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The Practicality of Pulsed Fast Neutron Transmission Spectroscopy for Aviation Security (1999) / Chapter Skim
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7 Conclusions and Recommendations
Pages 35-39

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From page 35...
... The promise of PFNTS and other element-specific technologies is their potential to detect a wider variety of threats and lower threat masses than are currently included in the FAA's EDS certification standards. Thus, a critical remaining step in the development of PFNTS technology is characterizing the range of potential threats and threat masses it could reliably detect.
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From page 36...
... Even though the panel believes a PFNTS-based device could be operated safely, the public, and perhaps even airline employees, might believe the system posed health risks. Because of the perceived risks and the physical size and weight of PFNTS-based devices, operations personnel could decide to locate the device in a remote facility, either a standalone facility or a separate building outside of the terminal complex, which would inhibit passenger involvement in resolving false alarms.
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From page 37...
... for significantly improving the quality of the test data. If innovative approaches to the use of currently available research accelerators cannot resolve this deficiency, research on the PFNTS technology for explosives detection may have reached a logical stopping point.
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From page 38...
... Recommendation. The FAA should develop and validate a procedure for resolving false alarms for the pulsed fast neutron transmission spectroscopy technology that meets or exceeds the capabilities of deployed certified explosivesdetection systems.
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From page 39...
... Recommendation. To ensure the availability of an accelerator research facility to a diverse range of researchers, the facility should be located in a university environment and not at an airport or private industrial site.
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Key Terms

  • detection algorithm
  • pulsed fast
  • neutron transmission
  • false alarm
  • fast neutron

  • certification standards
  • false alarms
  • pfnts technology
  • certification testing
  • current certification

  • alarm rate
  • test data
  • checked baggage
  • lower threat
  • testing requirements

  • threat quantities
  • detector array
  • resolving false
  • airport environment
  • explosive threat

  • transmission spectroscopy
  • threat masses
  • threat agents
  • current shortfalls
  • deuteron beam

  • air cargo
  • neutron attenuation
  • current explosive
  • alarm resolution
  • beam current


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