Strategies to Protect the Health of Deployed U.S. Forces Force Protection and Decontamination (1999) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Pages 1-15
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and other harmful agents was not unique to Gulf operations but have been a component of all military operations in this century. Nevertheless, the Gulf War deployment focused national attention on the potential, but uncertain, relationship between the presence of CB agents in theater and health symptoms reported by military personnel.
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This assessment includes an evaluation of the efficacy and implementation of current policies, doctrine, and training as they relate to protection against and decontamination of CB agents during troop deployments and recommends modifications in strategies to improve protection against deleterious health effects in future deployments. This report includes reviews and evaluations of the following topics: · current protective equipment and protective measures, as well as those in development · current and proposed methods for decontaminating personnel and equipment after exposure to CB agents · current policies, doctrine, and training for protecting against and decontaminating personnel and equipment in future deployments · the effects of using current protective equipment and procedures on unit effectiveness and other human performance factors · current and projected military capabilities to provide emergency response to terrorist CB incidents
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The United States discontinued its offensive biological and chemical military research programs in 1969 and 1989, respectively, but continued to expand its defensive programs. However, CB technologies have continued to proliferate in other countries, and with advances in bioengineering and molecular biological capabilities, even small nations or groups now have the potential to develop novel biological agents.
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The prioritization and selection of RDA projects are often based on compromises or political trade-offs unrelated to CINC prioritization, technical capabilities, or bona fide needs and are focused on servicespecific rather than joint service needs. Recommendation.
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Implementing the doctrine involved providing a combination of individual protective equipment and extensive training on fighting in contaminated environments. As technology has advanced, especially detection technologies, and as new detection equipment has been fielded, the doctrine has shifted to "contamination avoidance." Stated simply, this
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For example, the joint service lightweight integrated suit technology (JSLIST) affords better CB protection, reduces the physiological heat burden, and interferes less with weapons systems than previous technologies.
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The hands have traditionally been protected by impermeable gloves; however, recent research has also focused on multilaminate technologies and barrier creams designed to prevent or reduce the penetration and absorption of hazardous materials by the skin, thus preventing skin lesions and/or other toxic effects. Effective barrier creams might also be used to protect skin adjacent to areas where the garments are known to provide less than optimal protection (e.g., under seams, around closures)
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Finding. Although mask fit testing has been shown to improve protection factors 100-fold, the Air Force and Army have only recently begun deploying mask fit testing equipment and providing appropriate training protocols and supportive doctrine.
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An impermeable garment system is believed to provide the most comprehensive protection against CB agents. But impermeable barriers cause serious heat stress because they trap bodily moisture vapor inside the system.
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Recommendation. The Department of Defense should assess the needs of deployed forces for collective protection units in light of changing threats and the development of new personal protective equipment and provide adequate supplies of such equipment to deployed forces.
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The Department of Defense should initiate a joint service, interagency, and international cooperative effort to establish decontamination standards. Standards should be based on the best science available and may require the development of new models for setting benchmarks, especially for highly toxic or pathogenic agents.
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Adherence to the principles of the nonproliferation agreements entered into by the United States prohibits most tests using live agents, as well as studies with human volunteers (except with surrogate agents)
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Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense Chemical Casualty Site Team, the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and the National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Program. Finding.
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Based on the many lessons that have been learned from the Gulf War and subsequent deployments, as well as on information from other sources, a great deal can be done to minimize potential adverse health effects from exposure to CB agents and to increase protection levels against them. Recommendation.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15 Recommendation. Required levels of training (with the appropriate level of funding for training devices and simultants)
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