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Conclusions and Recommendations
Pages 129-142

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From page 129...
... Future cruise missile threats are likely to be characterized by features such as low-altitude terminal flight paths, low-RCS values, high agility and Mach number, ECMresistant sensors, and precision terminal homing capabilities. The Marine Corps operational concepts embodied in OMFTS and STOM will not be feasible without effective TBMD and OCMD if operations are conducted in this threat environment.
From page 130...
... Future ballistic missiles are likely to be characterized by features such as spin-stabilized RVs, separating ACMs and RVs, low-observable RVs, maneuvering and tumbling RVs, and an ensemble of penetration aids that might include decoys, shrouds, jammers, and debris. The NAD and NTW Block I systems will enable defeating some current unsophisticated ballistic missile threats; however, until upgraded systems are fielded, these systems will have limited capabilities against postulated advanced ballistic missile threats.
From page 131...
... 5.2.1 Prioritization of Cruise and Ballistic Missile Defense Programs Antiship cruise missile defense, overland cruise missile defense, and ballistic missile defense will all be necessary for naval (and joint) forces conducting 21st-century military operations for a number of reasons:
From page 132...
... ASCMD, 2. Area defense of forces and assets ashore against both overland cruise missiles and ballistic missiles (NAD system)
From page 133...
... Some argued that since ballistic missiles are widely available to probable or potential adversaries, and since land attack cruise missiles currently are not widely proliferated, priority for R&D funds should be assigned to the NAD program. Furthermore, ballistic missiles, which may be configured to carry weapons of mass destruction, can have a major political impact on allies and on forces ashore.
From page 134...
... antiship cruise missile defense, (2) area defenses against both overland cruise missiles and ballistic missiles (NAD system)
From page 135...
... The Marine Corps Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 214 (EMW 21) strategy is consistent with and dependent on the Navy's 4Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare 21 is the Marine Corps overarching strategy for conducting 2Ist-century Marine Corps operations, such as those described in "Operational Maneuver From the Sea"; "Ship to Objective Maneuver" (Van Riper, LtGen Paul K., USMC, 1997, "Ship to Objective
From page 136...
... Likewise, the Marine Corps has clearly defined procedures and CONOPS for both helicopter-borne and surface assaults on objectives ashore as well as a reasonable defensive capability against enemy aircraft and helicopters. The evolving threat of theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles presents a challenge too tough for any one Service to counter effectively on its own.
From page 137...
... Of immediate concern is the need to achieve a CMD capability to support naval forces and oint forces operating in littoral areas. J Recommendation: To achieve a competent cruise missile defense capability for the support of naval and joint forces operating in littoral areas, the CNO and the CMC should do the following: · Develop a concept of operations with the other Services that routinely substitutes and employs assets such as the airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
From page 138...
... The Navy will have to develop the necessary airborne sensors to support an OCMD capability or seek ways in which systems of the other Services, such as JLENS, might be brought into position and employed. Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should support the development of a competent cruise missile defense against antiship and overland cruise missiles.
From page 139...
... . Recommendation: In an effort to examine countermeasures beyond the design threat of naval theater ballistic missile defense systems, the Department of the Navy should maintain an ongoing red-blue effort that provides continuous analysis, design, and testing of potential theater ballistic missile
From page 140...
... 5.2.5 Current and Projected Marine Corps OCMD Capabilities Marine Corps plans for OMFTS and STOM depend on shipboard basing of assault elements and rapid transport of light forces to inland objectives. The Navy is expected to provide air support close air support along with Marine Corps air; combat air patrol; ship-based fire support; and ship-based early warning of and defense against air and ballistic missile attack.
From page 141...
... The committee observes that program effort in this area seems not to be coupled to thinking about a more open, network-centric communications architecture that would enable better access to information by lower-level participants, more useful reporting by those participants, and better decisions by the theater commander. Recommendation: Given that management of battle-space force components is a critical aspect of missile defense that is currently seriously deficient, Department of the Navy leadership should actively support efforts relating to doctrine, acquisition programs, and research to overcome such deficiencies, in particular by: · Supporting current efforts such as the Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP)
From page 142...
... 5.2.7 Technology Investment As presented to the committee by the Navy and Marine Corps, the developmental paths intended to evolve TMD capabilities are generally reasonable, although several exceptions are identified in this report. The evolutionary, or "spiral," development of added capabilities to pace the threat is a reasonable concept.


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