Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

4 Force Sustainment
Pages 34-51

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 34...
... The strategy is to use accurate, timely information and rapid transportation to create for the military the kind of efficient, effective logistics systems that leading commercial firms have developed under the labels of "supply chain management" and "just-in-time" logistics. The Marine Corps, in particular, under its Precision Logistics program, is streamlining logistics management and business practices, gaining visibility and control of assets, and modernizing computer systems -- all desirable actions to improve logistics irrespective of future operating concept.
From page 35...
... For some units, however, the capability is substantial: for example, in an artillery battalion it includes forklifts and trucks for hauling ammunition; in a tank battalion it includes mobile assault bridging and several fuel tankers. The combat service support detachment (CSSD)
From page 36...
... In addition to being the parent of the elements composing the combat service support detachments, the FSSG is the base for most in-theater logistics activity. When the distances from ports to combat units are long (e.g., over 50 miles)
From page 37...
... The landing force in Figure 4.2 is composed primarily of the prepositioned, ground-combat units of an MEF (FWD) , with some minimal command and combat service support.
From page 38...
... Logistics requirements of forces ashore would be cut dramatically if the Marine Corps eliminated both, or, in the case of artillery, determined that precision guided rounds and new naval guns and missiles could substitute for artillery enough to reduce conventional artillery ammunition requirements substantially. RECOMMENDATION: The Marine Corps should assess the roles of main battle tanks and artillery in future force structure, giving particular attention to the impact of precision guided munitions and naval guns and missiles on artillery ammunition requirements.
From page 39...
... • Direct unit delivery. Direct air delivery from the ships in the sea base to combat units ashore significantly reduces the need for disembarking considerable numbers of combat service support personnel and equipment.
From page 40...
... Combat units typically can sustain themselves for a few days without support from a combat service support detachment. Giving a combat unit the capability to sustain itself longer, by either enlarging its organic logistics capabilities or by assigning combat service support elements in a direct support role, could eliminate the need for a separate combat service support detachment.
From page 41...
... In all cases, the need will be to minimize the vulnerability of the detachments by keeping them small, dispersed, well camouflaged, and secure from enemy attack, but, at the same time, providing sufficient hedge against the risks created by relying on an at-sea logistics base many miles away. An example of possible uses of such mobile combat service support detachments is depicted in Figure 4.3.
From page 42...
... RECOMMENDATION: The Marine Corps should invest in modeling and simulating OMFTS logistics operations to assess logistics needs, capabilities, and alternative support concepts. PROVIDING SUPPORT OVER EXTENDED DISTANCES If battles of the future are fought as the conceptual designers of OMFTS envision, highly mobile combat units will be widely dispersed, possibly well inland, focusing only on key objectives with high military value; they will not be clearing and securing the areas through which or over which they move en route to their objectives.
From page 43...
... The issues are whether those two aircraft can meet the needs of the types and sizes of forces envisioned over the distances envisioned and, if not, what alternatives the Marine Corps should explore. The CNA study, in an analytic excursion, sought to gauge the outer limits of the V-22 and CH-53E in supporting the ground-combat element of today's pre 1See Appendix D for derivation of payload-distance and productivity relationships.
From page 44...
... Reducing the ground-combat element's fuel and ammunition requirements would be one approach to bringing air transport needs and capabilities into better balance. Long-term research and development should be focused on that goal.
From page 45...
... The issue here, however, is the extent to which naval expeditionary warfare doctrine and capabilities should depend on joint capabilities. Furthermore, if support of large forces well inland requires use of intratheater airlift, then an airfield or suitable terrain for rapid creation of a suitable airstrip must be an early planning objective in operational planning, and lack of such an airfield or suitable terrain will constrain the type of operations that can be supported.
From page 46...
... Not only will logistics be an integral part of maneuver operations, but the support concept for a task force, including command and control, will also need to be fully integrated with aviation support planning and air mission tasking. RECOMMENDATION: The Marine Corps should examine the capabilities and limitations of various options for delivering by means of air transport the sustaining support required by large ground forces over various operating distances from the sea base.
From page 47...
... This is a matter the Navy and Marine Corps should think through carefully, for using civilians in this manner would have cost, legal, and labor union implications. Nonetheless, civilians may be able to do on ships many of the logistics functions normally done by rear-area military personnel.
From page 48...
... Moreover, if the threat ashore warrants, V-22 and CH-53 logistics flights may have to be accompanied by suitably armed escorts, further complicating the overall integration effort. The Marine Corps has given little attention to the information systems needed to control and integrate combat service support activities in the sea-based OMFTS environment.
From page 49...
... • Container shuttle. If a shuttle ship, designed to handle and transport containers, had a well or other feature for interfacing with landing craft, containers could be loaded on the shuttle ship at an intermediate staging base, shuttled 4An Advanced Technology Demonstration project entitled Advanced Shipboard Crane Motion Control System is planned for Fiscal Year 2000 to demonstrate the feasibility of combining advanced control system technologies with existing shipboard cranes to reduce or eliminate cargo pendulation during lift-on/ lift-off operations.
From page 50...
... TOTAL LOGISTICS CONCEPT In summary, some of the important issues that must be addressed in redesigning the logistics system to sustain forces ashore are reducing prepositioning, deployment, and resupply requirements through redesign of the forces ashore; shifting the support concept to two primary nodes (unit and sea base) ; shifting the emphasis from truck transport to air transport; building the information capabilities to effectively integrate sustainment operations; resupplying the sea base; 5Naidu, Anil, Underway Replenishment, Port Hueneme Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, "Seabased Combat Logistics Concept," briefing to the committee, March 12, 1998.
From page 51...
... Both the Navy and the Marine Corps must participate in creating this support concept, and it should span the full set of combat service support functions, reaching from the Marine at the outer edge of the battlespace back to the CONUS sustaining base. RECOMMENDATION: The Navy and Marine Corps should create an end-to-end OMFTS logistics concept that supports the concept of operations at each stage in the iterative process of defining future forces and their capabilities.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.