Protecting Those Who Serve Strategies to Protect the Health of Deployed U.S. Forces (2000) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix D: Strategies to Protect the Health of Deployed U.S. Forces: Force Protection and Decontamination--Executive Summary
Appendix D: Strategies to Protect the Health of Deployed U.S. Forces: Force Protection and Decontamination--Executive Summary
Pages 69-82
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From page 69... ...
Nevertheless, the Gulf War deployment focused national attention on the potential, but uncertain, relationship between the presence of CB agents in theater and health symptoms reported by military personnel. Particular attention has been given to the potential long-term health effects of low-level exposures to CB agents.
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From page 70... ...
This report includes reviews and evaluations of the following topics: · current protective equipment and protective measures, as well as those in development, · current and proposed methods for decontaminating personnel and equipment after exposure to CB agents, · current policies, doctrine, and training for protecting against and decontaminating personnel and equipment in future deployments, · the effects of using current protective equipment and procedures on unit effectiveness and other human performance factors, and · current and projected military capabilities to provide emergency response to terrorist CB incidents.
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From page 71... ...
The United States discontinued its offensive biological and chemical military research programs in 1969 and 1989, respectively, but continued to expand its defensive programs. However, CB technologies have continued to proliferate in other countries, and with advances in bioengineering and molecular biological capabilities, even small nations or groups now have the potential to develop novel biological agents.
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From page 72... ...
Although analyses using relatively sophisticated computer models have shown that under certain conditions, 10 g/m2 levels may be present in localized areas of a battlefield, the average concentration may be considerably lower. These same models predict that the areas where levels would be higher than 10 g/m2 would be the same areas where the shrapnel and projected shell materials would be more likely to cause injuries or deaths than CB agents.
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From page 73... ...
Finding: System development is sometimes based on outdated and possibly inaccurate evaluations of threats and challenges. Recommendation: The Department of Defense should reevaluate the liquid and vapor challenge levels based on the most current threat information and use the results in the materiel requirements process and, subsequently, in the development of training programs and doctrine.
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From page 74... ...
For example, the joint service lightweight integrated suit technology (JSLIST) affords better CB protection, reduces the physiological heat burden, and interferes less with weapons systems than previous technologies.
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From page 75... ...
Recommendation: A total systems analysis, including human factors engineering evaluations, should be part of the development process of the personal protective equipment system to ensure that the equipment can be used with weapon systems and other military equipment. These evaluations should include: · the performance of individuals and units on different tasks in various realistic scenarios, and · the interface of the mask and garments and potential leakage during an "advance" from Mask-Only to MOPP 4 status.
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From page 76... ...
Finding: Although mask fit testing has been shown to improve protection factors 1 00-fold, the Air Force and Army have only recently begun deploying mask fit testing equipment and providing appropriate training protocols and supportive doctrine. Recommendation: Doctrine, training, and equipment for mask fit testing should be incorporated into current joint service operations.
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From page 77... ...
Finding: The Department of Defense does not have enough collective protection units to meet the needs of deployed forces. Recommendation: The Department of Defense should assess the needs of deployed forces for collective protection units in light of changing threats and the development of new personal protective equipment and provide adequate supplies of such equipment to deployed forces.
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From page 78... ...
If residual decontamination levels are based on ultraconservative toxicity and morbidity estimates, returning contaminated equipment becomes impractical. Benchmarks for decontamination should be based on highly accurate, reliable, up-to-date toxicity data.
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From page 79... ...
TESTING AND EVALUATION Testing and evaluation of equipment, methodologies, and the toxicological effects of chemical agents are critical for the development of appropriate defensive strategies. Adherence to the principles of the nonproliferation agreements entered into by the United States prohibits most tests using live agents, as well as studies with human volunteers (except with surrogate agents)
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From page 80... ...
Examples of military programs to support emergency response include the DoD Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense Chemical Casualty Site Team, the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and the National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Program.
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From page 81... ...
SUMMARY AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS The health of military personnel who served in the Gulf War, and of personnel who will serve in future deployments, is a matter of great concern to veterans, the public, Congress, and DoD. Based on the many lessons that have been learned from the Gulf War and subsequent deployments, as well as on information from other sources, a great deal can be done to minimize potential adverse health effects from exposure to CB agents and to increase protection levels against them.
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From page 82... ...
Training for CB operations has been very inconsistent, both within and among the services. Recommendation: Required levels of training (with the appropriate level of funding for training devices and simultants)
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