Streamlining Space Launch Range Safety (2000) / Chapter Skim
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3 Risk Management Approaches to Safety
3 Risk Management Approaches to Safety
Pages 14-25
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From page 14... ...
Risk standards then can be used to derive safety requirements, and old requirements not needed to satisfy risk standards can be eliminated. This chapter describes a risk management approach to space launch range safety.
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From page 15... ...
Each command is expected to manage the hardware, software, and support necessary to meet its mission requirements. AFMC's role is to "perform all functions required to acquire, conduct developmental testing, sustain, and improve the operational performance of launch vehicles, satellites, and launch range systems" (AFSPC/AFMC, 1997~.
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From page 16... ...
AFMC is also responsible for the provision of sustaining engineering and depot-level maintenance for launch vehicles, upper stages, range systems, and associated ground equipment. In support of the acquisition process, AFSPC is responsible for defining and prioritizing operational requirements for existing and new launch vehicles and systems and for communicating those requirements to AFMC.
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From page 17... ...
during the acquisition, developmental testing, sustainment, and improvement of space systems. The AFMC safety office would also be responsible for certifying safety readiness for other government, civil, and commercial launch operations at the WR and ER, as outlined below.
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From page 18... ...
,2 EWR 127-1, other pertinent documents, and the results of design reviews, analyses, developmental tests, and/or operational performance records. Close coordination between operational staffs at the ranges, system operators or developers, and the AFMC safety office would be necessary to evaluate risks, generate new safety tools, establish appropriate risk standards, and manage risk for these missions.
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From page 19... ...
A collective risk standard (i.e., a casualty expectation, or Ec) of 30 x 10-6 per launch for members of the general public is consistent with the risk standards of many other fields in which the public is involuntarily exposed to risk, both domestically and internationally.
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From page 20... ...
This information would also be necessary for the settlement of international claims or disputes in the event that a malfunction occurs beyond the destruct capabilities of the ranges (45th SW, 1999~. Neither DoD nor AFSPC instructions establish different risk standards for citizens of the United States and citizens of foreign nations, and the ER allows vehicles to proceed over Europe and Africa without further intervention if the vehicles have successfully navigated the appropriate gates.
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From page 21... ...
Therefore, the absence of FTS capability beyond the coverage area of uprange assets would not reduce safety for malfunctions that terminate thrust prematurely. This would not be true if a malfunction occurred downrange that unexpectedly reduced vehicle thrust or directed a vehicle off the intended trajectory while maintaining stable, powered flight.
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From page 22... ...
Safety procedures based on risk avoidance should be replaced with procedures consistent with the risk management philosophy specified by EWR 127-1. Destruct lines and flight termination system requirements should be defined and implemented in a way that is directly traceable to accepted risk standards.
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From page 23... ...
Moving the Africa gates uprange has the potential to reduce the cost of safety-related downrange assets, decrease the complexity of range safety operations, and reduce launch holds and delays. Moving the Africa gates to within the reach of uprange flight termination, telemetry, and tracking systems is not likely to increase EC significantly or 0.01 o c)
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From page 24... ...
Continued evolution and assessment of these modeling and analysis techniques is critical, especially for new types of launch vehicles such as RLVs. Because of inherent uncertainties in input parameters and modeling assumptions, safety assessments can provide only approximate results, even though range safety personnel are constantly improving their analytical models based on actual range experience.
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From page 25... ...
1997a. Supplement to Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges: Inert Debris.
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