commodities and do not worry particularly about where the knowledge comes from to support the models.) The point here is not to criticize that view, because it has its place.
From page 63...
... The result would be an M&S better able to accommodate future research results as well, rather than 2As an example of this, there have been a number of interesting historical studies on when and how battles are won and lost, but they have seldom related easily to the simulation models on which DOD depends. Incorporating their insights, much less their data, has been difficult.
From page 64...
... M&S with data structures that do not relate well to experimental data or to changes of perspective.3 Modularity of Knowledge Another reason for emphasizing research rather than model building per se is that if one attempts to build a comprehensive model of complex systems, there is a good chance of failure: the computer model will eventually collapse under its own weight. By contrast, modular knowledge can endure.
From page 65...
... An overarching theme is the need to take a holistic approach rather than one based on either top-down or bottom-up theology. For each warfare area the panel recommends developing hierarchically integrated families of models with different characters and resolutions not to predict detailed behaviors, but rather to explore and understand military phenomena.
From page 66...
... Likely large differences among weapon enthusiasts, planners, and on-the-ground reality Short-notice planning and mission rehearsal M&S will be only mechanism for evaluating effectiveness in largescale battles Problems with smart mines, opposition, missiles, and WMD range of possible tactics for both oneself and the adversary, perhaps through some cycles of measure and countermeasure. Historians repeatedly remind us that the principal changes wrought by previous revolutions in military affairs (RMAs)
From page 67...
... If simulations are to be realistic, whether or not precise, it is essential that they reflect a vast range of soft factors that include, for example, random human errors, virtual attrition (as when pilots achieve poorer a~r-to-ground performance when Ilying in an intense a~r-defense environment, even if they take no attntion) , "fnctional" effects, and suppression of enemy effectiveness by information warfare or barrage bombing.
From page 68...
... Empirical work using DIS exercises is mentioned above, but much broader activities are possible. These include historical research, dispatching operations researchers to observe and report on operations and doctrinal experiments, structured interviewing of military expertsforeign as well as American and field tests.
From page 69...
... . As an example here, someone conducting research on command and control might need to see how his ideas could be modularized so as to be useful in a DOD-wide model repository constructed with the imagery of Figure 5.3 in mind.4 4Adapted from a MORS briefing on CMMS issues sponsored by the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (1996)


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