Antarctic Treaty System An Assessment: Proceedings of a Workshop Held at Beardmore South Field Camp, Antarctica, January 7-13, 1985 (1986) / Chapter Skim
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20. Panel Discussion on Nonliving Resources
20. Panel Discussion on Nonliving Resources
Pages 285-302
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From page 285... ...
He questioned the lack of serious consideration given to the nondevelopment option and believed that the reason for this is that antarctic policy is fashioned primarily by civil servants in the foreign affairs ministries of states parties to the Antarctic Treaty who are not directly answerable to the public. mis means that no express public mandate, which might challenge conventional wisdom, is sought or derived from discussions within and between political parties.
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From page 286... ...
n He questioned the presumption of the Antarctic Treaty states in appointing themselves to determine what the "interests of mankind" are. Wilson doubted whether the primary way Beeby had described in which the minerals regime would take account of the interests of the international community at large was indeed sufficient: maintaining good relations with other international organizations having competence south of 60°S latitude.
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From page 287... ...
Wilson also criticized the decision making institutions of the minerals regime as being biased in favor of development, since only those states actually engaged in minerals development activities, during such time as they are engaged in them, can join the consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty as decision making members in the institutions of the regime; states in favor of environmental protection would not have the same sort of say at the decision making level as those interested in exploiting mineral resources in Antarctica. Clearly the decision making institutions promote minerals activities by giving decision making power to the exploiters.
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From page 288... ...
REMARKS BY ADRIAAN BOS Bos commented that Beeby's presentation dealt mainly with the politics within the ATS. However, the minerals regime negotiations have recently attracted the attention of the wider international community, and for that reason the establishment of the minerals regime has become a global political concern, raising issues new to the ATS framework.
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From page 289... ...
and by the panelists. Many of these addressed the role of states and organizations currently not involved in the antarctic minerals regime negotiations: · Their involvement in policy formulation at the negotiation stage; · Their involvement in the implementation of the minerals regime once completed, and specifically in its decision making processes; and Their involvement in potential minerals development activities and benefits therefrom.
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From page 290... ...
Others asked whether a basis for management other than the ATS would likely represent more effectively and equitably "the interests of all mankindn; they stated that "right" derived, among other things, from the fact that the ATS worked; and that the rights and obligations generated by the Antarctic Treaty were exclusive only as between states parties and neither granted rights to nor obligated third parties without their consent. CO+ON HERITAGE OF MANKIND Beeby's comments on the applicability of the common heritage of mankind concept to Antarctica provoked opposing views from those who believed that Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty suspends the applicability of the claims as long as it is in effect; they did not accept, as debated earlier in the workshop (Section II)
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From page 291... ...
Others shared Beeby's view that the environmental provisions developed through a global conference, such as those governing deep seabed mining in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, would be far worse than those contemplated in the antarctic mineral regime. PARTICIPATION IN THE MINERALS REGIME NEGOTIATIONS Beeby's point that the motivation for the minerals regime talks is essentially political rather than economic in nature led one participant to conclude that this is all the more reason to involve more states than the consultative parties in these talks Moreover, discussions in the United Nations would not necessarily mean that the common heritage concept would be applied; the U.N.
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From page 292... ...
PARTICIPATION IN THE ADOPTION OF THE MINERALS REGIME Returning to the question of who has the right to determine the future of Antarctica, one participant questioned whether, if not in the negotiations, then at the stage when the final product of the minerals negotiations would be formalized, a wider circle might then be involved. He suggested, however, that the final diplomatic conference would also be dominated by those who had negotiated the agreement and that the invitations and rules of procedures would be controlled by them.
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From page 293... ...
Various options for breathing life into the concept of humankind's interest in Antarctica have been considered in the minerals regime negotiations and these will receive further attention in forthcoming meetings. These options include joint ventures, particularly if they encourage participants from developing counties, and revenue sharing, although lack of knowledge about the economics of antarctic minerals development would make it difficult to develop the kind of precise formula for revenue sharing found in Article 82 of the Law of the Sea Convention.
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From page 294... ...
URGENCY AND TIMING OF MINERALS ACTIVITIES Debate over the reasons for urgency in negotiating the minerals regime revealed additional views to that of the preventive approach ("plugging a gap,n Filling a vacuum," Putting out a fire") as a means to avoid renewed conflicts over territorial sovereignty should prospects for minerals development improve.
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From page 295... ...
For these reasons, one should not assume that antarctic minerals exploitation will be uneconomic for many years to come. In fact, the minerals regime negotiations should presume that antarctic minerals development will be economic and to establish a regime to effectively govern commercial operations.
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From page 296... ...
THE REGIME Area of Application That the area of application of the International Seabed Authority contemplated in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention might overlap with that of the antarctic minerals regime, as noted in Section II, brought the response that there is a reason for the vague language in the minerals regime with respect to the area of application of the regime; nevertheless, in the end, the antarctic minerals regime will not extend beyond the continental shelf as defined by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Moreover, the minerals regime will have to coordinate with the International Seabed Authority in the future with respect to environmental protection south of 60°S latitude.
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From page 297... ...
What is needed is to construct a framework that would identify the decisions that will be necessary to determine the acceptability of possible mineral resource activities and the basic criteria against which such decisions will be made and to provide for the establishment of the institutions necessary to make these decisions and oversee any activities that might be permitted. More specifically, such a framework regime would · Prohibit mineral resource exploration and development unless specifically authorized through the institutions of the regime; · Provide as general criteria that no mineral resource activity take place unless (1)
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From page 298... ...
. The smaller regulatory committees described by Beeby's paper would not be composed solely of the state or states claiming sovereignty in an identified resource province of Antarctica and the state wishing to undertake or sponsor minerals activities in that area; there would be
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From page 299... ...
, as was the 1984 report of the SCAR Working Group on Logistics, which states with respect to the proposed minerals regime: The group discussed the possible impact on scientific support services of those activities likely to be involved in any commercial activities related to exploration for or exploitation of mineral resources. It was agreed that there is a need to ensure that within the documentation of a minerals regime there should be included a statement that all planned commercial activities in Antarctica should give special attention to all aspects of safety and have appropriate search and rescue resources adequate to meet any emergency.
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From page 300... ...
In the context of the antarctic minerals regime, they have supported freedom of scientific investigation and the free exchange of results from Antarctica, the maintenance of the demilitarized status of Antarctica, and the importance of protecting wilderness values and wildlife there. Members of these organizations feared that the threat of minerals activities in Antarctica could jeopardize these values.
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From page 301... ...
He also stressed that current Antarctic Treaty practices should be improved with respect to seismic data exchange; that is, that the seismic tapes, not just summaries of work done, should be made freely available. He noted that the important element is not the data tapes themselves but the interpretation of the raw data.
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From page 302... ...
One would also need to carry out an environmental impact assessment and collect the baseline data required to complete it, because this would not have been done in Antarctica, and it would be necessary to make provision for monitoring during and after the operation as well as for remedial measures required or contemplated as a result of the operation. Reporting requirements were also seen as an important part of the future regime, and several speakers expressed interest in further discussion of inspection under the minerals regime.
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