Attitudes, Aptitudes, and Aspirations of American Youth Implications for Military Recruitment (2003) / Chapter Skim
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2. Military Manpower Requirements
2. Military Manpower Requirements
Pages 15-40
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From page 15... ...
Figure 2-1 provides an overview of the major factors involved in the process of establishing recruiting requirements. The size and shape of the military services are determined by the National Security Strategy (NSS)
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The commanders in chief of the regional combatant commands develop their theater strategies from the NMS. The actual military force structure (sizei.e., end strength)
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The military requires a constant influx of new young people, and therefore it is as important to bring in new young men and women as it is to keep an optimal number of trained and experienced military members. The desired retention rate differs for each Service on the basis of its mission (i.e., the Army and the Marine Corps require more young people to perform very physically demanding duties; Air Force and Navy jobs are generally more technically oriented, require more experienced individuals, and thus have higher targets for first-term retention rates)
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From page 18... ...
military forces. New strategic planning principles include emphasis on homeland defense, on surprise, on preparing for asymmetric threats, on the need to develop new concepts of deterrence, on the need for a capabilities-based strategy, and on the need to balance deliberately the different dimensions of risk.
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However, "Preparing forces for homeland security may require changes in force structure and organization....
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(The role of the National Guard has taken on increased importance with the new emphasis on homeland security; however, in this study we did not review data on the National Guard.) The reductions in force size observed during the 1990s appear at this point to have leveled off; in fact, the chiefs of staff of each of the Services suggested in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (March 7, 2002)
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Table 2-2 displays the reserve component of enlisted strength by Service for the same time period. Given recent terrorist threats to the United States, it seems unlikely that force sizes will be significantly reduced in the near term from their current levels.
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The article states, "it would cost $40,000 [per year] to add each enlisted Person in addition to the $10,000 to recruit that person." Note that the QDR looks for ways other than just increased force structure to mitigate the operational risk, to include possible "changes in capabilities, concepts of operations, and organizational designs" (p.
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From page 23... ...
, in 2000, the force was 18 percent female as contrasted with 51 percent female in the general civilian population ages 18-24. The ethnic distribution of the force was 62 percent white, 20 percent black, and 11 percent Hispanic as contrasted with 65 percent, 14 percent, and 15 percent, respectively, in the general civilian population ages 18-24.
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Having the right kinds of imaginative, highly motivated military and civilian personnel, at all levels, is the essential prerequisite for achieving success. Advanced technology and new operational concepts cannot be fully exploited unless the Department has highly qualified and motivated enlisted personnel and officers who not only can operate these highly technical systems, but also can lead effectively in the highly complex military environment of the future.2 Typically, two measures are used to assess the overall education and aptitude of the enlisted force: cognitive ability (as measured by scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test [AFQT]
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From page 26... ...
Alternatively, recent RAND research concluded that future military jobs would require no significant changes in abilities from those observed in today's military; TABLE 2-4 Active Enlisted Accessions by AFQT Category (percentage) Year I-IIIA IIIB IV Unknown 1980 48.7 42.2 8.7 0.4 1981 47.3 31.1 21.3 0.3 1982 52.0 32.4 15.2 0.4 1983 57.5 31.4 10.7 0.4 1984 58.2 32.0 9.5 0.4 1985 60.2 31.9 7.5 0.3 1986 62.4 32.5 4.9 0.2 1987 67.0 28.2 4.7 0.2 1988 66.5 28.1 4.9 0.5 1989 64.4 28.4 6.4 0.8 1990 68.0 28.3 3.1 0.7 1991 72.1 26.5 0.5 0.9 1992 74.9 24.5 0.2 0.4 1993 71.1 27.7 0.8 0.4 1994 70.6 28.3 0.7 0.4 1995 70.1 28.8 0.7 0.5 1996 68.5 30.0 0.7 0.7 1997 68.3 30.3 1.0 0.5 1998 67.5 31.1 1.0 0.4 1999 65.1 33.0 1.4 0.6 2000 65.8 33.1 0.7 0.4 Civilian Population Ages 18-23 Year I-IIIA IIIB IV Other 1980 51.4 18.28 21.03 9.28 SOURCE: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy)
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Gribben notes that the "dramatic increases in technology-oriented positions in the civilian workplace during the last 25 years are not very closely tied to occupational area trends in the military during the same time period." Interviews with senior personnel managers in DoD and the Services confirm that no special skills are anticipated to be a prerequisite for military service given young men and women who meet the minimum qualifications, they can and will be trained to meet changing military requirements. This emphasizes the importance of the skills training mission by the Services and requires periodic evaluation to ensure that training fills the gaps between the abilities that recruits bring to the Services TABLE 2-5 Enlisted Member Occupational Distribution by Year (percentage)
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These represent a slight departure from skill, knowledge, and ability ratings for the force in the 1990s, for which conscientiousness/dependability was ranked first, followed by general cognitive aptitude and the need to achieve. The methodology for this study included evaluation and ranking of job characteristics and job skill, knowledge, and aptitude requirements for the next 10 and 25 years, respectively, by three panels one composed of subject matter experts (active Army senior noncommissioned officers representing 21 military occupational specialties)
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From page 29... ...
A second reason the military is unlikely to need to ratchet up its average level of technical skills requirements follows from what has been learned about civilian jobs that underwent technological change and what changes in the labor force were likely to be due to technology. Although there have been substantial changes in the education and skill requirements for particular occupations, industries, and sectors of the economy, skills upgrading in some areas has been accompanied by downgrading in others, leaving only a slow, upward drift in skill requirements in the aggregate economy over time (Cyert and Mowery, 1987; Handel, 2000~.
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Recruitment goals are affected by policy changes, such as the planned 1991-1997 downsizing of the military, and the mix of occupational specialties changes in response to, for example, technological innovations and applications. However, assuming reasonably stable personnel demands over time, the extent to which the Services can maintain acceptable retention rates by enhancing the perceived quality of the military experience may effectively lower numerical recruitment requirements and build recruitment capabilities.
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In sum, recruitment needs are in part a function of service retention capabilities: each Service's ability to retain personnel within acceptable rates of attrition and voluntary losses at the level required in each military occupational specialty (MOS)
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However, while the Marine Corps and the Army were exceeding goals for second-term and career enlisted personnel, the Navy and the Air Force fell short. Attrition rates for the separate Services over the 15-year period follow the general pattern of the aggregate rates, as expected, although there are exceptions and countertrends (Table 2-7~.
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With strong caveats about the quality of the available data, we examine the Service reports on the reasons personnel leave the military as indicated by broad separation codes. We also peruse Service career intention surveys, which monitor the attitudes and plans of troops under contract, and we review exit interviews with personnel separating from service for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001.
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From page 36... ...
The reason for most separations in the Navy is "other," defined as "personality disorder, conscientious objector, fraudulent enlistment, defective enlistment agreement, insufficient retainability, military security program, etc." "Other" is the second-highest percentage reason that men separate from the Marines and the Air Force, which report rates of 21 and 23 percent, respectively. The second-highest rate for separation from the Navy is behavior, 42 percent.
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From page 37... ...
Classes of variables examined in one or another survey include the attitudes of spouses and families toward staying in the Service, satisfaction with job characteristics, compensation, the availability of civilian jobs, promotion opportunities, pride in the Service, time away from home, and other quality-of-life issues. However, the data currently collected from these surveys cannot support any strong general conclusions regarding which factors have the largest effect on intentions or on decisions, due to the low response rates and differing data-gathering strategies across the Services.
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From page 38... ...
Attrition rates may be interpreted as an unobtrusive measure of quality of life in the military, which is affected by long-standing personnel policies. The litany of service personnel grievances includes low pay; decaying infrastructure, including poor housing and dated base facilities; outdated pension and retirement policies; family-unfriendly relocation policies and inadequate health care services; and such unglamorous workplace deficits as deficient spare parts inventories (Dao, 2001~.
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From page 39... ...
The current administration's emphasis on transformation, as well as recent new emphasis on homeland security, could also argue for changes in force size and shape, to include balancing the forces between active-duty, reserve, and National Guard forces. The QDR Report provides some of these decisions and also requires studies to provide the rationale for future decisions that could affect military force structure.
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From page 40... ...
Assuming the validity and the urgency of attrition rates and retention expectations, the task at hand is to bring knowledge and information to bear that informs policies and practices designed to enhance retention and to expand the recruitment pool. In fact, the QDR specifically states, "DoD can no longer solely rely on such 'lagging' indicators as retention and recruiting rates to detect personnel problems; by the time those indicators highlight a problem, it is too late" (U.S.
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