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U.S.-German Cooperation in the Elimination of Excess Weapons Plutonium (1995) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Pages 1-5

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From page 1...
... Other criteria, such as technical feasibility within a comparatively short time, low risks to environment and health, political acceptability to the relevant parties, and reasonable costs were consiclered as well, but security considerations were paramount. As a basis for assessing relative security risks, the NAS study recommends that WPu ctisposition operations should meet what it calls the "spent fuel standard." This means making the excess WPu roughly as inaccessible for weapons use as the much larger anti growing quantity of plutonium in spent fuel from commercial nuclear-power reactors.
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From page 2...
... In the United States, no closed fuel cycle to recycle reprocessed plutonium exists, and government policy is not to encourage such technologies abroad.
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From page 3...
... laboratory-to-laboratory program to identify the most pressing deficiencies that are not already being adequately addressed by the United States. Then the GRS should subcontract with the appropriate experts from industry and other appropriate institutions; specific funding to the institutions and people in Germany and Russia doing the work would be required.
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From page 4...
... The Steering Committee, therefore, aloes not recommend efforts to gain Russian acceptance for a major vitrification facility for Russian WPu at this time.
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From page 5...
... Therefore the Steering Committee recommends the development and construction of a small vitrification facility in Russia, which the Russians couict use for their weapons plutonium residues (e.g., non-metal scrap anc! waste plutonium)
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Key Terms

  • international safeguards
  • intermediate storage
  • water reactors
  • closed fuel
  • fuel cycle

  • light water
  • security risks
  • russian weapons
  • excess weapons
  • civilian nuclear

  • international security
  • fabrication facility
  • mox fabrication
  • spent fuel
  • fabricating mox

  • nuclear energy
  • storage facility
  • excess russian
  • vitrification facility
  • feasibility study

  • nas study
  • reactor safety
  • political parties
  • mox fuel
  • hesse government

  • disposition process
  • existing light
  • russian ministry
  • percent completed
  • comparatively short


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