Antarctic Treaty System An Assessment: Proceedings of a Workshop Held at Beardmore South Field Camp, Antarctica, January 7-13, 1985 (1986) / Chapter Skim
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6. The Antarctic Treaty as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism
6. The Antarctic Treaty as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism
Pages 65-76
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From page 65... ...
ThuS -- to give just three examples -- in the 1960s two states found themselves engaged in armed hostilities over an area subsequently described by an arbitral tribunal as a "unique geographical phenomenon," bearing "similar iEv hm a d—~~ i n ohm Alar Mar ~ -em ~~ ~ =~=V11 Alla e e e to a lake in the wet season"; the tribunal noted that terms most frequently used to sum up the area were "swamp, marsh, morass, salt marsh, salt water waste, mud and sand, marsh of 65
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From page 66... ...
There was what has been described as "a massive dispute about sovereignty in Antarctica. n6 Of the twelve states that eventually sat down to negotiate the Antarctic Treaty, seven7 had for many years asserted sovereignty over areas~of Antarctica, although the areas over which threes of them did so largely overlapped one another; two other states,9 while not having made claims to territorial sovereignty, considered themselves as having a basis for doing so, while at the same time not acknowledging the claims made by the seven states previously mentioned; and finally, the remaining three states neither claimed sovereignty nor recognized such claims or
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From page 67... ...
To their credit, the negotiating states got their priorities right: they were determined to secure the benefits of demilitarization, denuclearization, and scientific cooperation for which the treaty was to provide, and in Article IV they established a legal framework within which their respective positions regarding sovereignty could be adequately protected. It is worth looking a little more closely at that article, to see more clearly what it says and also what it does not say.
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From page 68... ...
This too is a critical provision, since, just as any workable antarctic regime must take into account the fact that certain states assert territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, so too it must take into account the fact that certain other states do not recognize those assertions. While the first paragraph of Article IV looks to the consequences that might flow from the Antarctic Treaty itself, the second is concerned with the consequences of future conduct.
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From page 69... ...
and, by virtue of its inherent link with adjacent coastal sovereignty, is perhaps to be regarded as "in Antarctica." Despite a few areas of uncertainty in the scope and interpretation of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, it is still a remarkably comprehensive provision, covering a uniquely complicated situation. What is more, it works in practice.
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From page 70... ...
Treaty.814 Doubtless, for their part, the Chilean government would see the situation in similar terms. It does not overstate the case to say that Article IV is the cornerstone of the Antarctic Treaty and thus of the whole system that has grown up around it.l5 The effectiveness of that article has, for something like a quarter of a century, kept Antarctica free of the conflicts to which its complex territorial situation would have been most likely to lead and generally has removed it from the usual range of international political tensions.
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From page 71... ...
If, accordingly, even within the framework of Article IV, conflicts over sovereignty are still possible, what has become of that article's effectiveness as a means of resolving conflicts over territorial sovereignty? Once again, the success in practice of Article IV must not be allowed to obscure its essential limitations: while, in what would otherwise be a potentially serious situation, it takes away the need for the kinds of responses in protection of a state's interests that lead to conflict, the possibility of conflict remains.
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From page 72... ...
Article IV itself will not determine the outcome. Its strength has lain not in solving the underlying differences, nor in precluding their resurrection, but rather in offering an unparalleled opportunity for states, despite fundamental differences as regards so politically sensitive a matter as territorial sovereignty, to cooperate and to coexist in Antarctica.
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From page 73... ...
Article IV is as follows: 8.
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From page 74... ...
might suggest that the geographical scope of paragraph 2 of Article IV is similarly limited. A consequence of this uncertainty has been that, whereas the existence of Article IV has effectively put a stop to the exchanges of diplomatic protest notes in respect of things being done by contracting parties in Antarctica, it has not completely put a stop to the sort of "paper war" that takes place, for example, within the framework of international organizations in which statements and counterstatements are made outside the Antarctic Treaty area [see, e.g., with respect to an exchange in relation to the universal Postal Union in 1979, British Year Book Int.
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From page 75... ...
It may also be noted that Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty served as an obvious model for a provision in the United Kingdom/Argentina exchange of notes of August 5, 1971 [United Kingdom Treaty Series No.
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