Strategies to Protect the Health of Deployed U.S. Forces Force Protection and Decontamination (1999) / Chapter Skim
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8 Summary and General Recommendations
8 Summary and General Recommendations
Pages 155-163
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From page 155... ...
· Terrorists have used and threatened to use CB agents. · The United States has agreed to adhere to the precepts of the CWC and the BWC.
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From page 156... ...
In addition, the knowledge that the Soviet Union was committing major resources to R&D and that design bureaus were focused on developing CB weaponry heightened the expectation that U.S. forces might encounter novel CB agents on the battlefield.
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From page 157... ...
In general, the liquid chemical agent challenge has been set at 10g/m2 for 24 hours for all agents, and the vaporous chemical agent challenge has been between 5,000 mg-min/m3 and 10,000 mg-min/m3. Definitions of biological agent challenges are generally based on LD50s and minimum infective doses for individual agents.
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From page 158... ...
forces has changed in the following ways: · No potentially hostile proliferant country has an R&D structure as capable of producing novel CB weapons as the Soviet Union. Therefore, a surprise attack with novel chemical agents is much less likely than it was.
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From page 159... ...
This problem resurfaced with questions about the health problems of Gulf War veterans, which many believe are the results of exposures to CB agents or other potentially harmful substances (e.g., environmental and occupational contaminants and toxic industrial chemicals) during their deployment.
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From page 160... ...
Current R&D is aimed at developing decontamination systems that would overcome these limitations and effectively decontaminate a broad spectrum of CB agents from all surfaces and materials. DoD has developed doctrine and training protocols for the use of decontaminants, but in order to relate doctrine to risk, guidelines must first be established for what constitutes acceptable risk.
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From page 161... ...
Therefore, based on simulant testing, it is difficult to determine whether or not a specific piece of equipment has met its performance requirements. In general, knowledge of the physiological effects of CB agents is based on animal studies, anecdotal evidence, and random accidents.
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From page 162... ...
Objective criteria should be established for determining whether current service-specific training requirements are being met. Program Objective Memorandum for Funding Research The primary approach to CB defense, according to current doctrine, is contamination avoidance, which depends primarily on the detection of contamination.
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From page 163... ...
decontamination technologies SUMMARY 163 Although substantial improvements have been made in the protection of deployed forces from CB agents, progress has been hampered by overly conservative design criteria for equipment based on challenges that may not be credible today. In addition, substantial changes have been made in the way military missions will be prosecuted (e.g., force projection, joint service requirements, expanded use of reserve troops, adherence to the CWC and BWC)
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