Realizing the Potential of C4I Fundamental Challenges (1999) / Chapter Skim
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Pages 27-63
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From page 27... ...
Military responsibilities span a wide range, from peacetime engagement to shape the international environment, maintain alliances, and ensure access; to stability and support operations including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping; to a capability for prosecution of conflict from small-scale contingencies to major theater war. Primarily a deterrent force during the Cold War, today the U.S.
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From page 28... ...
(Box 1.2 describes some major C4I systems; Box 1.3 describes elements of the defense information infrastructure.) One important capability that C4I systems provide commanders is situational awareness information about the location and status of enemy and friendly forces.
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and allied forces, the real-world impact of C4I technology in enhancing the effectiveness and security of the coalition forces was amply demonstrated. The C4I capabilities on which allied forces depended were highly tenuous and relied on inadequate methods for construction and distribution of operational plans and execution orders (e.g., the air tasking order had to be delivered manually to ships at sea)
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From page 35... ...
For example: · C4I systems supported through simultaneous suppression of enemy air defenses highly effective, precise, orchestrated strikes on a variety of targets in Baghdad on the initial night of war, with extremely low casualties. · The Global Positioning System allowed orchestrated movements of coalition armored forces to outflank Iraqi forces and engage them at the maximum effective range of coalition weapons.
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From page 36... ...
Use of information technology to make a commander's situational awareness better also creates the potential to improve the effectiveness with which the commander directs and controls his forces. To the extent that the promise of C4I technologies is realized, reduced force size might be compensated for by information superiority the ability of a force to have, and protect, a comprehensive view of enemy and friendly forces as well as the combat environment, while denying the enemy a comparable capa 4Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe is the U.S.
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From page 37... ...
The cornerstone of information superiority is advanced C4I technology and systems, which can provide to all tactical levels of command a robust, continuous, common operating picture of the battlespace.6 The resulting heightened situational awareness should vastly improve the effectiveness with which commanders at all levels can pursue a mission. The common operating picture can allow tactical decision making at the lowest levels of command consistent with the higher-level commander's operational objectives, and the decentralized tactical execution can enhance the ability of lower-level tactical units to react quickly to changing circumstances.
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From page 38... ...
Conducted by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, the Theater Air and Missile Defense program seeks to develop capabilities to display a single integrated air picture, available to all relevant units in the theater, that is accurate, resolved, consistent, and timely (essentially real-time)
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From page 39... ...
Disaggregated units could operate in an enlarged battlespace, presenting few concentrated targets to the enemy while employing massed remote firepower to harass, damage, and destroy. Central to ELB is a beyond-line-of-sight tactical information infrastructure with wideband communications networks and enhanced situation understanding that would provide common situational awareness at all levels of command.~° Decentralized Freedom of Action The transmission of a common operating picture to each unit, in real time and in parallel, would enable commanders at the tactical level to quickly grasp the larger battle picture and thus to determine local unit objectives with much greater latitude and assurance.
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From page 40... ...
The United States has been striving for a single integrated air picture since 1969 when the Tactical Air Control System/Tactical Air Defense System program was launched. Subsequent developments have yielded capabilities that allow the creation and maintenance of a single integrated air picture, but these systems still have clear deficiencies in such areas as integration and the ability to share information with potential coalition partners.
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From page 43... ...
For each of these concepts, information superiority is a critical enabler. Each of the services is exploring the implications of Joint Vision 2010 for itself, taking steps with experimental studies, wargames, research and development investments, advanced concept technology demonstrations, and simulation gaming to develop and test concepts and capabilities that will ensure military preparedness for the 21st century.
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From page 44... ...
44 REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF C4I: FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES mercialization in such areas as information technology, space operations, imaging, and global positioning, and the increased need and desire of the United States to use commercial technology for military use, reduce the ability of the United States to protect these technologies. Also, when an adversary is able to make use of commercial space and information tech
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From page 49... ...
Such trends portend a future in which low-cost ballistic and cruise missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and information attacks are a threat. Weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological weapons, will be available to the full range of threats, from rogue nations to transnational actors, international criminals, and terrorists.
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The combined joint task force commander, when American, would have the same command and control requirements with his entire combined forces as he would have with his U.S. forces.
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Further, commanders must have the ability and the training to query the "fused" picture to get the understanding they need to carry out their particular piece of the mission. However, the displays all must have a common basis so as to i3Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
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From page 52... ...
The system of systems must be supported by a global communications network since it must provide the linkage between the home stations of deploying units, the providers of transportation, the supporting forces, enroute movements, the supported forces, and the arrival locations. Obviously, such a system of systems is inherently joint, and often combined, since it must be used by the joint force commander, the military service component commanders, the supporting unified commanders, and the nations providing forces and transportation capabilities.
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These C4I requirements apply to the Joint Air Operations Center, each service component command, and the air command elements of the contributing nations' air forces. 1.4.4 Proliferation in the Use of the U.S.
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restrictive rules of engagement aimed at reducing the potential for undesired escalation, and providing clear limits on the force, and which are understood by potential adversaries; and (7) the potential for undesired escalation or "mission creep" without having the proper force to deal with the new or expanded mission.
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From page 55... ...
, the density of relay nodes is low, distances between relay nodes are large, and connectivity thus may be more intermittent for patrols communicating with field headquarters. Satellite-based or unmanned aerial vehicle-based communications are an obvious solution, and a number of programs now under way provide such intermediate nodes.
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1.4.6 Strategic Vulnerability of Infrastructure to Information Attack The growing dependence of the United States on its national information infrastructure, as well the dependence of other elements of its infrastructure (e.g., electric power, transportation) on information technology,
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infrastructure might well have the additional effect of compromising traditional U.S. military readiness and ability to respond militarily.~7 1.5 EXPECTED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TRENDS FOR C4I Rapid development of information technology and the expectation that C4I technology can dramatically increase force effectiveness have made this technology a critical element of future military modernization.
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From page 58... ...
Key areas of progress in communications technology applicable to C4I will include advanced video and data compression techniques to transfer expanded information sets through limited-bandwidth channels; wireless wide area network/local area network packet-switched networks utilizing mobile base stations; wider-bandwidth optical communications networks for low-cost, robust terrestrial connectivity; advanced waveforms to maximize coding gain; advanced modulation approaches to increase bandwidth efficiency, given the pressures on military spectrum allocation; "software" radios that provide broadband digital processing; and multifunction, multiband phased array antenna technology that will find application in both communications systems and sensor development.
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From page 59... ...
that enable the location of targets, events, and friendly forces will also be important. Such technologies confer the ability to register events and objects in the same coordinate system, and underlie the ability to generate a common operating picture.
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1998. Defense Information Superiority: Progress Made, But Significant Challenges Remain, GAO/AIMD-98-257, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.
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From page 61... ...
Some of the most important are the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the ultimate authority within DOD on acquisition matters; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, the focal point of DOD policy with respect to matters related to C4I and information superiority (and also today the DOD's Chief Information Officer) ; the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, an organization that validates requirements and military needs for "major" C4I systems; the Defense Acquisition Board, which is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and advises on individual acquisition programs and generally on acquisition policies and procedures; the 2iElectronics Industry Association press release, "EIA Ten-Year Forecast Projects 14% Growth in Electronics; Defense Market Remains Stable," October 8,1997; available online at |
From page 62... ...
Achieving this level of interoperability poses technical as well as cultural and process challenges. Significant technical dimensions include design tensions between immediate and future needs; tensions between applications-specific needs and the needs of the entire system of systems; inability to anticipate all relevant scenarios for use, resulting in an inability to anticipate which systems need to interoperate; extent of backward compatibility to be designed into systems; difficulties of anticipating a sustainable technology environment; inherent difficulties of system integration; and synchronization of interdependent programs.
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From page 63... ...
Cultural dimensions include the need to promulgate a defense-wide awareness of information security (ranging from accountability to providing good information security support) and a legal constraint and military tradition of refraining from involvement in domestic security affairs.
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