Strategies to Protect the Health of Deployed U.S. Forces Force Protection and Decontamination (1999) / Chapter Skim
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2 Threat and Risk Assessment
2 Threat and Risk Assessment
Pages 23-57
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From page 23... ...
Respirators greatly diminished the tactical advantage of using toxic gases, and new chemical warfare agents had to be developed. Some of the new agents were chemical mustard agents, sulfur and nitrogen mustards, which caused serious injury and incapacitation not only when they were inhaled but also when they came into contact with the skin or mucous 23 13547 -- Deployed Forces 02 23 12128199, 1:33 PM
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From page 24... ...
Army Office of the Surgeon General, 1997~. Although neither chemical nor biological agents were actually used during World War II to achieve any military objectives, work continued and provided the foundation for the extensive CB research program of the Cold War powers.
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From page 25... ...
However, CB technologies have been transferred to, and proliferated in, other countries; and modern bioengineering and molecular biological capabilities have given even small nations and groups the capability of developing novel, lethal agents. Documentation of the use of chemical weapons in localized wars and credible warnings from the intelligence community confirm that many potential enemies in regions to which U.S.
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From page 26... ...
Founded in June 1918 as the Chemical Warfare Service and renamed the Army Chemical Corps in August 1946, the Army Chemical Corps has alternately enjoyed support and been threatened with elimination, depending on political and economic exigencies. Prior to 1920, the development of chemical defenses was not tightly structured.
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From page 27... ...
Other responsibilities of the ISMG include preparation of the Joint Service NBC Defense RDA Plan, preparation of the Joint Service NBC Defense Logistics Support Plan, continuous review of the technology base, and reviews of developmental programs for possible NBC defense applications Although the NBC defense program addresses nuclear, as well as chemical and biological threats, the National Academies was only asked to address chemical and biological threats. Thus, this report only includes the chemical and biological aspects of CB defense.
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From page 28... ...
Department of Energy; DTRA = Defense Threat Reduction Agency; JAW USA = in accordance with the joint service agreement; JPO-BD = Joint Program Office for Biological Defense; SIG = Joint Service Integration Group; SAG = Joint Service Materiel Group; USAF = United States Air Force; USD(A&T) = Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)
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From page 29... ...
16. Intelligence Precision attack with no collateral damage Special operations forces counterterrorism NBC detection and warning Theater missile defense with no collateral damage Defeat underground targets Target planning and battle damage assessment Individual protection Proliferation pathway analysis Cruise missile DEF/ADA with no collateral damage Collective protection Defeat mobile target Offensive information warfare Logistics consequences capability Decontamination NBC medical treatment Source: Nilo, 1999.
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From page 30... ...
Nonmedical Defense Program Priorities Priority Area Program 1 CA Joint Biological Point Detection System 2 CA Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System 3 CA Joint Service Light NBC Reconnaissance System 4 BM Joint Warning and Reporting Network 5 CA Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector 6 CA Biological Integrated Detection Systems 7 CA Chemical/Biological Mass Spectrometer 8 CA Interim Biological Agent Detector 9 IP Joint Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JLIST) 10 CA Joint Chemical Agent Detector 11 IP Aircrew Mask Programs 12 CA NBC Reconnaissance System Product Improvement Program 13 CA Automatic Chemical Agent Detector and Alarm 14 RES Joint Service Fixed-Site Decontamination 15 CA Long-Range Biological Stand-off Detection System 16 IP Protection Assessment Test System 17 RES Joint Service Sensitive Equipment Decontamination 18 IP M40A1 Series Mask 19 CA Special Operations Modular Chemical/Biological Detector 20 IP Joint Service Aviation Mask 21 CA Joint Service Warning and Identification LIDAR Detector 22 IP Joint Protective Aircrew Chemical Ensemble 23 IP Chemical Environment Survivability Suit 24 RES Fixed-Site Decontamination Subitem: Joint Advanced Decontamination System 25 CP Joint Transportable Collective Protection System 26 BM Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Alarm 27 CA Shipboard Automatic Agent Detector 28 CA Improved Chemical Agent Monitor 29 CP Shipboard Collective Protective Equipment 30 CA Improved Point Detection System 31 IP Joint Service General Purpose Mask 32 CP Joint Collective Protection Improvement Program 33 RES Joint Lightweight Portable Decontamination System 34 CA Joint Chemical/Biological Agent Water Monitor 35 RES Lightweight Decontamination System 36 RES Modular Decontamination System 37 RES Sorbent Decontamination System 38 IP Joint Canteen Refilling System 39 IP Chemical Environment Survivability Mask 40 CA Pocket RADIAC (Radioactivity, Detection, Indication, and Computation)
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From page 31... ...
. Individual Protection Individuals can be protected by individual protective equipment (breathing masks with high-efficiency filters that selectively remove noxious agents, chemically treated clothing that can prevent agents from contacting the skin, and gloves and boot covers that are impervious to noxious agents)
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From page 32... ...
CHARACTERISTICS OF CURRENT AND FUTURE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS Effects and Tactical Utility of Chemical Agents Chemical agents can be characterized as either lethal or nonlethal (incapacitating) (see Table 2-3~; however, these distinctions have more to do with intent and use than with the composition of the agents because all agents are lethal in high concentrations.
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From page 33... ...
-1,4-oxazepine, chloropicrin dip henyl chloro ars ine , dip henylc yan o ars ine adamsite are strong irritants that attack lung tissues causing membranes to swell and become "leaky." The lung can then fill with fluid, and death can result from pulmonary edema. Acute nonlethal exposures to choking agents can result in chronic lung disease.
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From page 34... ...
Most fungi form spores. Because bacteria are much better understood than other biological agents, they are the most likely type of biological warfare agents (All et al., 1997~.
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From page 35... ...
Fungal toxins, which are produced by various species of fungi, are much less toxic than bacterial and plant toxins in vapor form, but unlike the other toxins they are dermally active. The tactical utility of biological agents depends on their robustness, their dissemination characteristics, their persistence (see Box 2-1)
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From page 36... ...
Although the number of countries that possess CB capabilities is troubling, intelligence assessments also indicate that most of these countries have limited quantities of agents and limited delivery systems. Estimates also indicate that most proliferant countries have neither the industrial infrastructure nor the military logistics capabilities to produce chemical weapons in sufficient quantity to pose an extensive threat to 13547 -- Deployed Forces 02 36 12128199, 1:33 PM
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From page 37... ...
Current assessments also indicate that these nations are not likely to possess novel chemical agents or to have weaponized biological agents. Thus, current U.S.
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From page 38... ...
They can also be introduced directly into food supplies, water supplies, and air-handling systems. Ordinarily, biological agents are much more environmentally sensitive than chemical agents and lose their effectiveness quickly when exposed to the atmosphere, and spreading most biological warfare agents from one infected individual to another (with the exception of smallpox)
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From page 39... ...
THREATENED USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Proliferant nations could use CB weapons for several purposes: battlefield use against neighboring countries with similar military capabilities; battlefield use against U.S. or other asymmetrically powerful forces; as a weapon of terror; or as a means of changing public opinion.
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From page 40... ...
. Most of the nerve agents in liquid or vapor phase and many of the vesicants can be absorbed percutaneously.
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From page 41... ...
Other mucous membranes are also vulnerable to many agents. The biological agents associated with percutaneous and mucous membrane absorption are listed in Table 2-10.
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From page 42... ...
42 STRATEGIES TO PROTECT THE HEALTH OF DEPLOYED U.S. FORCES TABLE 2-5 Inhalation/Respiratory Agents Effective Mode of (mg-min, Agent Delivery Effect where of: Phosgene Vapor Causes fluid buildup in the lungs ICtso = 1 that can cause drowning Diphosgene Vapor Causes fluid buildup in the ICt50 = 1 lungs that can cause drowning Tabun Vapor Cessation of breath ICt50 = 3 Ect50 = n Ect50 = n Ect50 = 0 Ect50 = 2 Sarin Vapor Incapacitation; cessation ICt50 = 7 of breath ECt50 = r Ect50 = ~ Ect50 = 2 Ect50 = Soman Vapor Incapacitation; cessation ICt50 = 7 of breath ECt50 = r Ect50 = Ect50 = r Ect50 = ~ GF Vapor Incapacitation; cessation ECt50 = r of breath ECt50 = r Ect50 = r VX Vapor Incapacitation; cessation ICt50 = 5~ of breath ECt~n = r Hydrogen cyanide Vapor 13547 -- Deployed Forces 02 42 Interferes with the body's utilization of oxygen; accelerates rate of breathing 12/28/99, 1:33 PM 50 var Ect50 =
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From page 43... ...
; 24 (mildly active) ECt50 = no existing estimates (thresholdJa ECt50 = 25 (severe effects ECt50 = 0-09 (mild effects ECt50 = 1-2b ICt50 varies with concentration ECt50 = ~1,500 13547 -- Deployed Forces 02 43 Delayed, although immediate irritation in high concentrations At low concentrations, no effects for three hours or more Delayed, although immediate irritation in high concentrations At low concentrations, no effects for three hours or more Very rapid Very rapid Very rapid Very rapid Very rapid Very rapid; incapacitation can occur within 1 to 2 minutes of exposure to an incapacitating or lethal dose, and death can occur within 15 minutes of receiving a lethal dose 12/28/99, 1:33 PM
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From page 44... ...
Effective Mode of (mg-min Agent Delivery Effect where of Cyanogen chloride Vapor Choking, irritation, slows breathing ICt50 = 7 Arsine Vapor Damages blood, liver, and kidneys ICt50 = 2 Distilled mustard Vapor Inflammation of the nose, throat trachea, bronchi, and lungs 50= 1 Ect50 = r Ect50 = 2 severe ECt50 = Ect50 = Nitrogen mustard Vapor Incapacitation N/AC Mustard-T mixture Vapor Incapacitation N/AC Lewisite Vapor Incapacitation ECt50 = 1 Mustard-lewisite mixture Vapor Incapacitation N/AC Phenyldichloroarsine Vapor Incapacitation Ethyldichloroarsine Vapor Incapacitation Methyldichloroarsine Vapor Incapacitation Phosgene oxime Vapor N/AC 50 = 5 = 2 Coughing, choking, chest tightness on exposure; possible cyanosis following pulmonary edema 50 = U concentr' is 1 mg/r agent be' one mint aNATO, 1996a; NRC, 1997a.
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From page 45... ...
THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT 45 Effective Dose (mg-min/m3 except where otherwise noted) Rate of Action Thing ICt50 = 7~000 Very rapid reys ICt50 = 2,500 Effects delayed from 2 hours to 11 days ICt50= 150 ECt50 = no existing estimates (thresholdJa ECt50 = 200 (moderate temperature, severe effects ECt50 = >50 (mild effects ECt50 = 10-l,OOOb N/AC N/AC ECt50 = 1,500 N/AC N/AC ICt50 = 5-10 Ict50 = 25 .ess ICt50 = unknown; lowest irritant concentration after a 10 second exposure is 1 mg/m3; effects of the agent become unbearable after one minute at 3 mg/m3 Effects delayed for 4 to 6 hours Effects delayed for ~12 hours Delayed action not well known Rapid acting Rapid acting skin irritation, blisters in 13 hours Rapid acting Rapid acting nose/throat irritation, blisters in 12 hours Rapid acting nose/throat irritation, blisters in several hours Rapid acting 13547 -- Deployed Forces 02 45 12/28/99, 1:33 PM
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From page 46... ...
Liquid N/Aa ED50 = n GF Liquid N/Aa ED50 = n VX Liquid N/Aa ED50 = 5 ED50= 1 Distilled mustard Liquid Inflammation of the nose, throat, trachea, bronchi, and lungs Nitrogen mustard Liquid Incapacitation Mustard-T mixture Liquid Incapacitation ID50 = 2, ED50 = n ED50= 1 = 2t = v Lewisite Liquid Incapacitation ID50 = le more the ED50= 1 Mustard-lewisite mixture Liquid Incapacitation ~ . Phenyldichloroarsine Liquid Incapacitation Ethyldichloroarsine Liquid Incapacitation Methyldichloroarsine Liquid Incapacitation ID50 = 2t 1,500-2,0 ID50 = 1( 1,800 as N/Aa N/Aa aUnlikely exposure via this route; no information found.
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From page 47... ...
THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT 47 Effective Dose (mg-min/m3 except where otherwise noted) Rate of Action ED50 = no existing estimates ED50 = no existing estimates ED50 = no existing estimates ED50 = no existing estimates ED50 = 5 mg/70-kg mane ED50= 1 mgC ngs ID50 = 2,000 by skin; 200 by eye ED50 = no existing estimatesb ED50 = 10 TgC ID50 = 200 by eye; 9,000 by skin ID50 = very low ID50 = less than 300 by eye; more than 1,500 by skin ED50 = 15 Tg ID50 = 200 by eye; 1,500-2,000 by skin ID50 = 16 as vomiting agent; 1,800 as blister N/Aa N/Aa Very rapid Very rapid; may be lethal within 15 minutes of absorption Very rapid; may be lethal within 15 minutes of absorption Very rapid Very rapid; may be lethal within 15 minutes of absorption Effects delayed for 4 to 6 hours Effects delayed for ~12 hours Delayed action not well known Rapid acting Rapid acting skin irritation; blisters in 13 hours Rapid acting Rapid acting nose/throat irritation; blisters in 12 hours Rapid acting nose/throat irritation; blisters in several hours 13547 -- Deployed Forces 02 47 12128199, 1:33 PM
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From page 48... ...
Aerosol 80% mor Q fever (Coxiella burneti) Aerosol 70% mor Smallpox Aerosol 30-35% Venezuelan equine encephalitis Aerosol 90% mor Dysentery (Shigella dysenteriae)
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From page 49... ...
THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT 49 Effective Dose Rate of Action ID50 = 2,000 by skin; 200 by eye ED50= no existing estimatesa ED50 = 10 gab ID50 = 200 by eye; 9,000 by skin ID50 = very low ID50 = 200 by eye; 1,500-2,000 by skin Effects delayed for 4 to 6 hours Effects delayed for ~12 hours Delayed action not well known Rapid acting skin irritation; blisters in 13 hours Onset Effect Effective Dose Time (days) 75% morbidity; 80% mortality 8,000-50,000 spores 1-5 100-500 organisms 2-3 80% morbidity; 35% mortality 10-50 organisms 2-3 70% morbidity; <1% mortality 1-10 organisms 14-21 30-35% mortality 10-100 organisms 12 90% morbidity; <5% mortality 10-100 organisms 1-5 25% mortality 10-100 organisms 1-7 15-90% mortality 1,000,000 organisms 1-5 2% fatality 10-100 organisms 5-21 13547 -- Deployed Forces 02 49 12128199, 1:33 PM
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From page 50... ...
Army et al., 1990. TABLE 2-10 Agents Absorbed via Mucous Membranes or the Skin Mode of Agent Delivery Effect Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
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From page 51... ...
tom Onset Effect Effective Dose Time 25% mortality N/Aa N/Aa mbranes 80% morbidity; 10-50 organisms N/Aa 35% mortality rate tact skin N/Aa N/Aa N/Aa N/Aa N/Aa N/Aa N/Aa N/Aa N/Aa 13547 -- Deployed Forces 02 51 12128199, 1:33 PM
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From page 52... ...
Each level of military conflict or operation poses different challenges in terms of potential CB use and, therefore, different risks to deployed forces. Military operations range from major regional conflicts involving large numbers of personnel to policing and peacekeeping operations that involve small units.
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From page 53... ...
, (NRC, l999b) , our current capability has been Onset Effect Effective Dose Time (days)
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From page 54... ...
The progression is shown in Table 2-13. CB battlefield exigencies may require collective protection, a place for medical treatment of casualties and the removal of MOPP gear for eating and recovery periods.
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From page 55... ...
The standard battledress overgarment and other individual protective equipment that make up the soldier's MOPP gear are readily available (i.e., equipment is either carried by each soldier or stored within arm's reach [e.g., within the work area, vehicle, or fighting positions. Units at MOPP Zero are highly vulnerable to attacks with persistent agents and will automatically upgrade to MOPP 1 when they determine, or are notified, that persistent chemical weapons have been used or that the threat of chemical weapons has arisen.
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From page 56... ...
The prioritization and selection of RDA projects are often based on compromises or political trade-offs unrelated to CINC prioritization, technical capabilities, or bona fide needs and are focused on servicespecific, rather than joint service, needs. 13547 -- Deployed Forces 02 56 12128199, 1:33 PM
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From page 57... ...
The reevaluation should include a reassessment of the use of threat information. 13547 -- Deployed Forces 02 57 12128199, 1:33 PM
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