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Appendix B Exemplary Scenarios and Vignettes to Illustrate Potential Model Uses T o support the analysis effort and focus subsequent discussions of potential model utility, we present here a detailed scenario describ- ing key operational aspects of a real-life scenario containing many of the Quadrennial Defense Review (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006) and Joint Urban Operations (JUO) considerations posed earlier. Researchers and model developers might believe that there are any number of scenarios available on which one might build oneâs analyses, but this is not the case. It is very difficult to find one that embraces all of the likely future combat conditions, since official publications state that realistic scenarios must include â¢ modernized industrial age forces with high-tech systems and more primitive paramilitary and insurgent forces; â¢ complex terrain and urban environments; â¢ failed states (the norm) with the internal society fractured and crime rampant; â¢ international interest/involvement in the region with nongovernmen- tal organizations or information operations (IOs) engaged; â¢ national will at issue; â¢ use of IOs including media-mediated psychological operations (PSYOPS) and computer network operations; â¢ soft influences ongoing in parallel, including diplomatic, infrastruc- ture, military, and economic activities; â¢ time criticality; and â¢ potential for inclusion of diverse missions. 381
382 BEHAVIORAL MODELING AND SIMULATION General Setting and Friendly Force Organizational Structure The scenario elements included here are derivative of the one detailed in TRADOC PAM 525-3-90 O&O 22 JUL 2002 (U.S. Army, 2002) and include all these aspects. For purposes of this study, three vignettes have been extracted and distilled. The three vignettes provide a construct for the purpose of addressing potential of behavioral models supporting a brigade combat team (BCT) as part of a joint campaign. As stated in the TRADOC pamphlet: âThey are presented for illustrative purposes only and are cast incidentally in the trans-Caucasus region to account for the realistic, tough range of variables and conditions, as well as the difficulty of the tactical dilemmas presentedâ (U.S. Army, 2002, p. F-1). The pamphlet, in its seven sections, provides a very detailed mission operational setting in the trans- Caucasus region (see Figure B-1). It includes three relevant vignettes: FIGURE B-1â Trans-Caucasus regionB-1.eps for TRADOC PAM 525-3-90 scenario. SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002, p. F-1). bitmap image uneditable low resolution
APPENDIX B 383 1. tactical operations in entry operation (Entry), 2. operational maneuver by air, combined arms operation for urban warfare (Transition), and 3. secure portion of a major urban area (JUO). The design purpose of these vignettes is to develop requirements, seek new tactical concepts, and seek new organizational design principles. The pamphlet emphasizes joint operations, and it explicitly describes new tacti- cal principles based on development of the situation in and out of contact with the enemy. In addition, the trans-Caucasus region includes long- standing fault lines of bitter ethnic rivalry dating back millennia and thus supports strong components of scenario design for purposes of assessing particular behavioral model applications with religious, political, social, economic, and cultural impacts. The nature of these âsoftâ regional factors emphasizes the need to appre- ciate and leverage political and informational domains to advantage. The BCT will be the basic building block of future combat forces (U.S. Army, 2002). It will have the capability to command and control up to six maneuver battalions, will be able to employ a range of supporting capabili- ties, and will be able to perform a variety of missions, including reinforcing fires, engineers, military police air defense, PSYOPS, civil affairs, etc. The BCT will not be a fixed organization but âmust be absolutely superior in complex situations where sophisticated political and informational skills are required in small unit leadership. Adversaries will leverage information, the media, and ethnic and religious fractures to maximum advantageâ (U.S. Army, 2002, p. 21). The BCT must have the ability to see, understand and act first, then finish decisively. Mid-grade and junior leaders must effectively recognize and solve problems in complex situations with political and informational dimensions. In the past, uncertainty about enemy and friendly conditions on the battlefield often dictated cautious movements, expenditure of time and resources to develop the situation, followed by initiation of decisive action at times and places not necessarily of the commanderâs choosing. The BCT will not be constrained in this way. Future commanders will develop the situation before making contact, maneuver to positions of advantage largely out of contact, and, when ready, initiate decisive action with initia- tive, speed, and agility. The supporting 81-person military intelligence (MI) unit, organized as illustrated in Figure B-2, is an important component of the BCT. It is the primary focal point for management and analysis of information pulled from the full spectrum of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) resources. The MI company provides all of the brigadeâs timely, rel- evant, accurate, and synchronized intelligence, emitter mapping, electronic
384 BEHAVIORAL MODELING AND SIMULATION MI Analysis & Collection & HQ Processing Integration FIGURE B-2â Military intelligence unit organization. SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002, p. 32). B-2.eps bitmap image redrawn with real type attack, targeting information, and battle damage assessment support dur- ing the planning and execution of multiple, simultaneous decisive actions by means of information and intelligence collection, analysis, processing, integration, and dissemination. The purpose of this organization is analysis, fusion, and integration of ISR from external sources, organic UA R&S, combat battalion reconnaissance detachments, and troops in contact. The MI unit has available to it ISR assets that are either organic (effec- tively owned and operated by the unit) or nonorganic (loaned to them for temporary use by sister or higher echelon units). The reliance on these two classes of assets changes over the course of an engagement, as illustrated in Figure B-3. Three Phases of the Scenario This scenario develops vignettes occurring during three phases of the scenario: 1. Entry: Combat forces enter the area of operations, Azerbaijan, and establish Forward Operating Base (FOB) Alpha. 2. Transition: Combat forces depart FOB and maneuver to Baku. 3. Major urban operations: Combat forces attack to seize Baku city center to facilitate its return to the host nationâs control. These vignettes are scaled back to depict only one BCT employed in combat operations. In this scenario, the BCT will conduct tactical opera- tions in three distinct phases.
APPENDIX B 385 Non-Organic ISR Capabilities Organic ISR Capabilities FIGURE B-3â Reliance on organic and nonorganic ISR assets over time. SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002, p. 89). B-3.eps bitmap image heightened contrast new vector type for colored labels Entry operations: The BCT uses military and commercial strategic lift to arrive in FOB Alpha ready to fight, fully synchronized with other elements of the joint force. For example, the BCT will have access to net- worked fires or âNetFiresâ as soon as it touches down in the FOB. This is a fundamental change in current approaches to deploying forces to theaters of operation. The future intent is also for intelligence already available from national and theater assets, as well as information on friendly forces, weather, and geospatial products provided through the global infor- mation grid, routed through the combat information centers, to be pushed directly to the BCT, allowing the commanders to do planning and rehearsals en route. When the FOB is secure, the BCT will enter the transition phase, a movement to contact, prior to entering their objective area, Baku. Transition operations: Until recently, the operational significance of transition operations was underestimated. This attitude has changed: âTransitionsâgoing from offense to defense and back again, projecting power through airheads and beachheads, transitioning from peacekeeping to warfighting and back againâsap operational momentum. Mastering transitions is key to winning decisively. Forces that can do so provide strategic flexibility to the National Command Authorities, who need as many options as possible in a crisisâ (U.S. Army white paper, Concepts for the Objective Force, [quoted in U.S. Army, 2002, p. 61]). Operational â NetFires will enable the dynamic application of lethal and nonlethal destructive and sup- â pressive effects. It will be integrated fully from the theater level to the tactical platform level, allowing the commander to establish, alter and terminate linkages between sensors and line- of-sight (LOS), beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS), non-line-of-sight (NLOS) division/corps and joint systems to achieve a wide set of lethal and nonlethal effectsâ (Haithcock, 2006, p. 25).
386 BEHAVIORAL MODELING AND SIMULATION transitions are required as the force shifts from deployment operations, to smaller scale contingencies, to major combat operations. The transition from securing the FOB to the movement to contact at Baku will provide the enemy 304th Brigade with time and space to recover and attempt to exploit BCT vulnerabilities. The BCT will plan and rehearse carefully to eliminate these dangerous transition areas. Because of its ability to keep situational understanding during a tactical operation, the BCT can transition immediately and aggres- sively to movement to contact. The BCT will initiate a series of deliberate attacks against a moving enemy under hasty conditions. Such an operation is graphically depicted in Figure B-4. The enemy 304th Brigade will marshal all the resources available in the locale and use every means possible to disrupt, attrite, and destroy elements of the BCT. Hasty and deliberate attacks resembling cold war maneuvers, crowds laced with suicide bombers, attacks by fire, mines, and improvised explosive devices will be used by the enemy at every possible opportunity. FIGURE B-4â BCT attack against a moving enemy. B-4.eps SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002, p. 63). bitmap image
APPENDIX B 387 During this phase the BCT will use three primary tenetsâspeed, preci- sion, and knowledgeâto successfully complete the transition in preparation for major urban operations (MUOs). Major urban operations: The brigadeâs mission is to seize Baku city c Â enter in order to facilitate its return to host nation control. It will have made some preparation for MUO during the movement to contact and transition phases, but the less built-up areas encountered en route to Baku will bear very little resemblance to Baku itself. Baku is a third-world city of 2 million composed of massed and heavy- clad framed buildings, which are dispersed in circular street patterns. Cur- rently, the enemy is occupying company strong point defenses within the city, and they have activated terrorist cells and other paramilitary units to control critical areas. The Baku city center with BCT objectives is shown in Figure B-5. Insurgent clans and terrorists will move to reinforce elements of the enemy 304th Brigade. The clans will âpile onâ to join in the attrition of FIGURE B-5â Baku city center. B-5.eps SOURCE: U.S. Army (2002, p. F-19). bitmap image
388 BEHAVIORAL MODELING AND SIMULATION the BCT. In accordance with joint doctrine, âClose assault is a central aspect of urban engagements, both due to the nature of the terrain and enemy as well as the need to minimize collateral damage and preserve critical infrastructure. Small unit effectiveness and empowered leadership are critical to the success of these operations. Close urban assault has a significant dismounted character, requiring a robust infantry capability to engage and sustain the urban fight. . . . These units will exploit handheld and unmanned ISR tools and the common operational picture (COP). Tar- get acquisition and engagement is difficult in the close confines of the urban environment. Fleeting targets can be acquired and killed using the BCT ISR capabilities and advanced weapons systems . . . The BCT must be able to sustain operational momentum through multiple battles by cycling forces in and out of contactâ (U.S. Army, 2002, pp. E-2âE-3). References Haithcock, J., Jr. (2006). Networked fires. Field Artillery, JanâFeb, 22â27. U.S. Army. (2002). U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) pamphlet (Pam) #525-3-90, The United States Army objective force operational and organizational plan for maneuver unit of action. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. U.S. Department of Defense. (2006). Quadrennial defense review report. Washington, DC: Author.