The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century (1996) / Chapter Skim
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From page 25... ...
Part 2: Discussion
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From page 27... ...
In the absence of a hostile global competitor having both the strategic and tactical force reach and military power of the Soviet Union at the peak of its strength, regional concerns have come to the fore. The Gulf War, military operations in northern Iraq (Provide Comfort)
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From page 28... ...
It also involves the ability to deny such information and weapon delivery to the opposition. Beyond that, there is concern about 28
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These elements of agreement among the Services about future conditions and needs of warfare in regional conflict provide a basis for assessing Navy and Marine Corps missions and concepts of operation in such conflicts. First, some further aspects of this study and its background are explained, followed by a review of the missions and emerging concepts of operation.
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The 2020 generation of equipment and forces is not yet under serious consideration. The period chosen is therefore the one for which the results of the study can be most helpful to Navy and Marine Corps choice of further directions for development.
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Once the Navy and Marine Corps have achieved these new, high levels of capability, they face a period of consolidation over the time period being considered in the study. The next technological steps toward improving combat power are known.
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From page 32... ...
All operations of the Navy and the Marine Corps over the past few years, from the Gulf War to activities in the Adriatic, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, illustrate the range of military activities involved in the above kinds of scenarios. Military operations short of war are and will clearly continue to be the most frequent.
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From page 33... ...
These are likely to include the following: · Modern tanks, combat aircraft, and artillery; · Radar-based air defenses, including short-range systems like Crotale, medium-altitude systems like the Russian SA-6 and SA-8, and advanced, long-range, high-altitude systems like the SA-10 and SA-12 that may have some counter-stealth and counter-tactical ballistic missile capability; Tactical ballistic missiles with ranges from 200 to 2,000 miles and advanced guidance systems capable of achieving an accuracy of 50 meters, and possibly equipped with maneuvering, radiation-seeking guided warheads; · Antiship cruise missiles that (1) fly at subsonic speed but have stealth characteristics that significantly reduce engagement time or (2)
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From page 34... ...
This listing of military capabilities that the Navy and Marine Corps may meet in any of the scenarios considered emphasizes that the Services must not rest complacent with their present military capabilities. Given the time it takes to field new military systems and to develop new tactics and operational techniques using them, especially in the assumed tight budget environment, continuing progress will be necessary to meet potentially demanding opposition that we can see being fielded today.
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Continuing loir't and Combined Operations The Navy and Marine Corps would then continue with the other U.S. Services and local national forces in joint and combined operations until the military action is successfully completed.
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From page 36... ...
They will, by their maneuver, seek to neutralize or subdue opposition rapidly and to make the objective secure and functioning in the service of the lodgment. The anticipated rapidity of maneuver will put a premium on pre-landing intelligence gathering, preparation of the landing zones by special operations forces and of the local population by psychological operations, and preliminary fires to clear landing areas deep in the opposition's territory as well as on the beach, if and as necessary.2 It is helpful, to visualize the scope of the OMFTS concept as it is currently evolving, to picture a scenario in which a port city with its airfield must be taken (see illustration in Figure 1~.
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From page 38... ...
Implementing the New Form of OMFTS To implement the OMFTS concept in its emerging form, the Navy and Marine Corps have the following sequence in view: Lighten the force. In their ultimate form the initial assault forces ashore would have organic mobility in the form of light vehicles and helicopters, sensors, communications, and much close-in combat power such as mortars and antitank and antiaircraft weapons, but no tanks or artillery for indirect fire.
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From page 39... ...
(This should not be taken to imply "just-in-time" logistic supply, in the pattern of new manufacturing technology. Rather, it means that logistic support will be called for and furnished as the forward combat elements need it, starting from a base that stays at sea rather than being moved ashore in anticipation of need during combat.)
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From page 40... ...
This uncertainty is based on the following conditions: Communications connectivity with mobile forces beyond the horizon, the linchpin of battlefield awareness, is weak; Command and control and targeting are too slow, and combat identification (CID) is too uncertain, to assure the forward forces of reliable, sustained, and accurate fire support when they call for it; and Old patterns, generally unsuited to the new operational concept's fire support needs, still dominate weapon system design and munitions acquisition.
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From page 41... ...
Coalition issues, especially command and control in complex arrangements involving the United States, other coalition partners, and the United Nations, also have to be addressed. The new OMFTS concept and associated systems will require resources beyond current plans.
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From page 42... ...
Especially, current and planned systems will not meet the needs of Marine forces in the highly mobile transition phase from ship to shore and beyond the horizon. The only available communications for forward troops during that critical period are vulnerable, low-capacity, line-ofsight communications, not suited for calling in the essential fire support and logistic support that can ensure the success of the forward elements in OMFTS.
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From page 43... ...
The Navy and Marine Corps can take advantage of these developments to design the "retail-level" systems needed to implement the future OMFTS. Communications links and terminals at the "retail" level should be highly mobile, robust, and jointly interoperable with other Service systems.
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. The Navy and Marine Corps should consider the establishment and maintenance of robust communications connectivity as a joint endeavor with the other Services, National and civilian agencies, and coalition parmers where appropriate.
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The Navy and Air Force should also be involved in this effort, to ensure interoperability among all the Services in joint operations. The Navy and Marine Corps should be involved in related Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
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From page 47... ...
The time lines in building situational awareness have been suited to the technical capabilities and the resulting tempo of the warfare of the time, with the operational and tactical advantage going to the side that could build the greatest information advantage in the least possible time within those constraints. Situational knowledge can never be perfect.
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From page 48... ...
The sections that follow lead to some recommended steps to improve key aspects of situational awareness that will be needed by Navy and Marine Corps forces in joint operations along the littoral. Essential integration beyond those steps will require application of the will and the resources across the entire DOD.
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From page 49... ...
In addition, the c2 system to exploit the information will, in its current form, be insufficiently responsive to make the fire support available when needed. The Marine Corps has organization and procedures designed to make close air support responsive to the ground forces' needs.
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This worked reasonably well in a "steady-state" theater like Vietnam, when there was time to learn and therefore predict for most days how much air support would have to be made available this way. It was not as much a problem in the Gulf War, where the air and ground war were fought in clearly separable phases, special arrangements were made for hunting mobile Scud targets, and the ground war was over so quickly that a routine need for closely coordinated air support of the ground forces scarcely had time to develop.
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From page 51... ...
The common grid and universal time are in view through the use of GPS, but they have not yet been fully established in the joint arena or between the targeting system and weapon guidance systems within the Navy and Marine Corps. Theoretically, if they existed and if differential GPS could be used for both targeting and weapon guidance, an accuracy of <1 meter should be achievable for weapons on target with only GPS target location and guidance.
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From page 52... ...
. The Navy and Marine Corps should take the lead in the joint arena toward building a single, joint situational and battlefield awareness capability, based on all-source inputs and all-Service use of the products, that will confer a commanding information advantage on U.S.
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From page 53... ...
-84 grid as a common grid by all the Services and National agencies, and of universal time, for mapping, navigation, target location, and weapon delivery, and take all feasible steps to accelerate that trend; and Help establish priorities for the Defense Mapping Agency to prepare accurate WGS-84 maps and data banks for likely regional conflict areas of operation. The Navy and Marine Corps will benefit greatly from advance sensor technology efforts currently under way, and should encourage them to the extent feasible.
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From page 54... ...
The Marine Corps operating procedures for close air support that were referred to earlier have been designed to mitigate this risk, but they do not extend to the joint and combined environment. Also, these procedures are generally linked to air attack from low altitude.
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From page 55... ...
Recommended Ad~dtitional Actions The following additional actions, which the Navy and Marine Corps should undertake, stimulate, and support in the joint arena, as appropriate, are necessary to achieve a satisfactory CID outcome: . A formal program to integrate all the separate Service CID projects into a coordinated system effort must be initiated, to ensure compatibility 55
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From page 56... ...
An important part of this practice will be the attention given to interfaces and handoff problems, where a large proportion of errors occur. WEAPON SYSTEMS FOR LONG-RANGE FIRE SUPPORT Increased Need for Guided Weapons Combat objectives in future Navy and Marine Corps operations along the littoral will require that the combat operations succeed quickly, with minimal friendly losses.
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From page 57... ...
A campaign for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) of this kind a priori, though feasible in special circumstances, would require using heavy fire from long range to "sanitize" areas that must be traversed by the aircraft; it would be expensive and could create extensive collateral damage and casualties.
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From page 58... ...
and the smaller numbers available when such weapons fill a significant part of a ship's magazine. All analyses of the subject performed over the past 2 decades show that extensive use of guided weapons In air attacks reduces the number of sorties needed to destroy a set of targets by up to an order of magnitude.5 Thus, although some level-of-effort bombing is needed for air support of troops in combat during rapidly changing situations of maneuver, most target destruction objectives in an air campaign and in the kind of fire support needed to make OMFTS succeed can be achieved in a much shorter time using guided weapons.
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From page 59... ...
It should be noted incidentally in this context that matching target location accuracy with weapon accuracy through use of a common grid and universal time reference becomes a critical system need in terms of economic and military campaign imperatives for target destruction. It is not simply a "nice-to-have" improvement.
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From page 60... ...
would provide about twice the payload of 7Tables 1 and 2 exclude older weapons such as Maverick and Paveway II, and helicopter-fired weapons such as Hellfire. These tables are intended only to illustrate the magnitude and scope of planned expenditures on guided attack weapons.
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From page 61... ...
However, when ship weapon loads for offense and defense must be planned and strike missiles must be divided, for example, between the NTACMS for battlefield fire support and the Tomahawk for longrange strike, and when the number of ships available offshore for any landing is Assessment of Alternative Ship-to-Shore Fire Support Systems (U9, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, June 1993.
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From page 62... ...
Among other uses, their stealth would make them an effective source of surprise delivery of preparatory fire against stationary targets that could interfere with the opening of an amphibious campaign; and they could be outfitted to launch special operations forces for mine clearance and other clandestine missions. Additional needs to enable long-range fire support include enough targeting pods for guided weapon delivery by all Navy and Marine Corps attack aircraft; a guided submunition dispenser; and a replacement weapon to carry out the missions intended for the canceled Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM)
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From page 63... ...
Expensive data links are needed when detailed two-way information transfer, including complete images, is required between target and targeter for guidance. Often, however, this requirement is based on a weapon delivery concept requiring continuously updated target location information and either automatic or manual correction of the weapon flight path to the target by observation of a visual image of the target beyond the horizon and return of weapon flight path data for flight path correction.
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From page 64... ...
However, updated target information can be sent to the targeter by observers like those mentioned above. The targeter can then send that information, or continual target location signals allowing weapon flight path error correction to static target locations, to the weapon over simple, low-data-rate, one-way data links that are much less expensive.
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From page 65... ...
Such inertial units can carry the weapons to their targets with only a small loss of accuracy in the short flight time during which most weapons will be exposed to effective GPS jamming signals as they approach the targets. Take any other steps to force jammer power and size up, to make the jammers viable targets for antijammer weapons.
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From page 66... ...
These problems raise the question of whether the Navy and Marine Corps, and the other Services, should accept dependence on a system with a known vulnerability that must be accounted for, at some cost, so early in the design stages of so many weapons. The answer is that there will be heavy dependence on GPS for all manner of military operations with which weapon delivery will have to be coordinated; that such coordination will be greatly facilitated by using GPS for targeting and weapon guidance; that the need for guided weapons will be so strong that large inventories will be required; and that the cost savings from using this guidance are essential to providing those large weapon inventories.
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From page 67... ...
The cost leverage in production of weapons in larger quantities can lead to reduction by factors of two in unit costs of individual weapons, in addition to the 30 to 50 percent savings estimated to be achievable through technical and management changes. Standardized components across weapon types can also reduce costs, through application of economies of scale to acquisition of the components.
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From page 68... ...
This estimate did not yet account for savings that might accrue from acquiring more units of fewer weapon types. Despite these uncertainties, it is clear that all the recommended steps in this section, if implemented, would make a significantly larger inventory of guided weapons feasible within the resources planned for such weapons.
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From page 69... ...
In this circumstance, resupply of the forward combat elements of the initial assault echelon will have to be by air, using mainly the vertical lift aircraft (CH-53E and V-22) organic to a Marine expeditionary force (MEF)
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From page 70... ...
Thus, a substantially larger and more capable force could be landed forward in the first assault echelon if the force were to rely wholly on long-range fire support from the fleet to deliver heavy firepower on the enemy. Building the commanders' confidence that the long-range fire support will be ready and available when needed and called for, with the same reliability and responsiveness as their organic artillery, will require all the force and system changes described previously, as well as much experience in exercises and even some operations.
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From page 71... ...
But the known dangers must be kept in view during operational planning, and all known means to avoid or reduce danger and to minimize losses must be taken. FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT TO THE INITIAL ASSAULT ECHELON All the above steps will not ensure indefinite support for the forward combat elements against strong opposition that can maneuver against them.
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The effective combat endurance of the forward combat elements will be measured in days, not weeks. It will depend on the enemy's combat capability and the U.S.
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PART 2: DISCUSSION 1~ t~ i-''1 I /~ , ~ I ~ i' ~ I a; ~ E== I / a// l I l I ~ 1, ii; I hi I 11 1 l !
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LCACs are designed to be loaded in the well-decks of amphibious assault ships, and these ships are designed to carry Marine Corps forces and their equipment to a landing location and unload them rapidly before carrying out other combat support functions. The amphibious ships, like the maritime propositioned ships (MPSs)
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From page 75... ...
The Marine Corps has initiated experimentation with industry technologies that will be especially helpful in tracking and handling materiel in-theater. Packaging will have to be revised so that the standard 8 ft x 8 ft x 20 ft containers contain materiel packaged for a sequence of anticipated unit needs 75
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From page 76... ...
The committee also suggests that, as part of implementing these initiatives, the Marine Corps invest further in its logistic analysis capability. Although some logisticians are starting to think about the ramifications of OMFTS, the current dearth of applicable quantitative analysis is troubling.
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From page 77... ...
The modules would be assembled and interconnected in quiet waters. The platform would constitute an operations and logistics base, having all the characteristics described above for modern logistic support ships, as well as the capacity to store internally as much supply as a major base ashore.
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From page 78... ...
It could be emplaced at sea outside the territorial waters of any nation, avoiding sovereignty issues at sensitive times. Aircraft from all Services could operate from it, making the airdrop option for logistic support of forward combat elements more attractive.
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From page 79... ...
SUMMARY OF NECESSARY ACTIONS It is indicated above that with appropriate re-engineering of the logistic system to support warfare along the littoral, as many as four or five landing teams having the strength of light battalions without organic artillery could be logistically supported from the sea by the organic vertical lift in an MEF, up to 75 to 100 miles inland, in an initial assault under the newly emerging concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea. These initial assault forces would bring heavy firepower to bear on enemy forces from long range, fixing the opposition and destroying much of it.
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From page 80... ...
In summary, the Navy and Marine Corps should take the following steps toward re-engineering the logistic system to make logistic support of the new OMFTS concept viable: · Examine, and revise according to need, the echelonment of initial and follow-on assault and support forces to suit the advanced concept of operation. · Revise materiel packaging and movement protocols and procedures so that unitized loads in standard 8 ft x 8 ft x 20 fit containers arranged according to anticipated need, rather than as bulk cargo, can move from loading points (possibly in CONUS)
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From page 81... ...
Pa 2: D~CUSSI~ providing logistic support Mom Me sea to farces m~euver~g ashore Id Clad, Id (2) Me LSQ/C far providing offload cagily ~ sea ages greater 1b~ 3.
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From page 82... ...
Often, the United States has been able to depend on our allies to supply the assets, but since future crises and conflicts will involve shifting coalitions we cannot be certain who our allies will be or what capabilities they will bring to the fray. The Navy and Marine Corps must build enough kinds of capability, and in sufficient quantity, and they must devote enough attention to the problems at all command levels, to ensure that mines do not stop amphibious operations at critical times, either in the seaborne or inland phases of a campaign.
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From page 83... ...
The longer the mine clearance operations take, the greater the chance that the landing force's stealthy cover and thus the element of surprise will be "blown" and that new mines and obstacles will be emplaced by a resourceful enemy. The very shallow water and surf zones, from about 12-ft depth in through the craft landing zone on the beach, are especially difficult to deal with in this respect.
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From page 84... ...
What is required is the application of resources, the attention of management and command, and the diffusion of mine warfare awareness and operational responsibility throughout the Navy structure, to ensure that the resources are applied in an appropriately focused manner and that the capabilities are integrated into the OMFTS concept: .
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From page 85... ...
Clearing mines from inland landing zones. Although Marine vertical lift aircraft have the flexibility to land in any area found to be unoccupied and undefended, there is always the possibility that a smart enemy, knowing his own terrain and force disposition, will anticipate likely landing zones and mine them to set an ambush.
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From page 86... ...
They must fully define the overall system problem from the approach of an invasion fleet toward the littoral to landings on the beach and far inland, evaluate all the alternatives to resolve the component sub-problems, and devote the necessary command attention, R&D attention, and resources to the total problem if it is not to become a main stumbling block to successful implementation of OMFTS. While the sea mine problem may remain a substantial responsibility of the Navy Department, with other Service inputs such as the PELEC approach described above, the problem of land mines is of great concern to both the Army and the Marine Corps.
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From page 87... ...
A draft Marine Corps manual deals with the subject as "military operations in urban terrain" (MOUT)
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From page 88... ...
They may not have had the chance to practice with those forces before the onset of the crisis precipitating military action, so that advance preparation, along the lines sketched above, will be essential. One step that can help all these preparations would be the establishment and continual updating of area databases for cities and countries where it is anticipated that military action may take place recognizing that the areas assigned highest priority may not be the ones demanding attention first.
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From page 89... ...
in landing zones; and Non-destructive operations against opponents in populated areas in the presence of civilian populations. Recommended Actions · The Navy and Marine Corps must expect to operate in populated and built-up areas along the littoral in all military actions from those short of war to MRCs.
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From page 90... ...
The Marines should be prepared to integrate and involve Army units in Marine Corps activities associated with military operations in populated areas, especially in intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, and maintenance of local order, where the Army may have capabilities not immediately available to the Marines. · Ethical and policy issues attending some aspects of operations in populated areas should be raised and discussed in advance to the extent feasible in the abstract, so that they can be resolved practically and with forethought during crises without hobbling ongoing operations.
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From page 91... ...
All these considerations must be part of the review and reformulation of medical care policy for the evolving concepts of operation in the littoral environment. Recommended Action The Navy and Marine Corps should review the policies for medical care and medical treatment of forward forces to account for the actual conditions of military operations along the littoral, and consider the need for revising them.
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From page 92... ...
The needs of such protection differ significantly from those of deep-water ASW since during a regional conflict many of the submarines will operate in relatively shallow coastal waters, where signals and signatures are uncertain or can be masked and where there are unlikely to be established bottom-mounted longrange sonar networks. Again, the amphibious and the logistic support ships may well have to be configured to contribute to the defense of the amphibious fleet against this threat.
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From page 93... ...
Finally, the force operating along the littoral must be able to contribute to deterrence of the use of weapons of mass destruction and to countering their effects. This includes the following actions: · Having a stated policy of severe retaliation, with a known retaliatory capability to which the Navy and Marine Corps forces in the local area are known to be able to contribute; Having a demonstrated ability to find and destroy weapon storage sites; · Developing doctrine and carrying out training for continued operations in case weapons of mass destruction are used; Deploying early warning systems against chemical weapons; · Developing and deploying early warning systems against biological weapons; Having chemical protective gear available and troops trained to don it and to operate while wearing it; and · Developing and having available vaccinations and treatments for biological weapon effects.
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From page 94... ...
. Protection of logistic and amphibious assault ships against the variety of antiship cruise missiles that can be launched against them from land, sea, or air; Protection of logistic and amphibious ships against the proliferating numbers of modern, quiet submarines that will be held by potential opponents; Provision for launch warning and SOPs for passive defense actions to take when hostile ballistic missiles are launched against the amphibious force; and Capabilities for Navy and Marine Corps littoral warfare forces to contribute to effective retaliation in case weapons of mass destruction are used, and to mitigate their effects if they are used against our forces.
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From page 95... ...
In summary, the following are among the many areas and activities where inter-Service collaboration has been assumed or recommended: Treatment of the Navy and Marine Corps, considered as separate Services in many forums, as essentially a single force for operations along the littoral; Preparation by special operations forces of the ground for Marine landings and operations ashore, in many ways including scouting, neutralization of defenses, calling in preparatory fires, and other measures; · Use of National, Air Force, and Army as well as Navy and Marine sensors and sensor platforms in integrated surveillance and reconnaissance systems under CINC command; · Creation of situational awareness at different command levels, command and control for long-range fire support, targeting, and CIDall cooperative, multi-Service functions; 95
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From page 96... ...
Key Areas of Emphasis to Refine Joint Operations Provision must be made in all the following areas to ensure seamless interoperability of all forces including Navy and Marine Corps forces that may be involved in all manner of regional conflict situations: . Joint interoperability for tactical C4I and weapon systems; · Common WGS-84 grid and universal time, with all maps in the grid, for all forces-for situational awareness, targeting, unit and force location (of all participants in a conflict, and neutrals)
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From page 97... ...
Similar arrangements, different in detail to suit local circumstances, obtain in Korea and with Japan. With the impossibility of predicting exactly who other potential future coalition partners may be, it may appear difficult to extend such arrangements beyond the existing ones.
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From page 98... ...
To recapitulate from the prior discussion, these changes are as follows: Drastically lightening the assault force, by reducing its landing weight and its logistic support requirements; Delivering major fire support from the fleet, thereby separating the weight of heavy firepower from the most forward echelon of the assault force; Establishing the logistic depot in the waters offshore; Re-engineering the logistic delivery system; Changing the C4I system to ensure robust, responsive situational awareness, targeting, communications connectivity, and enhanced CID; 98
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From page 99... ...
The main non-weapon capitalization changes highlighted by the results of this study are as follows: Communications connectivity, other C2, targeting, CID, intelligence, and situational awareness enhancements; Provision for long-range fire support systems on fleet combatants, and possible specialized fire support ships; Aircraft targeting pods, and avionic system modifications to enable GPS P(Y) code transfer to guided weapons before launch and retention of the initialization fix while the weapon is in the aircraft shadow after launch; 99
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From page 100... ...
To estimate what the cost of the additional weapons might be, it was assumed that the Navy and Marine Corps alone would acquire, for their own use, a roughly 50 percent increase in numbers of guided weapons, above the projected DOD-wide inventory outlined in Table 2. The distribution of weapon numbers by type in this acquisition would be roughly as shown in Table 2, with the exception that the original purchase of Block IV Tomahawk would not be Increased, and that Table 4 Potential Cost, OMFTS Improvements Communications connectivity]
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From page 101... ...
This would lead to Navy and Marine Corps acquisition of~60,000 guided weapons in an assumed mix having an average unit cost of $108,500, as shown in Table 2, for a total cost of ~$6.5 billion. In total, then, the estimated cost of capitalization involved in the projected force changes would be in the neighborhood of $20 billion.
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From page 102... ...
billion to $1 billion per year over a 20-year period must be found to pay for the force changes deemed necessary to ensure the success of the new approach to OMFTS. Where can such sums be found in the Navy and Marine Corps budget?
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From page 103... ...
Under the new concepts, with the new equipment and systems, the area of the secure initial lodgment will be expanded to 2,500 to 3,000 square miles, defined by the reach of the V-22. An area as large as 5,000 to 10,000 square miles would be dominated by the fleet-based surface and air fire support of the landing force, up to 75 to 100 miles inland.
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From page 104... ...
Even when their unit costs are reduced by the means outlined in this report, and others, guided weapons will remain more costly than conventional unguided weapons. What perspective can be put on the added costs to illustrate compensating gains?
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From page 105... ...
Large-scale use of guided weapons can greatly reduce the length of the "heavy firepower" phase of an MRC. Many analyses through the years have shown, and the Gulf War corroborated, that the typical 10,000 to 30,000 targets (other than attacking ground forces)
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From page 106... ...
The essential program elements are as follows: Improved situational awareness, communications connectivity, C2, targeting, and combat identification (CID) enabling sustained, reliable, and effective fire support from the fleet offshore to forward combat elements deep inland; Provision for increased use of guided weapons, including reduction of their cost, and application to long-range fire support from the sea; Re-engineering of the logistic system; and Countermine warfare.
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From page 107... ...
Field medicine for forward forces and for OOTW. Preparation for coalition warfare.
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