Realizing the Potential of C4I Fundamental Challenges (1999) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix B Summary of Relevant Reports and Documents
Appendix B Summary of Relevant Reports and Documents
Pages 250-271
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From page 250... ...
improve the "processes (architectures, requirements, resource allocation, and acquisition) that impact C4ISR capabilities needed by the warfighters and decision makers." C4ISR Vision: The Integration Task Force developed a C4ISR vision for the 21st century, based on concepts identified in Joint Vision 2010 and C4I for the Warrior: "Warriors, and those who support them, generate, use, iC4ISR Integration Task Force.
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From page 251... ...
APPENDIX B 251 and share the knowledge necessary to survive and succeed on any mission." C4ISR Guiding Principles: In order to achieve this vision, C4ISR capabilities generally need to be effective, affordable, and adaptable. In addition, the C4ISR capabilities and processes should be inherently joined and coalition-capable; interoperable; tightly coupled to requirements; secure and available to authorized users; robust and survivable; doctrinally agile; widely available and timely; able to share knowledge that can be tailored to the need; cognizant of the reality of chaos and able to deal with uncertainty; self-aware and self-healing; able to share language; able to keep pace with evolving technology; mobile and continuous; adaptable and adaptive; conformable to standards; easy to use, effective, and fast; innovative; and based on learning, collaboration, and empowerment.
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From page 252... ...
These recommendations are intended to work together to strengthen C4ISR roles and improve the efficacy of C4ISR processes and capabilities. B.1.2 1996 Report of the Advanced Battlespace Information System Task Force The Advanced Battlespace Information System Task Force was created by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering and the Joint Staff
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, with the C4I portion of the system of systems as the focal point. The task force released its report in May 1996.2 Background: The Advanced Battlespace Information System is a set of systems "that forms an underlying grid of flexible, shared, and assured information services and provides advanced capabilities in support of new command and control and force employment concepts." The vision for the Advanced Battlespace Information System is that it will provide a "knowledge-based C4I system environment that facilitates revolutionary operational capability by enabling warfighters to rapidly acquire and use all available information." Advanced Battlespace Information System Capability Framework: The task force identified an Advanced Battlespace Information System capability framework composed of three tiers effective force employment, Battlespace awareness, and a common information grid arranged and supported from the bottom up with the information grid providing the infrastructure and services.
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capabilities requires incremental insertion, adaptation, and assimilation of new operational concepts and technologies" that are guided "by a single long-term vision and a broad community of participants." The implementation process is "evolutionary and iterative." Initial Steps Toward the Vision: The task force found that the Advanced Battlespace Information System has "produced substantive near-term benefits." The Advanced Battlespace Information System has "served as a catalyst that stimulated the examination of architectural elements that can be incorporated into a Joint Staff operational architecture to support Joint Vision 2010," and results have been incorporated into defense-wide science and technology planning. B.1.3 1998 Toint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan The Joint Chief of Staffs, in collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service science and technology executives, identified 10 high-priority, joint warfighting capability objectives, which are
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B.1.4 DOD Inspector General: Implementation of the DOD Joint Technical Architecture In November 1997, DOD's Inspector General issued an audit report titled Implementation of the DOD Joint Technical Architectures The audit found that DOD does not have "an integrated or coordinated approach to implementing the Joint Technical Architecture." Background: The Joint Technical Architecture (ITA) , which was issued in 1996, "is a minimum set of rules governing the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of parts to ensure that a conformant system satisfies a specified set of requirements." In short, the Joint Technical Architecture provides minimum standards (which are performance based and primarily commercial)
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The Joint Technical Architecture was jointly implemented by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I in August 1996. Component Implementation Plans: Only half of the DOD components responded to the implementation guidance and, overall, the responses received by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I were "incomplete and inaccurate." In fact, when viewed as a whole, the responses "did not represent a uniform structure and a coordinated implementation strate~v .
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Recommendations: The Inspector General provided four recommendations to the co-chairs of the DOD Architecture Coordination Council (i.e., the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, and the Director of the Joint Staff C4 Systems Directorate) : · Develop a methodology for cross-service and cross-functional coordination of DOD component Joint Technical Architecture implementation plans.
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The study team reviewed communications requirements data collected from past studies and developed a C4ISR Mission Assessment communications requirements information flow model. Observations derived from the model clearly indicated that information management is critically needed to contain the growth of communications requirements.
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The study also considered alternatives to address the shortfalls identified in communications capabilities. Recommendations: The "C4ISR Mission Assessment" recommended the following changes to the current communications portfolio to address the deficiencies identified in the areas of tactical radios, joint tactical wide area networks, joint network and services management, military satellite and fiber communications, commercial leases, and unmanned aerial vehicles communications relays: · "Accelerate the procurement of the next generation wide-band military satellite system to address the shortfall in available capacity for theater reachback and intra-theater long haul communications." · "Accelerate and coordinate service programs for upgrades to the communications switching and bunking systems supporting the deployed tactical terrestrial [WAN]
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on all aspects of C4ISR as well as preparing separate reports of its judgments on C4ISR issues. The task force released its report in February 1997.5 Background: After meeting with the Integration Task Force to hear about its process, organization, and results to date, the Defense Science Board task force formulated a set of recommendations to be considered by the Integration Task Force and submitted two letter reports.
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Joint Process: The Defense Science Board task force envisioned a "more formal joint process on the front end of the programming and budgeting cycle that gives joint force commanders stronger influence on decisions regarding what increased (or decreased) capabilities are needed for them to carry out their assigned missions." The task force, therefore, recommended customer-based, output-oriented planning and programming in which the joint operational customer has a formal role in "formulating joint operational concepts and .
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Atlantic Command should share the lead for developing joint operational doctrine and architectures, and the "key implementing principle must be that the CINC's part of the front end process become an essential prerequisite to the follow-on planning and budgeting." Joint Systems Engineering Organization: As mentioned above, the task force found that there is a "need for a 'military engineering organization to support CICS and the CINCs in their role in joint C4ISR."' It also identified eight functions for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs in order to carry out their responsibilities for the design of the joint operational architecture. The task force further defined the organization of and resources for a military systems engineering capability for C4ISR integration.
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First, the inherently joint aspects of C4ISR are critical to the overall utility of C4ISR .... The second key characteristic is the pace of technological change in the field of information systems that form the basis for much of C4ISR," which is "totally incompatible with normal DOD procurement practices." As such, DOD needed "to push harder on acquisition reform." B.2.2 Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield In February 1997, the Defense Science Board task force on Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield (May-Tune 1996)
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/surveillance in C2 systems with timely feedback"; the task force found "that a failure to coordinate and integrate the use of superb ISR assets in direct support of the warfighter is a remaining barrier to achieving and exploiting information dominance") , human intelligence information management, countermine/demining, Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe, airborne video surveillance, tactical signal intelligence, commercial equipment, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, commercial satellite imagery, information warfare vulnerability, and total asset visibility.
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These forces would be distributed and disaggregated, empowered by unprecedented situational understanding (which is a higher level of knowledge than situational awareness) , dependent on remote fires that are effective against a variety of targets, connected by a robust information infrastructure, and supported by precision logistics.
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Enabling Elements of Concept: The new expeditionary force concept depends on the synergies and the interdependency between the following functions/capabilities: remote fires; battle management, command and control; information infrastructure; situation understanding; protection and survivability of ground forces; and training. In discussing the importance of battle management, command and control, the task force breaks down C4ISR into two interdependent categories the human function of command and the technical function of the C3ISR activities and emphasizes the "need to maintain human relationships on [the]
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In addition, the task force believed that the concepts identified can be "refined, tested, modified, shaped, and evolved into field capabilities over the next 10-20 years." Finally, four complementary concept enablers were identified: fielding the robust information infrastructure; turning situational awareness into situational understanding by managing sensors and information in conceptual contexts; making remote fires work; and operating in a disperse posture. B.3 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE STUDIES B.3.1 joint Military Operations: DOD's Renewed Emphasis on Interoperability Is Important But Not Adequate In 1994, GAO issued a report on DOD's C4I system and operational interoperability as a follow-up to a 1987 report that identified problems in this area as related to C3 systems.8 At the time this report was released, the General Accounting Office determined that DOD's success in achieving interoperability during joint operations would be "highly dependent on the availability of a comprehensive, integrated, and useful C4I architecture." Background: The General Accounting Office found that problems associated with interoperability were persistent, as identified by several reports issued by DOD and the Joint Staff.
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Atlantic Command assume a new mission as a joint headquarters for U.S.-based forces, based on a recommendation from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The General Accounting Office concluded that the Command would be "ideally suited for additional responsibilities associated with C4I interoperability.
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are generally not complying with the C4I certification requirement.9 Background: In 1992, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) established a certification process to ensure interoperability of C4I systems during joint operations as a result of interoperability problems experienced during the Persian Gulf War.
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· The Test Panel does not have a formal process for informing DOD stakeholders about expired waivers. i°The Defense Information Systems Agency's Defense Integration Support Tool database of C4I systems listed about 1000 systems that may exchange information with other systems, and there are approximately 1176 unclassified intelligence systems as well.
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· Finally, a system to monitor waivers should be established by the Chairman of the Toint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the report provided an appendix that briefly reviews the DOD initiatives currently under way that address aspects of interoperability: the C4I for the warrior concept; the C4ISR Architecture Framework; the Defense Information Infrastructure strategy; and the Levels of Information Systems Interoperability initiative.
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