Antarctic Treaty System An Assessment: Proceedings of a Workshop Held at Beardmore South Field Camp, Antarctica, January 7-13, 1985 (1986) / Chapter Skim
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19. The Antarctic Treaty System as a Resource Management Mechanism - Nonliving Resources
19. The Antarctic Treaty System as a Resource Management Mechanism - Nonliving Resources
Pages 269-284
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From page 269... ...
In its developed form, to be found, notably but not exclusively, in unresearched press articles, the mythology is that Antarctica is a vast reservoir of wealth, a cornucopia of riches for which a race is on, regardless of the risks to a unique environment. The discussions initiated by the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties about a regime for antarctic minerals are designed to allow that race to be won.
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From page 270... ...
It was a concern to preserve the stabilizing regime of the Antarctic Treaty (coupled with a worry about the impact on the environment if mining ever occurred on the continent) that led New Zealand, as far back as 1970 at the consultative meeting held in that year, to raise the question of antarctic minerals and to urge its treaty partners to consider the need for a comprehensive regime governing them.
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From page 271... ...
But it could also bring back to center stage the conflicting positions about sovereignty that the treaty had put to one side. This is so because, in the absence of agreed rules, states that claim sovereignty and states that neither make claims to sovereignty nor recognize the claims of others would give totally conflicting answers to a whole series of obvious questions arising if a minerals deposit of economic significance were ever found in Antarctica: "Who has title to the deposit?
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From page 272... ...
Another expert, Franze Tessensohn, writing a year later, said, after surveying the geophysical work that has been undertaken with respect to offshore areas frequently regarded as likely to be of economic interest before onshore areas, said: waif one tries to draw a conclusion based on all these investigations it can be stated that several interesting sedimentary basins exist on the antarctic shelves, but that we do not know much about their extent, about [the] nature and age of the sedimentary infill, about the thermal history they have undergone, and about possible source and reservoir rocks.
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From page 273... ...
The same recommendation made more specific an idea emerging from the previous consultative meeting, namely, that the nationals of consultative parties and other states should be urged to refrain from all exploration and exploitation of antarctic mineral resources "while making progress towards the timely adoption of an agreed regime concerning antarctic mineral resource activities. They will thus endeavor to ensure that, pending the timely adoption of agreed solutions pertaining to exploration and exploitation of mineral resources, no activity shall be conducted to explore or exploit such resources.
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From page 274... ...
274 Buenos Aires in 1981, that to postpone the negotiations until such time as a significant mineral deposit was found in Antarctica and there was a serious economic interest in exploiting it would very greatly complicate, if not make entirely unmanageable, the task of producing agreed answers to the complex issues raised. Since Recommendation XI-1 constitutes the basis for the negotiations now under way, it is worth noting the main areas of agreement that it recorded: The minerals regime should be negotiated by the consultative parties, and they should continue to play an active and responsible role in dealing with the question; The Antarctic Treaty must be maintained in its entirety; · The protection of the unique antarctic environment and of its dependent ecosystems should be a basic consideration; · The consultative parties, in dealing with the question of mineral resources in Antarctica, should not prejudice the interests of all humankind in Antarctica; The delicate balance contained in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty should not be affected by the regime, and the principles embodied in that article should be safeguarded; · The regime should include means for assessing the possible impact of mineral resource activities on the antarctic environment, determining whether such activities will be acceptable, and, if they are, regulating them; · The area of the regime should encompass the continent of Antarctica and its adjacent offshore areas but without encroachment on the deep seabed · The regime should cover all mineral resource activities at every stage; · The regime should be open in the sense that it should include provisions for adherence by states other than the consultative parties on the understanding that adhering states would be bound by the basic provisions of the Antarctic Treaty; · The regime should include provision for cooperative arrangements with other relevant international organizations; · The regime should protect the special responsibilities of the consultative parties with
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From page 275... ...
The regime will be expressed in the form of a legally binding international agreement, which, since its principal purpose is to preserve and strengthen the Antarctic Treaty, will, by one means or another, be closely linked with that treaty. Following the precedent of the Antarctic Treaty itself and also that of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
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From page 276... ...
And, by way of departure from the CCAMLR precedent, there will be a series of smaller so-called "regulatory committees, n with responsibility for certain aspects of the regulation of mining that may take place in an area identified by the commission. Representation on regulatory committees will include, inter alla, the state or states, if any, claiming sovereignty in the identified area and the state wishing to undertake mineral resource activities or to sponsor such activities by its nationals.
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From page 277... ...
At the meeting in Bonn in July 1983 the consultative parties accepted as a starting point for further negotiations a text that attempted to break this deadlock by switching attention from the question of location of the necessary regulatory powers and focusing, instead, on the institutions of the regime, their composition, and the method by which they would take decisions. The basic assumption underlying this approach was that it was not necessary and almost certainly not possible either to attempt to spell out in detail all the elements of an accommodation on the sovereignty question in the text of the agreement to be adopted or, in particular, to try, in the text itself, to reconcile strongly conflicting views
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From page 278... ...
Prospecting, which will not confer title on the prospector, will not require prior authorization. It will, however, be subject to environmental controls applicable to all stages of mineral resource activity.
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From page 279... ...
It is of some importance to note that if the regime is structured in this way with respect to exploration and development, it will stand in sharp contrast to the marine living resources regime established by the CCAMLR. The basic proposition underlying the CCAMLR -- that activity is permitted until restrained -- will be reversed: the only mineral resource activities that would confer title on the operator and might confer economic benefit will be prohibited unless specifically authorized.
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From page 280... ...
Further consideration will be given, in the ongoing negotiations, to alternative techniques for ensuring that environmental considerations and advice are given proper weight and are not overridden by an interest in promoting and deriving benefit from mineral resource activities. Finally, there will be provision for the suspension, modification, or cancellation of authorized exploration and development if a determination is made that there has been a failure to comply with the rules applicable to it or that new and unforeseen risks to the environment have arisen.
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From page 281... ...
The regime is likely, in fact, to contain an all-embracing provision requiring the commission to cooperate with all interested international organizations and, more specifically, to develop a cooperative working relationship with any international organization having competence in mineral resources in areas adjacent to those covered by the regime. Then, of course, there is the basic point that the regime under consideration is not a closed system.
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From page 282... ...
I should like to elaborate on my prepared remarks about the origin of the antarctic minerals regime negotiations by drawing a hypothetical analogy to the discovery of a mountain of gold in the area of Antarctica claimed by New Zealand. Once the gold were discovered there would be considerable pressure on the New Zealand government to develop rules to regulate its exploitation and to treat the deposit as any other deposit of gold located in New Zealand.
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From page 283... ...
Countries close to Antarctica whose ecosystems might be affected by antarctic minerals development and those farther away, whose ecosystems are unlikely to be directly affected by such activities. Countries with access to the requisite technology Finally, the primary matters yet to be settled in the negotiations are the exact methods and procedures by which decisions will be taken e Inspection will be an important element in the minerals regime.
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From page 284... ...
Potential Mineral Resource Availability and Possible Environment Problems in Antarctica.
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