U.S. Air Force
Strategic Deterrence
Analytic Capabilities
An Assessment of Tools,
Methods, and Approaches for the
21st Century Security Environment
Committee on U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Military Capabilities in
the 21st Century Security Environment
Air Force Studies Board
Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
Washington, D.C.
www.nap.edu
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NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
This is a report of work supported by Grant FA9550-12-1-0413 between the U.S. Air Force and the National Academy of Sciences. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project.
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THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
Advisers to the Nation on Science, Engineering, and Medicine
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COMMITTEE ON U.S. AIR FORCE STRATEGIC DETERRENCE MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
GERALD F. PERRYMAN, JR., Independent Consultant, U.S. Air Force (retired), Co-Chair
ALLISON ASTORINO-COURTOIS, National Security Innovations, Inc., Co-Chair
JOHN F. AHEARNE, Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society
GERALD G. BROWN, Naval Postgraduate School
ALBERT CARNESALE, University of California, Los Angeles
W. PETER CHERRY, Independent Consultant
PAUL K. DAVIS, The RAND Corporation and Pardee RAND Graduate School
STEPHEN DOWNES-MARTIN, U.S. Naval War College
KATHLEEN L. KIERNAN, Kiernan Group Holdings, Inc.
RONALD F. LEHMAN II, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
JOHN A. MONTGOMERY, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory
JERROLD M. POST, The George Washington University
BARRY SCHNEIDER, Air War College
STEPHEN G. WALKER, Arizona State University
MICHAEL O. WHEELER, Institute for Defense Analyses
Staff
TERRY J. JAGGERS, Director, Air Force Studies Board
CARTER W. FORD, Study Director
MARGUERITE E. SCHNEIDER, Administrative Coordinator
DIONNA C. ALI, Research Assistant
AIR FORCE STUDIES BOARD
GREGORY S. MARTIN, GS Martin Consulting, Chair
DONALD C. FRASER, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (retired), Vice Chair
BRIAN A. ARNOLD, Peachtree City, Georgia
ALLISON ASTORINO-COURTOIS, National Security Innovations, Inc.
CLAUDE M. BOLTON, JR., Defense Acquisition University
STEVEN R.J. BRUECK, University of New Mexico
THOMAS J. BURNS, Great Falls, Virginia
FRANK J. CAPPUCCIO, Cappuccio and Associates, LLC
BLAISE J. DURANTE, U.S. Air Force (retired)
BRENDAN B. GODFREY, University of Maryland at College Park
MICHAEL A. HAMEL, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company
DANIEL E. HASTINGS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
RAYMOND E. JOHNS, FlightSafety International
PAUL G. KAMINSKI, Technovation, Inc.
ROBERT H. LATIFF, R. Latiff Associates
NANCY G. LEVESON, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MARK J. LEWIS, Institute for Defense Analyses Science and Technology Policy Institute
LESTER L. LYLES, The Lyles Group
ALEX MILLER, University of Tennessee
RICHARD V. REYNOLDS, The VanFleet Group, LLC
STARNES E. WALKER, University of Delaware
DEBORAH WESTPHAL, Toffler Associates
DAVID A. WHELAN, Boeing Defense, Space, and Security
REBECCA WINSTON, Winston Strategic Management Consulting
Staff
JOAN FULLER, Director (from October 20, 2014)
TERRY J. JAGGERS, Director (until October 17, 2014)
ALAN H. SHAW, Deputy Director
DIONNA C. ALI, Research Assistant
GREGORY EYRING, Senior Program Officer
CARTER W. FORD, Program Officer
CHRIS JONES, Financial Manager
MARGUERITE E. SCHNEIDER, Administrative Coordinator
Preface
In 2012, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Headquarters U.S. Air Force and the Commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command, asked the National Research Council’s (NRC’s) Air Force Studies Board (AFSB) to conduct a workshop on what Air Force strategic deterrence capabilities would be required for the 21st century security environment. The AFSB agreed and organized a workshop to frame the issues and construct the terms of reference (TOR; see Appendix A) for a follow-on study. A summary of the workshop was approved by the NRC and submitted to the Air Force co-sponsors in early 2013.1
TERMS OF REFERENCE
At the Air Force’s subsequent request, the NRC approved the terms of reference in March 2013.2 The chair of the NRC then appointed a committee of experts in June 2013 to conduct this follow-on study.3 The Committee on U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Military Capabilities in the 21st Century Security Environ-
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1 NRC, 2013, U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Capabilities in the 21st Century Security Environment: A Workshop Summary, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
2 The TOR are contained in Appendix A.
3 Appendix B provides biographies of the committee members. The committee includes experts with experience in academia, government, and industry—combined with many years in Air Force nuclear weapons capabilities, strategies, and postures; decision and game theory; behavior-based profiling; risk management; operations research; and modeling and simulation.
ment met during 2013 and 2014 to gather and assess facts, discuss findings, and construct recommendations. The TOR include the following:
1. Identify the broad analytic issues and factors that must be considered in seeking nuclear deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies in the 21st century.
2. Describe and assess tools, methods—including behavioral science-based methods—and approaches for improving the understanding of how nuclear deterrence and assurance work or may fail in the 21st century and the extent to which such failures might be averted or mitigated by the proper choice of nuclear systems, technological capabilities, postures, and concepts of operation of American nuclear forces.4
3. Discuss the implications for the Air Force and how it could best respond to these deterrence and assurance needs. Include in this discussion a framework for identifying the risks and benefits associated with different nuclear force postures, structures, levels, and concepts of operation.
4. Recommend criteria and a framework for validating the tools, methods, and approaches and for identifying those most promising for Air Force usage.
5. Recommend an appropriate mix of the classes of analytical tools affordable in today’s austere financial climate, and identify what can be planned for by the Air Force as future improvements to this mix if defense budgets increase or decrease.
WHAT THIS STUDY SEEKS TO DO AND HOW IT GOES ABOUT DOING IT
The TOR basically direct the committee to identify the broad issues and factors to be considered in seeking nuclear deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies in the 21st century and to evaluate and recommend tools, methods, and approaches for (1) understanding nuclear deterrence and assurance in the new security environment and (2) sizing forces appropriate for deterrence and assurance. The sponsor amplified the TOR by asking the committee to answer the following specific questions in the context of deterring adversaries and assuring allies:
• What analytic capabilities are needed to evaluate Air Force concepts and assertions about Air Force capabilities requirements as strategy is developed in the 21st century security environment?
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4 The committee interpreted items 2 and 3 of the TOR to mean that it should describe and assess analytic tools, methods, and approaches that would help both (1) in improving and understanding deterrence and assurance and (2) understanding how nuclear forces, posture, technological capabilities, and concepts of operations can improve prospects or mitigate failures. The committee and the Air Force understood that the study was not going to make recommendations about force structure and the like.
• How do we develop and validate future deterrence requirements and inject them into the joint requirements development process?
• What analytic capabilities can improve understanding of how nuclear deterrence and assurance work in the 21st century and how they might fail, and how might failure be averted by the proper choice of Air Force systems, technological capabilities, postures, and concepts of operation for American nuclear forces?
• Since what we believe about an adversary will change over time, can we develop systematic, integrated approaches to incorporate feedback, which would narrow the gap between beliefs about the adversary and knowledge about the adversary?
• How can we assist operational planners in matching Air Force capabilities, procedures, and actions to operational deterrence situations?
• How can we detect and evaluate adversary responses to deterrence actions?
The committee conducted its fact-finding and deliberations with those questions in mind.
While this study of deterrence and assurance has applicability to the U.S. Navy and its nuclear forces, the committee’s focus was on those forces that the Air Force is responsible for: primarily the strategic systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs] and long-range bombers and stand-off, air-launched missiles) but also dual-capable aircraft for theater operations.5
The committee grappled with a number of issues in deciding how to approach the study. First, it understood that to produce a result that is useful to the sponsors, the study’s recommendations should be cognizant of Air Force roles and authorities in the Department of Defense (DoD). As a military department, the U.S. Air Force has the legal authority to organize, train, and equip forces, which it then provides to joint combatant commands. The Air Force neither commands forces in peacetime or combat operations nor prepares operational plans for their use. The command and operational planning functions are done by functional or regional joint combatant commanders and their subordinate joint task forces, which, of course, does include Air Force personnel.6
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5 See Amy F. Woolf, 2013, U.S. Strategic Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, October 22 and Amy F. Woolf, 2012, Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 19.
6 The Air Force was established as a separate military department by the National Security Act of 1947, with its legal authorities (as were those of the Army and Navy) codified in Title X of the U.S. Code. This is what is meant when one finds the Air Force referred to as a “Title X organization.” The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, changed the mission of the military departments. Goldwaters-Nichols limited their authorities to organizing, training, and equipping forces, while assigning the responsibility for commanding and operational planning to the functional and regional COCOMs. The responsibilities and alignments of the COCOMs are specified
This creates a known tension. Combatant commands (COCOMs) develop operational plans with short horizons relative to procurement and training timelines. The Air Force time horizon is much longer than those of combatant commands. In balancing readiness and modernization, the Air Force must organize, train, and equip for today’s requirements (the current fight) and for the requirements not only of the next Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) but even for the “FYDP after next” (future contingencies). The question of what time horizon is appropriate for this study thus emerged as an important issue, which will be discussed further in this chapter.
The committee acquainted itself in broad terms with the process for establishing requirements in DoD. Prior to the reforms put in place by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the combatant commands had no formal role in the requirements process, nor did they have large supporting staffs that were expert in DoD’s elaborate Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) System. Goldwater-Nichols assigned leading roles in setting requirements for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman and brought the joint combatant commanders into the process.
Today, requirements are set by a joint system supporting the Secretary of Defense, where the Air Force has a voice but does not make final decisions. The Air Force has a seat on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the JCS. 7 JROC is responsible for identifying, assessing, validating, and prioritizing joint military requirements, to include requirements for delivery systems but not for the nuclear stockpile. Stockpile requirements are addressed in the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), where the Air Force does not have a seat.8
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in the Unified Command Plan, which is prepared by the JCS Chairman, reviewed and updated every two years, and approved by the President. There currently are nine COCOMs: Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, Transportation Command, African Command, Central Command, European Command, Northern Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command. See Andrew Feickert, 2013, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 3.
7 In addition to changing the relationship of the armed services to joint combatant commands, Goldwater-Nichols created the position of Vice Chairman of the JCS, strengthened the role of the JCS Chairman and the Joint Staff, and gave the combatant commanders an important role in the process for establishing requirements. Under the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, the JROC was created. JROC is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the JCS. The Air Force is represented on the JROC by the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.
8 NWC is a joint DoD-National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) organization established to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the two Departments. Among other things, it addresses requirements for the nuclear stockpile. The NWC is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD/AT&L). Members are the Vice Chairman of the JCS, the NNSA Administrator, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Commander of STRATCOM. The NWC is supported by the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee, where the Air Force does have a seat at the table.
In this complicated requirements system, the Air Force may seek to advance the understanding of the requirements for deterrence and assurance, but it does so primarily within the processes, assumptions, and lexicon of the joint force, and in a system where it does not have the final decision authority.
Of special importance to the committee’s work was to gain an understanding of the role and perspectives of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). The committee reviewed STRATCOM documents (especially the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept), received briefings from and interacted with STRATCOM staff, and devoted one of its fact-finding visits to STRATCOM headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base (AFB) in Omaha, Nebraska. The committee also acquainted itself with the views of STRATCOM’s senior leadership.9 Those have been taken into account in this report.
There are other major factors that were especially important to the committee’s deliberations. One was the attempt in DoD to shift its force planning framework away from platform-centric thinking (the ICBM and the long-range bomber are delivery platforms) to a capability-based approach (where a capability is defined, in joint parlance, as “the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through a combination of means and ways across the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Personnel, Facilities).”10 DoD has developed an elaborate Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to support JROC. This establishes the framework and processes the Air Force must work within in DoD.
The committee found that, while thinking in terms of capabilities and effects, it is highly conducive to deterrence analysis (as will be discussed in subsequent chapters), constructing and defending a deterrence-related program within DoD, and successfully advocating the program to the White House and, ultimately, to the Congress, cannot be done simply by discussing capabilities and effects but must focus on platforms, e.g., the next generation bomber, ICBM, and SSBN. While it is currently U.S. policy to retain a traditional triad of strategic nuclear forces (which, for the Air Force, means retaining the ICBM and the long-range bomber) and to retain the Air Force dual-capable aircraft, it is unclear whether that will remain the case as arms control proceeds, budgets shrink, and hard choices must be made between force readiness and force modernization. There already have been advocates for eliminating the ICBM force and/or the nuclear-armed bombers and nuclear-
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9 Those views are readily available in statements prepared for testimony to Congress. Of special relevance were General Kehler’s posture statement to the Armed Services Committees in March 2013 and his statement to the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on nuclear weapons modernization programs in October 2013, General Kehler relinquished command of STRATCOM to Admiral Haney on November 15, 2013.
10 See http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afpd10-6/afpd10-6.pdf. Accessed November 21, 2014.
capable fighters and cancelling the Navy’s SSBN-X as cost-saving measures. While the committee does not take a stand on such issues, it does acknowledge the debate as part of the unfolding security environment, which underlines the importance of providing the sponsors with the best possible tools, methods, and approaches for conducting sound deterrence analysis.
There are other considerations that were important factors in conducting this study, five of which deserve highlighting: (1) the meaning of strategic (as opposed to nuclear) deterrence; (2) the increasing importance of deterrence in regional settings; (3) nonstate actors; (4) the distinction between delivery systems and the nuclear weapons themselves, and (5) the possibility of changed circumstances, both positive and negative.
Like the workshop that preceded it, the committee spent considerable time discussing the fact that nuclear deterrence is not synonymous with strategic deterrence. There is a tension in these two concepts of deterrence, which is acknowledged and concisely expressed but not resolved in a white paper signed by senior Air Force civilian and military leadership on the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise and issued while this study was ongoing. Two passages from the white paper illustrate the tension:
Nuclear weapons are not an anachronism of the Cold War but some concepts are outdated; the Nation requires fresh thinking to meet the deterrence challenges of today’s strategic environment. Deterrence in the twenty-first century demands credible, flexible nuclear capabilities, linked to comprehensive strategies and matched to the modern strategic environment.
Nuclear deterrence operations do not occur in a vacuum. All Air Force capabilities, including space, cyber, and conventional capabilities play a role in effective deterrence and provide options for decision makers. Airmen must understand the interactions of these capabilities and how to integrate them to achieve the desired deterrent effects (emphasis added).11
The white paper is silent on who is responsible for ensuring that airmen understand the interactions of these effects. That assurance appears to be a responsibility shared among a number of Air Force organizations, but with no common framework. That is true not only for the Air Force, but for DoD in general.
There does appear to be agreement within DoD and within the Air Force that strategic deterrence is cross-domain deterrence. This is emphasized in the STRATCOM documents the committee reviewed and in STRATCOM presentations. It is beyond the scope of this present study to provide a new analytic framework for cross-domain deterrence. It is reasonable to expect that the tools, methods, and approaches that this study addresses may help advance the analytic agenda for
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11 Air Force Headquarters, 2013, Flight Plan for the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise, Washington, D.C., June 26.
understanding cross-domain deterrence, even though they focus first and foremost on understanding how the nuclear dimension of deterrence is evolving.
Second, one of the major shifts in priority in U.S. deterrence thinking occurring over the years since the Cold War ended is reflected in the increased attention paid to nuclear weapons states in regional settings, and to ways not only to deter such states but also to assure their neighbors, (many of whom are U.S. allies, that they do not need nuclear weapons to protect their interests against regional aggressors. This study places an emphasis on how the concept of tailored deterrence is evolving,12 the different mindsets of regional aggressors, controlling escalation in regional crises, the growing importance of missile defenses, and new dynamics for a concept that in the Cold War was called extended deterrence (which then was especially prominent for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) and now is referred to in policy documents as assurance. Planning for assurance is a major feature of the evolving security environment.13
Third, even before al-Qaeda launched its attack on September 11, 2001 (known to history as 9/11), U.S. policy makers were aware of the possibility that nonstate terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and use them against the United States, its allies, or other nations. This nuclear concern was intensified exponentially after 9/11. Countering nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation were elevated in priority in U.S. policy, eclipsing (many would argue) the traditional nuclear deterrence missions. The committee is aware of this fact and devoted attention to understanding deterrent requirements related to counterterrorism and nonproliferation planning.
The committee did not try to probe deeply into the nuclear weapons side of the equation. That would have required special clearances and a work schedule beyond the charter of the study. However, the committee was briefed on current plans. Today’s U.S. nuclear stockpile consists of two nuclear weapons types for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), two others for ICBMs, and three (with multiple modifications) for airborne platforms.14 The NWC, the senior body synchronizing requirements for nuclear weapons, has approved a “3+2 Strategy,” which is the “long-term strategy to move toward a stockpile consisting of only three interoperable ballistic missile warheads deployed on both the SLBM and ICBM
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12 See M. Elaine Bunn, 2007, Can Deterrence Be Tailored?, Washington, D.C., Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, January.
13 The committee devoted much of its fact-finding to the regional dimension, reviewing literature, and receiving briefings from experts. It did not, however, have an opportunity to visit the regional combatant commands (as it did STRATCOM) to gain their perspectives on deterrence in regional settings.
14 The current U.S. nuclear stockpile includes the W76 and W88 warheads for SLBMs, theW78 and W87 warheads for ICBMs, the B61 and B83 bombs, and the W80 warhead for air-launched cruise missiles.
legs of the triad and two air delivered warheads, (1) a gravity bomb deployable on both bombers and tactical aircraft” and (2) a warhead for a long-range stand-off (LRSO) capability ultimately to replace the air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).15 Whether this strategy can be sustained with adequate funding over the long term remains to be seen.
Fourth, while this committee addressed tools, methods, and approaches appropriate to sizing the delivery systems, it did not extend its discussions to whether the same tools, methods, and approaches provide an analytically sound basis for determining the appropriate stockpile size and mix. Fifth and last, the committee understands that over the planned lifetime of U.S. Air Force and Navy nuclear delivery platforms and weapons, both continuity and change will be significant. Planning for continuity must also provide flexibility and options to respond to change, both geostrategic and technological, which could be very sudden and dramatic in the years ahead.
It was our great pleasure to work with the extremely dedicated and professional members of the committee during this study. We would like to single out committee members Michael Wheeler, Paul Davis, Stephen Walker, W. Peter Cherry, and Jerrold Post for their outstanding contributions as chapter leads. It is our hope that this report provides a useful service to DoD and the nation.
Gerald F. Perryman, Jr., Co-Chair
Allison Astorino-Courtois, Co-Chair
Committee on U.S. Air Force Strategic
Deterrence Military Capabilities in the
21st Century Security Environment
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15 See B61 Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy, House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Armed Services, testimony of Donald L. Cook, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, NNSA, October 30, and 2013. Those hearings addressed the increasingly costly B61 life extension program and its place in the future stockpile strategy.
Acknowledgment of Reviewers
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
Kevin P. Chilton, U.S. Air Force (retired),
Raymond Jeanloz, University of California, Berkeley,
Michael E. Kassner, University of Southern California,
Brad Roberts, Stanford University,
C. Paul Robinson, Sandia National Laboratories (emeritus),
James Scouras, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory,
Alan Washburn, Naval Postgraduate School, and
Larry D. Welch, Institute for Defense Analyses (emeritus).
Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Stephen M. Robinson, University of Wisconsin,
Madison. Appointed by the National Research Council, he was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.
Contents
The Evolving 21st Century Security Environment
2 ANALYTIC ISSUES AND FACTORS AFFECTING DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE
What Do Nuclear Forces Help to Deter?
What Should Be the Basis of Nuclear Employment Planning?
What Are the Key Principles for Thinking About Assurance?
What Is New in Thinking About Deterrence and Assurance?
Have the Right Lessons Been Learned from the Past?
What Issues Should Analysis Address?
Increased Importance of General Deterrence
Improving and Moving Beyond Strict Rational-Actor Assumptions
Reexamining Ballistic Missile Defense with Extended Deterrence in Mind
Anticipating the Unexpected: Technological and Other Drivers of Change
Maintaining the Reality and Perception of Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Forces
3 SELECTED DISCUSSION OF TOOLS, METHODS, AND APPROACHES FOR DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE
Empirical: Data Collection and Social Science Analysis
Content Analysis and Profiling
Quasiempirical Sources: Gaming and Computational Modeling
Frameworks and Qualitative Modeling
Complex Adaptive System Theory
System Diagrams of System Dynamics, Bayesian Nets, and Influence Nets
Factor Trees, Cognitive Maps, and Cognitive Models
System Dynamics, Bayesian Nets, and Influence Nets
Game-Structured, Agent-Based Modeling
Modeling of Limited Rationality
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Acronyms
AFB |
Air Force Base |
AFGSC |
Air Force Global Strike Command |
AFSB |
Air Force Studies Board |
ALCM |
air-launched cruise missile |
BMD |
ballistic missile defense |
CAS |
complex adaptive systems |
COCOM |
combatant command |
CTBT |
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty |
DAAP |
deterrence and assurance analysis program |
DARPA |
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency |
DoD |
Department of Defense |
DOTMLPF |
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities |
DSB |
Defense Science Board |
FYDP |
Future Years Defense Program |
IAEA |
International Atomic Energy Agency |
ICBM |
intercontinental ballistic missile |
IT |
information technology |
JCIDS |
Joint Capabilities Integration Development System |
JCS |
Joint Chiefs of Staff |
JROC |
Joint Requirements Oversight Council |
LEP |
Life Extension Program |
LRSO |
Long-Range Standoff (Missile) |
MIRV |
multiple independently retargetable reentry vehicle |
MM |
Minuteman missile |
NATO |
North American Treaty Organization |
NNSA |
National Nuclear Security Administration |
NPR |
Nuclear Posture Review |
NPT |
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty |
NRC |
National Research Council |
NSA |
National Security Agency |
NSC |
National Security Council |
NWC |
Nuclear Weapons Council |
OSD |
Office of the Secretary of Defense |
PPBE |
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution |
RSAS |
RAND Strategy Assessment System |
SAC |
Strategic Air Command |
SALT |
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty |
SLBM |
submarine-launched ballistic missile |
SNA |
social network analysis |
START |
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty |
STRATCOM |
Strategic Command |
TOR |
terms of reference |
UN |
United Nations |
USD/AT&L |
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) |
WMD |
weapons of mass destruction |