The committee’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations are presented in this chapter and correspond to elements of the committee’s statement of task (Box 1.1), beginning with task A:
- Assess the principles for development of any new governance structure for the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] National Security laboratories in order to:
- Give multiple national security agencies, including the Department of Defense [DOD], the Department of Homeland Security [DHS], the Department of Energy [DOE], and the Intelligence Community [IC], direct sponsorship of the national security laboratories as federally funded research and development centers [FFRDCs] so that such agencies have more direct and rapid access to the assets available at the laboratories and the responsibility to provide sustainable support for the science and technology needs of the agencies at the laboratories;
- Reduce costs to the Federal Government for the use of the resources of the laboratories, while enhancing the stewardship of these national resources and maximizing their service to the Nation;
- Enhance the overall quality of the scientific research and engineering capability of the laboratories, including their ability to recruit and retain top scientists and engineers; and
- Maintain as paramount the capabilities required to support the nuclear stockpile stewardship and related nuclear missions.
The principles for development of any new governance structure, determined by the committee for item A, are discussed in Chapter 2.
The committee addresses item A(i), multiagency sponsorship of the laboratories, below.
Finding 1.1. The committee found no evidence that DOD, DHS, or the IC want to take on direct sponsorship of the DOE/NNSA laboratories as FFRDCs.
Rather, these agencies reported difficulties obtaining adequate funding to support their own facilities, infrastructure, and laboratories. These agencies are eager to use the DOE/NNSA laboratories in areas that are critical to their own missions, but as a general matter are not interested in committing their own budgets to pay for recapitalization of major NNSA laboratory facilities and equipment. They are generally pleased with the quality of the services they receive from the NNSA laboratories, although they uniformly perceive the laboratories to be expensive in comparison to other research providers.
Finding 1.2. Agency representatives who presented to the committee did not report major problems in obtaining access to the DOE/NNSA laboratories.
Perhaps the most satisfied customer is DHS, which enjoys a unique status as a result of specific legislation1 passed in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. It guarantees DHS access to DOE/NNSA laboratories on an equal basis with DOE.2 The committee was told, however, that while this legislation may have “greased the wheels” of access early in the history of DHS,3 it does not currently accelerate the approval process for DHS Work for Others (WFO) projects compared with other agencies.4
1 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, Title III, Section 309 (a) November 25, 2002).
2 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), dated February 28, 2003, provides guidance enabling DHS to gain efficient access to specific DOE capabilities. DHS has the same access to the DOE labs as DOE does.
3 Parney Albright, former Assistant Secretary, DHS, in comments to the committee on March 12, 2014.
4 Kathleen Alexander, NNSA, comments to the committee on March 12, 2014.
Several previous studies have cited frustrations on the part of customers with the complexity of the WFO approval process and the length of time required to initiate new projects (or add scope and funding to existing ones).5 NNSA has attempted to address these frustrations and to streamline the approval process,6 but further improvements are necessary, such as those highlighted below in Recommendation 4.1.
Conclusion 1. A new governance model involving formal, multiple-agency FFRDC sponsorship of the DOE/NNSA laboratories would create more problems than it would solve and would be resisted by the other agencies.
Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) presented an analysis to the committee7 in which they qualitatively matched a series of key NNSA laboratory values with a range of possible governance models and concluded that the best fit would be an arrangement in which DOE remained the primary sponsor of the laboratories while DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) became co-sponsors. The committee appreciates the value of analysis of radical changes that would promote greater involvement of the national security agencies in the governance of the NNSA laboratories. But it notes that there are no examples of successful multi-sponsor FFRDCs on the scale of the NNSA laboratories. One reason, no doubt, is the funding uncertainty inherent in such an arrangement; for example, jointly funded multiyear investment programs are vulnerable to reprogramming of funds by participating sponsors or Congress in response to changing priorities, and the processes for appealing and resolving such decisions are not obvious. Further, the large number of congressional oversight and appropriations committees with jurisdiction on national security issues makes it highly impractical to have multiagency sponsorship of the NNSA laboratories; overlapping committee jurisdictions would inevitably result in blurring the lines of authority and funding. DOE’s mix of national security and domestic responsibilities produces a complex web of congressional oversight and appropriations that already complicates funding DOE’s national security mission. Adding other agencies and their oversight and appropriations committees to the mix would be a recipe for further problems and complexities, not success.
5 Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, 2014, Interim Report, April, available from the Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, Va.
6 Kathleen Alexander, NNSA, “Comments to The National Academies Committee on Assessment of Governance Structure of the NNSA National Security Laboratories,” presentation to the committee on May 5, 2014.
7 Jill Hruby, SNL, “Perspectives on Governance of 21st Century National Security FFRDCs,” presentation to the committee on April 8, 2014.
The clearest line of authority (Principle 2) for an FFRDC is via single-agency sponsorship. Given DOE’s responsibility for the nuclear stockpile and the centrality of the laboratories in fulfilling that responsibility, DOE is now, and is likely to remain for the foreseeable future, the most appropriate sponsor for the national security laboratories. DOE thus must continue to assume both the authority and the responsibility to assure the success of the laboratories.
Recommendation 1.1. The Department of Energy should remain the sole sponsor of the NNSA laboratories as federally funded research and development centers.
NNSA, representing the sole sponsor (DOE), should provide strategic-level oversight of the laboratories and should, for example, negotiate the umbrella contract for the laboratories’ operations and assess performance under those contracts. DOE should also provide much of the federal funding for the laboratories’ programs and operations.
Recommendation 1.2. To complement the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) sponsorship of the NNSA laboratories, the other national security agencies should have a strategic partnership with DOE that should be formally recognized and should give those agencies a seat at the governance table for the laboratories.
It is short-sighted to think of multiagency sponsorship as the only alternative model to the current governance approach of DOE as the sole sponsor (and sole source of governance) of the laboratories. Because the current system is not working well, most recent studies have proposed shared governance, not multiple sponsors (see Appendix E). The national security agencies should have roles in the laboratories’ governance that complement DOE’s role as sponsor and promote sustained strategic engagement, as described in Principle 5.
As sponsor of the national security laboratories, DOE/NNSA has overall responsibility for managerial oversight and funding for the laboratories’ core operations and investments, which are focused on nuclear weapons. As strategic partners,8 the national security agencies would have the responsibility to help the laboratories, and their DOE sponsor, to understand the larger national security agenda and enable the laboratories and sponsor to meet future national security needs beyond those of
8 The partnership envisioned here is among DOE and the other national security agencies in the execution of their national security missions through their use of the laboratories in appropriate ways.
nuclear weapons. This strategic partnership relationship stems from the national security agencies’ vested interest in the laboratories’ performance and development of capabilities to support the agencies’ future mission needs.
As part of this strategic partnership function, it is essential that the national security agencies have a strategic dialog and relationship with the national security laboratories. The agencies need to be aware of the capabilities of the DOE laboratories that have relevance to their own respective missions and also need to provide the laboratories with assessments of their own future challenges and science and technology (S&T) needs. This will allow them to call on the laboratories’ special capabilities when needed, and, in turn, allow DOE and its laboratories to plan for and develop the necessary capabilities to meet the agencies’ future needs. Each strategic partner would, as now, obtain the benefit of the laboratories’ skills through the WFO process and, as appropriate, would invest or advocate for the investment in facilities or major equipment that serve its national security needs.
There are benefits for the laboratories, for DOE/NNSA, and for the other national security agencies in reinforcing this strategic partnership role. The work for other agencies helps to sustain key nuclear weapons capabilities, helps to attract and retain the best scientific talent, and provides value to the nation from its investment. Although an enterprising culture among the scientists and engineers in the laboratories is essential, the work undertaken by the laboratories should not dilute or distract from the achievement of the core weapons mission. Moreover, in line with Principle 4, the efficient use of national resources means that funds should go to the most capable and cost-effective performers; work should not be directed to the laboratories merely because they exist and have available staff.
This strategic partnership concept depends on three foundational ideas: (1) clarity of the national security mission, (2) a shared vision of the future, and (3) a collaborative approach to meeting future financial and capability needs. The national security agencies’ strategic partnership function should be pursued by way of an enhanced role for the Mission Executive Council (MEC; see below).
Finding 2. Although the NNSA laboratories are now by law referred to as “national security laboratories” rather than “nuclear weapons laboratories,” no one has clearly articulated what this evolution means in terms of the mission of the laboratories or the
proper relationships with other national security agencies and laboratories.
Consistent with Principle 1, an efficient organization requires a clear mission statement.
Recommendation 2. The Department of Energy, in collaboration with the other national security agencies, should develop a clear mission statement for the national security laboratories.
The foundation for strategic planning should be a crisp and clear mission statement that articulates the role that the national security laboratories should play in supporting the national security agencies. Indeed, according to the Federal Acquisition Regulation section 35.017-1, one of the responsibilities of the sponsor of an FFRDC is to define the scope of its mission in the sponsor agreement. The mission statement of the FFRDC is to be reviewed by the sponsor no less than every 5 years.
The core mission is assuring the reliability, safety, and security of the arsenal of nuclear weapons. Ancillary elements clearly should encompass capabilities that flow directly from that mission, such as weapons-related intelligence and assessments, nuclear forensics, radiation-hardened microelectronics, radiation detection capabilities, and the like. The challenge is in defining the appropriate role for the national security laboratories with regard to S&T matters that are more distant from the core weapons mission. DOE can and should use the MEC in its coordinating capability (in consultation with the laboratories) in developing a mission statement for the laboratories that reflects their evolving role. Although the laboratories should expect to be significantly involved in this process, it is essential that the new mission statement reflects the stakeholders’ (i.e., the DOE sponsor’s and national security agency partners’) buy-in and endorsement.
Finding 3.1. Essentially no strategic planning has taken place in a multiagency context to determine the future national security capabilities needed by the United States, including those that should be funded and resident within the NNSA laboratories.
The committee’s review of current strategic plans at DOE, NNSA, and the laboratories found that while these organizations do strategic planning individually, there is no joint, integrated process for strategic planning that
involves DOE/NNSA, the other national security agencies, and the laboratories. The planning should include not only the articulation of current capabilities and future thrusts and directions, but also governance-related issues, such as assessments of human and physical capital and strategies, to assure that capabilities for the future are funded and developed to meet the national security agencies’ needs. Such strategic planning could reasonably be accomplished through an expanded role for the MEC.
Although not members of the MEC, the laboratories need to be regular participants in order to provide insights both as to existing capabilities and as to future capabilities that could advance achievement of the national security mission.
Finding 3.2. The four-party Governance Charter and the MEC it established are significant beginnings to implement the national security agencies’ strategic partnership role in the governance of the national security laboratories. However, the MEC’s performance to date has not met the need for shared, long-term research and development (R&D) planning among the four national security agencies or addressed how the agencies would prioritize and fund the sustainment of national security laboratory capabilities. Moreover, the MEC has had limited engagement with the NNSA laboratories.
The process of interaction among the MEC member agencies is not yet mature, perhaps because turnover has been relatively high among MEC-related officials, and there have been relatively few meetings of the full MEC. MEC-commissioned topical working groups have made progress on near-term, tactical-level issues, which demonstrates the potential for the MEC to drive a long-term strategic dialog and planning process among DOE/NNSA, the national security agencies, and the national security laboratories.
The committee notes that senior-level agency commitment is important for the success of the four-party Governance Charter and for an enduring strategic partnership relationship between the national security agencies and DOE/NNSA. Such a relationship will enhance the laboratories’ ability to support the national security agencies in the future. This means an active strategic dialog, not only on which current laboratory capabilities need to be sustained, but also for identifying capabilities that are appropriate to be developed at the NNSA laboratories to deal with future national security challenges. This will require the national security agencies to share with other MEC agencies and the national security laboratories their strategic priorities and over-the-horizon challenges that
they need S&T help to address.9 The laboratories, in turn, will need to share with MEC agencies their assessment of the impact of S&T developments on potential national security issues, as well as the status of their current and planned capabilities to address these issues. Participation of high-level agency leadership in the MEC—at the Under Secretary or key Assistant Secretary level10—is necessary for the MEC to successfully negotiate the requisite coordination of strategic planning, priority setting, and funding of laboratory capabilities to meet current and emerging national security challenges. Periodic cabinet-level interaction is also essential.
Recommendation 3.1. The Mission Executive Council should become the primary vehicle to define and implement the national security agencies’ governance role. It should develop and pursue an agenda focused on identifying strategic priorities and critical capabilities to deal with ongoing and upcoming national security challenges, coordinate approaches for supporting needed investments in the laboratories, and provide coordinated guidance and processes. It should provide the following:
- Authoritative, periodic, and structured strategic guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and the laboratories about member agencies’ medium- and long-term mission challenges and thrusts.
- Periodic, structured assessments of the laboratories’ performance and capabilities in meeting current national security mission needs and the impact of DOE’s oversight on this performance (as an integral part of the laboratory overall assessment process).
- A strategic dialog among the agencies and the laboratories about investments that may be needed to better meet anticipated future mission needs and how those investments can be structured and funded.
- A strategic dialog with the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of Management and Budget, and the relevant authorizing and appropriating committees of Congress to discuss future laboratory needs and funding priorities as they relate to the laboratories’ broader national security mission.
- Periodic consideration of other (non-NNSA-laboratory) sources of science and technology to meet national security needs.
9 The MEC may conclude that it should involve other agencies in its deliberations. For example, the Department of State has an important role in nuclear nonproliferation policy and it might be invited to participate in MEC deliberations on that subject.
10 The level of the appropriate person may vary among individual agencies.
Recommendation 3.2. The high-level Mission Executive Council meetings should be complemented by biannual meetings (or more frequent as necessary) at the cabinet level that would be chaired by the Secretary of Energy.
Such periodic meetings would ensure that the capability and funding priorities identified by the MEC are raised to the attention of senior policymakers.
A description of the activities of a more expansive, effective MEC, as envisioned by this committee, is presented in Box 3.1.
With respect to item A(ii) of the statement of task, an NNSA laboratory analyst11 stated in a briefing to the committee that the costs to non-DOE agencies for contracting with the NNSA laboratories for S&T work through the WFO process are in the middle of the range of such costs for contracting with other potential research providers. However, at least in the perception of customer agency representatives who briefed the committee, the NNSA laboratories are considered to be relatively expensive compared with other potential research providers, and the high cost of the laboratories is a significant factor in their decision about where to conduct R&D work.12 An apples-to-apples comparison of the fully burdened rates of different research institutions is not a simple analysis, and the committee did not attempt to conduct an independent assessment. However, it is plausible that the laboratories’ responsibilities for safeguarding and working with special nuclear materials, as well as the layers of oversight currently employed to ensure compliance with DOE’s and NNSA’s risk-averse approach to environmental, safety, and health issues at the laboratories would make their overall costs comparatively high.
At least a small part of the cost problem at DOE/NNSA laboratories may be alleviated through changes in culture and attitude. The DOE Office of Science laboratories have to operate under the same DOE orders as DOE/NNSA laboratories, but appear to do so more smoothly and cost-effectively. The committee received briefings from the DOE Office of Science,13 a site
11 Dori Ellis, LLNL, “Enabling Interagency Work at the NNSA National Security Laboratories,” presentation to the committee on May 6, 2014.
12 Al Shaffer, DOD, “DOD Perspectives,” presentation to the committee on March 12, 2014; John Phillips, CIA (retired), “NAS DOE Governance Input,” presentation to the committee on March 13, 2014.
13 Steve Binkley, DOE, “A DOE View on NNSA Labs Governance,” presentation to the committee on March 12, 2014.
Mission Executive Council 2.0 Vision
The Mission Executive Council (MEC) has been slow to develop and is not yet effective in either establishing an appropriate governance role for the national security agencies with the DOE/NNSA laboratories or serving as a strategic science and technology (S&T) forum among the national security agencies and between the national security agencies and the laboratories. The committee’s vision of what the MEC should become—a new and improved MEC 2.0—is described below.
MEC 2.0 would provide a forum for two-way strategic communication between the laboratories and the national security agencies. In one direction, the specific science and engineering capabilities of the individual laboratories would be identified and promulgated among the participating national security agencies, as well as the laboratories’ views of strategic S&T trends and the national security challenges that may flow from them. In the other, the strategic S&T priorities and research and development needs of the participating agencies that are appropriate to be addressed by the laboratories would be identified and promulgated to the laboratories. MEC 2.0 would utilize this exchange of information to formulate a mission statement for the national security laboratories and generate an integrated, strategic S&T plan that would inform individual agency and laboratory planning.
MEC 2.0 would provide a forum for strategic dialog between the participating agencies and the laboratories with regard to investments that may be needed to sustain capabilities at the laboratories or develop new ones that the agencies consider crucial to their national security missions. As appropriate, MEC 2.0 would engage with the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and relevant committees of Congress to help ensure that the identified priorities are funded.
MEC 2.0 would feature regular meetings of senior leaders of the participating agencies and include dialog as appropriate with the directors of the DOE/NNSA laboratories. The Secretary of Energy would chair periodic meetings of his/her counterparts from the participating agencies to review the MEC’s strategic direction and ensure that issues that arise are addressed in a timely and integrated fashion. No changes to the original charter of the MEC would be required to realize this vision.a
a The 2010 four-party memorandum of understanding (MOU) entitled “Governance Charter for an Interagency Council on the Strategic Capability of DOE National Laboratories as National Security Assets,” which includes the original charter of the MEC, is reprinted in Appendix F. In the fiscal year (FY) 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112239, Sec 1040 (a)), Congress authorized the establishment of the Interagency Council on the Strategic Capability of the National Laboratories and then detailed the council’s membership (the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Administrator of the NNSA) and its responsibilities. The legislation does not specifically mention the MEC but mandates that “the President may determine the chair, structure, staff, and procedures of the Council.” The legislation calls for a report from the Council assessing, among other items, the implementation of the 2010 four-party MOU. As of this writing, that report had not yet been delivered to Congress.
office at one of the Office of Science laboratories,14 and two senior managers of the Office of Science laboratories currently conducting substantial work for other national security agencies.15 The committee found that the Office of Science’s approach to governance of its national laboratories and their WFO projects achieves a more cost-effective operation, along with higher customer agency satisfaction.
The DOE Office of Science’s governance relationship with its laboratories is characterized by partnership, strong mission-delivery focus, and a positive approach to enabling work for other federal agencies. Planning is a joint effort between the laboratories and the Office of Science, and the laboratories’ plans are reviewed annually. Other federal agencies provide feedback to the laboratories annually. Aligned with this mission-focused partnership, the site offices of the Office of Science laboratories are nominal in size in comparison to those of the DOE/NNSA laboratories. The committee received comments that this approach, culture, and attitude about governance in the Office of Science contributes to less complexity, reduced cost, and greater productivity at the Office of Science laboratories. It could serve as a model for change in the DOE/NNSA (see Recommendation 4.2).
The committee looked at the processes and procedures for the NNSA laboratories and the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to obtain approval to conduct work for other U.S. government agencies. The committee received oral briefings from NNSA headquarters, the laboratory directors of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), SNL, and the president of NSTec, LLC (the management entity of NNSS). In addition, substantive information was provided by laboratory personnel in response to several committee questions.16
Considerable frustration exists between the laboratories and the sponsoring agencies around the current DOE approval process for WFO. DOE Order (O) 481.1C describes the requirements for the contracting officer to approve WFO (Section 4.c of the order). The major concern expressed by the laboratories, and to some degree the sponsoring agencies, is the
14 Roger Snyder, DOE, “Site Office Perspectives,” presentation to the committee on May 5, 2014.
15 Thomas Mason, ORNL, and Tony Peurrung, PNNL, untitled presentations to the committee on April 9, 2014.
16 Material was provided by Dori Ellis and William Goldstein of LLNL, Charles McMillan of LANL, Paul Hommert, Jill Hruby, and Matt Riley of SNL, and Raymond Juzaitis and James Holt of NNSS.
substantial time it takes on the part of the laboratory and the sponsoring agency to package the request for WFO to meet the field office contracting officer’s interpretation of the DOE order (and there are multiple contracting officers at each NNSA field office). This can be a major problem when a project is time sensitive. The committee did not find any DOE- or NNSA-wide standards for risk assessment or broad agreement for WFO projects that would be acceptable at an NNSA laboratory. Thus, the decision to approve is largely up to the contracting officer, who is generally not a domain expert, but becomes the risk acceptance official in cases where there is no clear benefit to DOE in allowing the laboratory to conduct the work. Briefings received by the committee indicated that the processing time—from the point that the non-DOE agency first contacts a laboratory to the point that the WFO proposal is in a form that the field office contracting officer will approve it—can take 2 to 12 months. This process requires many iteration cycles and much effort on the part of the other agency and the laboratory personnel.
Table 3.1 shows the large number of WFO projects that were active in FY 2013 at each of the NNSA laboratories and the NNSS.
Not only are the totals in Table 3.1 large, the project values can be quite small, with a substantial fraction costing less than $100,000. Indeed, the numbers in Table 3.1 do not reflect the true number of approval requests that must be processed by the laboratories for a given project. Each funding increment, each new phase, and each addition of work scope for the same customer and the same project requires a new approval package that has to be submitted to the contracting officer. Both SNL and LLNL told the committee that the number of WFO packages that they may have to process each year can be three to four times the number of new projects initiated for any given year, requiring potentially thousands of transactions each year.
TABLE 3.1 Number of Active Work for Others Projects at the NNSA Laboratories and NNSS in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013
|FY 2013 Project Value in $ Millions|
SOURCE: Compiled from discussions with various laboratory personnel.
LLNL has tracked the nominal number of days to get a WFO package through the process to approval; the in-laboratory time is typically double that in the field office. Both have been reduced over the years, but the total was about 32 work days in FY2013. This in-laboratory expense is typically covered in laboratory overhead, which contributes to overall costs for both DOE and the WFO clients.
Committee interviews with the leadership of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) site office and the management of PNNL and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)—two DOE Office of Science laboratories that perform a considerable amount of national security WFO—found that achieving approval of WFO projects at these laboratories was less difficult. One apparent difference is that the Office of Science headquarters takes an active role with the laboratories and site offices in annual planning for WFO, with the intention of approving a broad scope of work within which each laboratory may accept WFO projects.
In recognition of the above, NNSA has communicated with the DOE Office of Science to better understand its WFO process. NNSA recently established the position of NNSA Director of Interagency Work to “enable rather than control” WFO work at NNSA laboratories. This has resulted in a reduction in the approval time at NNSA headquarters and at the field offices. However, the processing times still vary widely from site to site. In conclusion, the NNSA WFO approval process is a costly and burdensome transactional oversight process, particularly as conducted by the field offices.
Finding 4. The current NNSA WFO approval process has been improved but still involves costly, repetitive steps at the laboratories and is associated with unnecessary transactional oversight and lack of cooperation and advanced planning between the laboratories and NNSA field offices.
DOE/NNSA has made progress in reducing the time required to approve WFO proposals, and on their side, customer agencies such as DHS17 and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency18 have streamlined the process by developing standard forms for requesting work from NNSA laboratories. However, the individual laboratories process on the order of 1,000 WFO-related actions each year, including very small projects and
17 DHS Form UA201208, supplied by James Johnson, Director, DHS Office of National Laboratories.
18 Defense Threat Reduction Agency Blanket Determination and Findings (D&F), AIC No. BAP119922631, September 13, 2011.
renewal of previously approved projects.19 Because the review process for a small award is the same as for a large award, efficiencies can be gained by consolidating the review processes under umbrella agreements previously negotiated between DOE/NNSA and the sponsoring agencies. A clear mission statement (see Recommendation 2) would also facilitate the WFO approval process by making it clear what kinds of WFO the laboratories should take on and what kinds they should not.
Recommendation 4.1. NNSA should generate one or more Work Scope Agreements (WSAs) with each of the other national security agencies (the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Homeland Security) that is considered a strategic partner. The WSA would be the bounding document for bringing in new work from the strategic partner. Used in conjunction with a Work Boundary Agreement20 (WBA) between NNSA and each laboratory, work that falls within the WSA/WBA envelope would require only the processing of the funding documents. Further approvals would not be needed.
The laboratories would then be held accountable for their WFO decisions in their next evaluation period. The committee provides conceptual examples of a WSA and a WBA between one NNSA laboratory and one sponsoring agency in Appendix H. Initially, Recommendation 4.1 could be implemented as a pilot project with one or more laboratories and one partner agency. If successful, the template could be replicated by the other laboratories and agencies. According to an estimate by an analyst at one laboratory (LLNL), this would reduce LLNL’s approval efforts by 25 to 30 percent, as well as reducing the level of effort at the NNSA field office. The NNSA Administrator should set an outcome-oriented cost reduction goal of, say, 30 percent in WFO administration costs, and monitor progress against this metric.
The committee is not suggesting that there should be one set of WFO procedures for all non-DOE national security agencies, but rather one set for each partner (one for DHS, one for DOD, one for the IC, etc.) This would accommodate unique requirements while still expediting and simplifying the process. Once proven to be cost-effective, the committee does believe that there are efficiencies to be gained if the proposed WFO processes were standardized DOE-wide, including DOE/Office of Intelligence, DOE/Office of Science, NNSA, etc.
19 Dori Ellis, LLNL, in comments to the committee on May 6, 2014.
20 The WBA is based on the operational constraints that would provide the envelope for WFO work at the laboratories—safety, security, facility requirements, total cost, etc.
Recommendation 4.2. NNSA should conduct a comparative assessment of the Office of Science approach to Work for Others, including planning, processes, working relationships between site offices and laboratories, and all associated oversight and approval actions.
Committee interviews with the leadership of the PNNL site office and the management of PNNL and ORNL—the two DOE Office of Science laboratories that perform a considerable amount of WFO—found less controversy and inefficiency around approval of WFO at these DOE Office of Science laboratories than at the NNSA laboratories. One apparent difference is that the Office of Science headquarters takes an active role with the laboratories and site offices in annual planning to include WFO, with the intention to approve a broad scope of work and core competencies within which each laboratory may pursue WFO projects.21
Other national security agencies have, from time to time, provided funding for new facilities and major capital equipment at the NNSA laboratories in support of their missions. The committee is aware of three such capital investments that have been made by non-DOE agencies in the past: DHS funding for the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center at SNL; IC funding for part of the refurbishment of an older facility at SNL; and joint funding from DOE/Office of Science, DOE/NNSA, and DHS for a facility at PNNL.
Finding 5. Based on the limited experience to date with investment by other federal agencies in major equipment and facilities at the national laboratories, there is no proven, systematic approach to assure such investments are made in a timely, cost-effective way.
In each case the committee is aware of, there was no standard process for non-DOE investment, and in each case, the process proved to be ad hoc, tortuous, and time consuming. Success depended on sustained attention and effort of all parties involved, particularly of the host laboratory.
Recommendation 5. The Mission Executive Council (MEC) should be directed to develop a systematic approach for multiagency
21 See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science, “Laboratory Planning Process,” last modified October 22, 2014, http://science.energy.gov/lp/laboratory-planning-process/.
investment in the laboratories that allows for Department of Energy investment, together with investment from other federal agencies when and where appropriate. This approach should enable timely enhancement of both facilities and major equipment to meet a range of national security needs consistent with the new mission statement of the laboratories, or to meet a specific newly identified need. The MEC should define the principles for such an approach, oversee the development of a rolling 10-year plan, approve the annual plan, coordinate agency presentations to the Office of Management and Budget and Congress, and monitor agency accountability for meeting the plan.
With regard to items A(iii) and A(iv) of the statement of task, the committee believes that the continued ability of the NNSA laboratories to attract and retain top scientific and technological talent is a critically important metric by which any new governance structure should be judged (Principle 3). In two recent studies,22 the National Research Council (NRC) reviewed and commented on the quality of science and engineering at the NNSA laboratories, and emphasized the important role of interagency engagement, including WFO, in helping both to sustain the critical nuclear weapons capabilities and to attract and retain top talent. This committee agrees with the previous committee’s findings on the value of WFO and believes that its recommendations on recognizing and operationalizing the strategic partnership responsibilities of other national security agencies (Recommendation 1.2), clear definition of the mission (Recommendation 2), improved strategic planning (Recommendation 3.1), streamlined approval of WFO (Recommendation 4.1), and simplified recapitalization processes (Recommendation 5) will help to maintain critical capabilities at the laboratories and to attract and retain top talent.
Any assessment of the quality of science and engineering at a laboratory must include not only the technical people but also the management and leadership team as well. There is an aspect of the leadership within NNSA that deserves mention. It is important for sustainment of employee
22 National Research Council (NRC), 2012, Managing for High-Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. (Phase I report), and NRC, 2013, The Quality of Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. (Phase II report).
morale that NNSA leadership include individuals respected by the technical community in the laboratories. While the most important qualification of the overall leader is the ability to run a complex organization efficiently, the leadership team should include individuals who have significant competence in relevant technical disciplines in order to foster a sense of partnership and teamwork between NNSA management and laboratory personnel. The success of the DOE Office of Science laboratories may be attributed in part to a leadership team that includes individuals who are part of the relevant scientific community and who are seen to identify fully with and be part of any technical success.23 In order to establish such leadership, managers with respected technical competence should be strongly considered as part of the NNSA management team in order to build the appropriate linkage between NNSA management and its laboratories. Increased use of detailees with technical backgrounds from other agencies could help fill this need.
The committee addresses item B from the statement of task below:
- Recommend any other laboratories associated with any national security agency that should be included in the new governance structure.
The committee did not have the time or resources to evaluate all of the many laboratories (DOD laboratories, various FFRDCs associated with national security agencies, or even all of the DOE national laboratories) that do national security work for others. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the committee sees no reason why laboratories that conduct a large volume of interagency national security work should be excluded from the governance considerations outlined in this report. The committee found that in FY2012, two DOE/Office of Science laboratories, ORNL and PNNL, received major funding from other U.S. government national security agencies, largely for the purpose of performing national security research and development (approximately 24 percent of PNNL’s funding and approximately 16 percent of ORNL’s funding). Both laboratories have been successful in increasing their non-DOE national security work over the past 20 years. In addition, both ORNL and PNNL reported that they had succeeded in obtaining long-term, non-DOE investment in facilities for future use in support of the non-DOE federal agency work. Based on its discussions with ORNL, PNNL, and representatives of other govern-
23 Victor Reis, DOE, presentation to the committee on April 8, 2014.
ment agencies, the committee concludes that these laboratories can and do readily respond to the non-DOE national security needs within the current DOE Office of Science administrative and governance guidelines.
The important role of NNSS, which receives approximately 19 percent of its funding from other agencies, has already been discussed. Hence, the committee makes the following recommendation.
Recommendation 6. The governance model described in this report should encompass other laboratories and facilities that receive a significant fraction of their funding from interagency national security work, including Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the Nevada Nuclear Security Site. Moreover, as a long-term goal, Work for Others processes should be applied uniformly across these institutions, as described in Recommendations 4.1 and 4.2.
Over time, other DOE laboratories or facilities may emerge that conduct a significant amount of interagency national security work, and if this occurs, the committee sees no reason why they should be excluded from the governance considerations proposed in this report. For example, the Government Accountability Office reported that at the Idaho National Laboratory in FY2012, 17.5 percent of work performed was WFO.24
The committee addresses items C and D from the statement of task below:
- Discuss options for implementing the new governance structure that minimize disruption of performance and costs to the government while rapidly achieving anticipated gains.
- Discuss legislative changes and executive actions that would need to be made in order to implement the new governance structure.
The committee concludes that the optimal course is to build on and improve the existing governance structure. The implementation of a multiagency FFRDC governance structure such as that implied in item A of the statement of task would likely involve extensive modification of existing arrangements with multiple agencies. This would be resisted
24 Government Accountability Office, 2013, National Laboratories: DOE Needs To Improve Oversight of Work Performed for Non-DOE Entities, GAO-14-78, Washington, D.C.
by the various national security agencies. The more modest approach proposed by the committee could be put into place by the Secretary of Energy in consultation with the affected agencies, building on a structure the national security agencies have already initiated.
Because the recommendations in this report largely build on the current governance structure, the committee believes they would not require new legislation. For example, the MEC has already been created, and the expanded role envisioned here is clearly within the scope of the MEC, as articulated in the four-party memorandum of understanding (reprinted in Appendix F), although DOE and the other national security agencies will need to enhance their commitment to—and participation in—the MEC.
The committee addresses item E from the statement of task below:
- Assess the contribution and long-term impact of strategic multiagency engagement on the ability to maintain an effective peer review capability for the breadth of skills needed for the nuclear weapons missions.
The NNSA laboratories currently have a variety of mechanisms for peer review of their S&T activities; this is especially true of the unclassified activities. Because much of the work done by NNSA laboratories in carrying out their mission of stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile is classified, it is not subject to the normal peer review processes and evaluations that are common in the unclassified world. It is therefore critical that the laboratories maintain the breadth of internal expertise and the capacity for independent assessment within the classified environment to ensure that proposed solutions are robust and resources are spent efficiently. With respect to item E of the statement of task, the committee believes that the pool of qualified personnel available to the NNSA laboratories for peer review would be enhanced by the multidisciplinary challenges required for an expanded mission scope involving both nuclear weapons and national-security-related research. The committee also believes that such an expanded mission would enhance the attraction and retention of top talent to carry out such a
broad and challenging scope of research. The NRC has an ongoing study evaluating peer review at the NNSA laboratories.25
DOE’s national security laboratories have long played a critical role in U.S. national security. Given the rapid evolution of S&T generally, the globalization of enhanced S&T capabilities in particular, and the impact of S&T developments on the U.S. national security agenda, DOE/NNSA’s laboratories will remain a critically important resource for U.S. national security agencies for many decades to come. To ensure that the laboratories can meet national security needs in the future, adjustments are needed now to improve their governance and strengthen their strategic relationship with the non-DOE national security agencies. The recommendations in this report are designed to create a sustainably successful collaborative relationship among DOE, the other national security agencies, and the national security laboratories. Furthermore, the committee believes that everything recommended here is within the authority of the Secretary of Energy to implement. Implementing these recommendations would increase the probability that critical NNSA laboratory capabilities to support the national security of the United States will be available when needed in the future.
25 The cited NRC study was requested in Public Law 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Section 3144. It is sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration. According to the statement of task, the study will assess the following:
- The quality and effectiveness of peer review of designs, development plans, engineering and scientific activities, and priorities related to both nuclear and non-nuclear aspects of nuclear weapons;
- Incentives for effective peer review;
- The potential effectiveness, efficiency, and cost of alternative methods of conducting peer review and design competition related to both nuclear and non-nuclear aspects of nuclear weapons, as compared to current methods;
- The known instances where current peer review practices and design competition succeeded or failed to find problems or potential problems; and how peer review practices related to both nuclear and non-nuclear aspects of nuclear weapons should be adjusted as the three NNSA laboratories transition to a broader national security mission.
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