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Management of High-Level Waste: A Historical Overview of the Technical and Policy Challenges
Pages 1-14

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From page 1...
... In 198S, the Board on Radioactive Waste Management convened a study session with experts Mom the United States and abroad to discuss U.S. policies and programs for managing the nation's spent fuel and high-level waste.
From page 2...
... has recommended that the government postpone the search for a repository site until broad public acceptance of the geological isolation approach has been achieved. In Germany, there has been intense public opposition to moving spent fuel to an interim storage facility near GorIeben, the site of the German candidate repository, and the decision on whether to proceed with development of a repository at GorIeben has been delayed.
From page 3...
... The composition of high-level nuclear waste is now very different than what was considered in the 1957 National Research Council report. The main difference is that the United States and a number of other countries with nuclear programs now plan to dispose of spent nuclear reactor fuel as high-level radioactive waste, without reprocessing.
From page 4...
... One proposed method is disposal in a geological repository, perhaps after placing fission products in proximity to the plutonium (e.g., by immobilizing plutonium in vitrified high-level waste) to make it as theft resistant as spent nuclear fuel.
From page 5...
... commercial spent fuel (Ahearne, 1997~. ASSURING THE SAFETY OF A GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORY FOR HIGH-LEVEL WASTE The summary of the 1957 NRC report states, "Unlike the disposal of any other type of waste, the hazard related to radioactive waste is so great that no element of doubt should be allowed to exist regarding safety" (NRC, 1957, p.
From page 6...
... This design philosophy is often described as "defense in depth," or reliance on multiple barriers. Crucial aspects of the geological setting may be to maintain geochemical conditions that inhibit degradation and corrosion processes, to avoid geochemical conditions that facilitate the dissolution and transport of key radionuclides, and to avoid mechanical stresses that would compromise the engineered barriers.
From page 7...
... During the 199Os, experience in many national programs has demonstrated the need for flexibility and for accommodating the inherent limitations in the information that scientific investigation can provide about the geological setting and the durability of engineered barriers. The design and the assurance of safety for geological repositories must be a carefully considered exercise in making decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty.
From page 8...
... program describes it as follows: "To an outsider, the issue of what to do with high-level radioactive waste introduces a morass of obscure jargon and abstruse questions. An almost measureless bulk of documents, data, and technical reports describes the technology of nuclear waste management." Jacob, 1990, p.
From page 9...
... Excellence in geological science and engineering may be necessary, but not sufficient, to assure that a geological repository program will be successful. Social scientists have identified a number of principles that apply to gaining public acceptance of national programs.
From page 10...
... However, transmutation for waste management purposes would involve more extensive recycling and destruction of plutonium and other transuranic actinides than contemplated in a "closed" fuel cycle optimized for generation of electricity. In addition, the potential improvement in repository performance from transmutation of these materials in commercial spent fuel will be limited by the amount of such materials that will be present in high-level waste from defense nuclear activities.
From page 11...
... DISPOSAL VS. DISPOSITION Many discussions of the need for geological repositories have taken the position that current generations have an ethical imperative to avoid imposing the burden of ongoing surveillance and management, and of ultimate disposal, on fixture generations.
From page 12...
... It may be appropriate to consider strategies for extending the time between emplacement of waste and closure of a repository, and to regard an underground repository in a deep geological tormahon as a monitored, retrievable HEW storage facility, until sufficient confidence in its safety can be developed and the repository closed. SAFETY AGAINST HUTTON INTRUSION _ of HEW in a In this discussion paper we have waited until this point to introduce what some regard as the most challenging aspect of the planning of a geological repository: assuring safety against the future actions of human society.
From page 13...
... Reopening of a geological repository on land might be carried out in such a way that it could only be detected through on-site inspection. Relatively few and very remote repository sites offering easier surveillance possibilities may discourage unauthorized intrusion.
From page 14...
... A proposal has been made to locate a facility in Russia that could provide secure storage for spent fuel Tom Asian nations and also for nuclear materials Tom the Russian military program. Other proposals may emerge for cooperation or consolidation of national programs into international activities.


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