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The Spent-Fuel Standard for Disposition of Excess Weapon Plutonium Application to Current DOE Options (2000) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Pages 1-4

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From page 1...
... That standard held that plutonium in its final dispositioned forms should be roughly as difficult to acquire, process, and utilize In nuclear weapons as is the plutonium in typical spent fuel from civilian power reactors. The 1994 and 1995 reports concluded Mat He two disposition methods most likely to be able to meet the spent-fuel standard In the near future are (a)
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From page 2...
... The Panel was not asked to address: the proliferation and theft resistance of the steps that lead, under these disposition options, to the final plutonium forms; any questions related to geologic disposal or interim storage of these final forms except insofar as the properties of the final forms under such disposal or storage relate to assessing compliance with the
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From page 3...
... Such protections are appropriate and necessary, both for ordinary spent fuel and for plutonium disposition forms meeting the spent-fuel standard, but they are not substitutes for the built-in barriers to which the spent-fuel standard relates. Meeting the spent-fuel standard should be regarded as a necessary but not sufficient condition for judging a disposition method satisfactory, and satisfactory disposition should be understood to be only one element of the needed comprehensive approach to managing the hazards of excess nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials.
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From page 4...
... We have concluded that the LWR-MOX option is compliant with the spent-fuel standard; that the standard CANDU-MOX option is not compliant; that the compliance of the CANFLEX CANDU-MOX option is marginal; and that compliance of the reference can-in-canister option with the spent-fuel standard is contingent on the outcome of efforts to clarify this option's resistance against on-site attack and to improve its signatures aiding detection of separation activities. We have concluded, further, that resolution of the vulnerability of the current can-in-canister configuration to on-site attack will require additional investigation.
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Key Terms

  • final plutonium
  • plutonium forms
  • arms control
  • excess weapons
  • international security

  • plutonium disposition
  • plutonium form
  • typical spent
  • weapons plutonium
  • final forms

  • mox route
  • disposition option
  • disposition options
  • form produced
  • dispositioned plutonium

  • excess weapon
  • reports concluded
  • disposition methods
  • plutonium entirely
  • level radioactive

  • dispositioned forms
  • specified plutonium
  • excess military
  • interim storage
  • reference lwr

  • standard held
  • metric tons
  • military plutonium
  • barriers provided
  • matrix framework


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