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Vaccine Supply and Innovation (1985) / Chapter Skim
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8 Vaccine Injury Compensation and Liability Remedies
Pages 136-160

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From page 136...
... At present, injured individuals or their families can seek compensation through the tort system, but the results are not certain and the process is protracted (Chapter 6~. In addition, the courts' unpredictable handling of liability for vaccine-related injuries has created apprehension among manufacturers that ultimately could threaten the vaccine supply in the United States.
From page 137...
... 6. A supplementary compensation system and a vaccine supply public insurance program could operate as tandem mechanisms.
From page 138...
... No-fault insurance would provide payments to those injured individuals covered by the insurance. The sixth option examines the effects of combining a vaccine supply public insurance program with a compensation system, and the seventh explores the impact of providing both forms of insurance.
From page 139...
... Suggested Benefits Establishes a more certain means of providing payments to injured parties than the tort system. May reduce the number of tort claims.
From page 140...
... Operational Features System would require development of a schedule of compensable events and payments. Claimants would waive tort rights (if any)
From page 141...
... Additional Comments Could be used in combination with other systems, e.g., with a vaccine supply insurance program. Experience with malpractice prescreening panels in various jurisdictions suggests that the terms of reference need to be established carefully.
From page 142...
... Suggested Disadvantages Establishment of such a system alone would not provide a more certain or equitable system of dealing with vaccine injury, because of continued reliance on the tort system to provide compensation. Time to Effects Time to establishment depends on enactment of federal legislation.
From page 143...
... Ultimate effects on the predictability of vaccine injury tort claims and the certainty of vaccine sunolv not clear without operational experience. Additional Comments Differences between insurance contract tenders and post-injury, out-of-court settlement offers are discussed in Appendix C
From page 144...
... TABLE 8.7 Vaccine Supply Public Insurance Program and Promotion of No-Fault Insurance for Vaccine-Related Injury Intent To protect manufacturers against excessive losses from vaccine injury claims; to establish an insurance option under which injured parties would receive an offer of rapid settlement of economic losses in exchange for a waiver of tort rights. Precedent See comments for each option, no precedent for such a joint venture.
From page 145...
... Theoretically, unavoidable injuries would not be compensated. Time to Effects Legislation likely to be delayed by need to establish that vaccine-related injury liability deserves unique treatment.
From page 146...
... Suggested Benefits Manufacturers would be better able to predict the extent of their potential liability for vaccine-related injury. Suggested Disadvantages Manufacturers still would be required to defend all claims.
From page 147...
... Requirements for Establishment Federal legislation. Operational Features Basically operates through the tort system, but changes the defendant.
From page 148...
... Public health needs will remain unmet if liability considerations deter commercial production of technically feasible vaccines. The Rationale for Providing Compensation for Vaccine-Related Injury Although in one sense the provision of appropriate compensation for vaccine-related injuries is part of the broader problem of providing compensation for all unintentional injuries, vaccine supply and administration are sufficiently different from other injury-causing behaviors to justify separate treatment.
From page 149...
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From page 151...
... Therefore, the evaluation of options to provide compensation for vaccine-related injuries should include an assessment of their potential effects on the vaccine industry and, through vaccine supply, on public health. Finally, the issue of compensation for vaccine-related injuries is especially unwieldy for the common law tort system.
From page 152...
... The common law tort system is not able to provide predictable, rapid, and equitable compensation for vaccine-related injuries because each claim requires an extended, costly, and complex adjudicative procedure that results in unpredictable outcomes (Chapter 6~. THE COMPENSATION MECHANISM The primary objective in designing a system to provide payments to individuals with vaccine-related injuries is to find an approach (or combination of actions)
From page 153...
... The possible elimination of the individual's tort remedy against manufacturers (as envisaged in a compensation system with restricted tort options) would in no way affect other legal and administrative controls over vaccine manufacturers or providers, e.g.' in cases of serious misconduct, such as the intentional falsification of data to obtain certification.
From page 154...
... Projections for the proposed National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act suggest that a large proportion of costs (90 percent) could arise from loss of future earnings.8 Hence, any estimates of future earning potential should be made carefully.
From page 155...
... They would be on the side of compensation and, if few in number, would be tolerable. The schedule of compensable events must be drawn carefully to ensure that such mistakes are few, that nuisance or fraudulent suits are discouraged, and that the social policy of promoting vaccine use while compensating its victims is not perverted by extraneous payments or administrative costs.
From page 156...
... Certain nonpolitical arguments provide support for an alternative approach to raising funds. A well-designed vaccine price surcharge plan could assign injury costs in an economical, predictable, and therefore manageable way.
From page 157...
... n Indeed, informed consent may be a meaningless concept in the context of a public health program with legal requirements for vaccination. Attempting such a determination would slow dispute resolution and increase administrative costs.
From page 158...
... Additional Issues A number of other issues should be resolved prior to the final design and implementation of a vaccine-related injury compensation system. The purpose of establishing such a compensation scheme would be to provide a more rapid, equitable mechanism for payment to injured parties, not to increase the amount received by some individuals.
From page 159...
... a supplementary (non-exclusive) compensation system · a compensation system with restricted tort options · mandatory claim review by a compensation board with tort option · a vaccine supply public insurance program · promotion of no-fault insurance for vaccine-related injury · a supplementary compensation system and a vaccine supply public insurance program · a vaccine supply public insurance program and promotion of no-fault insurance for vaccine-related injury · changes in the tort law relating to liability for vaccinerelated injury · federal assumption of liability for all vaccine-related injury · acceptance of vaccine price increases to cover liability costs The committee believes that the goal of advancing the control of infectious diseases with vaccines should be pursued in as just and fair a manner as possible.
From page 160...
... Orrin Hatch, February 7, 1984, on preliminary Congressional Budget Office cost estimates of S 2117, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act.


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