High-Impact Terrorism Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop (2002) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
Molecular Epidemiology as a New Approach in Detecting Terrorist Use of Infectious Agents
Molecular Epidemiology as a New Approach in Detecting Terrorist Use of Infectious Agents
Pages 87-101
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 89... ...
Bioterrorist acts differ from other types of terrorist actions in that they may be open, announced, and demonstrative acts or hidden actions disguised as natural outbreaks or divine scourges. In the latter case, resources and procedures are required to investigate the episode, document its unconventional characteristics, and in the best possible outcome, prove that it is artificially created.
|
From page 90... ...
virus Lassa fever virus Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus Machupo (Bolivian hemorrhagic + + fever) virus Marburg virus Monkeypox virus Rift Valley fever virus Smallpox virus Tickborne encephalitis virus Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus Western equine encephalitis virus + + Yellow fever virus + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + NOTE: AHSC U.S.
|
From page 91... ...
Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens Staphylococcus enterotoxin B Salmonella species Shigella dysenteriae Escherichia cold 0157:H7 Vibrio cholerae Cryptosporidium parvum Category C Emerging Pathogens of Potential Future Use Nipah virus Hantaviruses Tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses Yellow fever Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis
|
From page 92... ...
but as potential terrorist weapons, I believe that chances are not high that, for example, variola, Marburg, or Ebola viruses would be used for the following reasons: · The high danger to the terrorists themselves; · The great and hardly surmountable difficulties involved in obtaining the initial material for propagation this is true at least for variola virus because its stocks in Atlanta and Novosibirsk are very well guarded, and the protection systems are constantly being improved; and · The need for a high biosafety-level laboratory for propagation of these biological agents. From this standpoint, it is more likely that terrorists would use more common pathogens that could be stolen from an average microbiological laboratory, easily produced, or isolated in considerable amounts for instance, hepatitis A from sewage collection systems, since human feces would contain it in great amounts during an outbreak.
|
From page 93... ...
Unfortunately, the paper lacks the rate per 100,000 people; however, if we consider that the morbidity rate of hepatitis B and C is approximately equal in all three regions listed in Table 3, it is evident that the specific morbidity (per 100,000 people) of hepatitis A among Russian soldiers in Chechnya is about two times higher than the rates in military units located in other regions.
|
From page 94... ...
Exam~nation of water sources during the epidemic detected the viral antigen that 300 / / 200 100 / ""/ / / / / 11 111 IV V Vl Vll Vlil IX X Xl · Hepatitis A · Acute enteric infections FIGURE 3 Dynamics of the Incidence of Hepatitis Disease caused by Hepatitis A Virus during the Chechnya Conflict (February-December 1995)
|
From page 95... ...
I will dwell in detail on the detection of primary infection sources using standard epidemiological methods, since it is obvious that contamination not of an open water reservoir but rather of a closed vessel points in itself to deliberate contamination. Actually, if a water source is contaminated by a common pathogen and there is no direct evidence (a bottle labeled virus X)
|
From page 96... ...
The overall data obtained indicate unambiguously that the new epidemic caused by this subtype did not start from a single test tube, but involved a heterogeneous material that differed considerably from the strain circulated in the world in 1950 and kept in cold storage thereafter. Thus, the viral genome sequencing data demonstrated that the hypothesis on the artificial origin of the new epidemic wave of the influenza virus HlN1 is rather unlikely.
|
From page 98... ...
98 Cal ·_.
|
From page 99... ...
2. The wide natural diversity of strains of infectious agents provides the principal possibility of investigating and differentiating between natural and artificial origins of an infectious disease outbreak.
|
From page 100... ...
100 IL OD OD hi us I o ~ U
|
From page 101... ...
1996. The epidemiological characterization and laboratory diagnostics of viral hepatitis in the Russian federal military forces on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.