Scientists, Engineers, and Track-Two Diplomacy A Half-Century of U.S.-Russian Interacademy Cooperation (2004) / Chapter Skim
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4. National Security Issues and a Wider Agenda for Cooperation
4. National Security Issues and a Wider Agenda for Cooperation
Pages 41-62
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From page 41... ...
Meanwhile, the protracted conflict in the Russian republic of Chechnya triggered hundreds of kidnappings and dozens of bombings of buildings and vehicles in some Russian cities. In October 2002 Chechen rebels seized a Moscow theater, and 130 of the 800 hostages died, most from an anesthetic gas released by Russian security forces at a high dosage level to incapacitate the Chechen militants.
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From page 42... ...
Even today, Western experts remain concerned about the weaknesses in the improved Russian security systems and the ability of those systems to contain all dangerous weapons and materials. The tens of thousands of Russian weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians with special knowledge about weapons of mass destruction pose a particular problem.
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From page 43... ...
PROTECTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL Throughout Russia, vast quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium suitable for use in weapons are kept in hundreds of buildings at 3 Source for $7 billion is the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Committee, August 2003.
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From page 44... ...
In any event, Congress increased the budget for the MPC&A program significantly in the year after completion of each of the studies, and senior DOE specialists continue to use recommendations in the reports as reminders of areas needing greater attention, even in 2003.5 An important conclusion of each study was the need to encourage the Russian government and Russian institutions with nuclear material to demonstrate explicit commitments to maintaining the MPC&A upgrades once U.S. financial support ended.
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From page 45... ...
participants in the program. · Expand efforts to utilize Russian equipment and services whenever possible and to encourage Russian enterprises and institutes to increase capabilities to provide high-quality equipment and associated warranties and services.
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From page 46... ...
CONTROLLING EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER DANGEROUS MATERIALS In any country, programs designed to ensure that nuclear materials will not be stolen or diverted should be closely linked to effective systems to control the commercial exports of nuclear and other dangerous items within the framework of international export control regimes. As noted in Chapter 3, in the 1 980s the NRC had conducted several studies of U.S.
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From page 48... ...
were important and were helping to tighten Russian export controls. Probably the most significant contribution of the NRC study was its advocacy of greater attention to establishing export control competence and commitment within large Russian industrial firms, which were the birthplaces and repositories of most of the items of concern.
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From page 49... ...
At home, the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine have expressed concern to the U.S. government about the impact on scientific research of restrictive policies that limit the international exchange of research concepts and results, a perennial issue that dates back several decades.7 Among many Russians, and indeed among American specialists, there is often confusion about the overlap among controlled technical data, proprietary information, and classified information, and this overlap will undoubtedly produce recurrent uncertainties for specialists involved in high-tech ventures.
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From page 50... ...
At the center of the discussions were proposed steps that could help provide assurance that the Russian government had abandoned its offensive biological weapons program, that it was complying with the Biological Weapons Convention, and that it was not providing militarily sensitive materials or expertise to states of proliferation concern. Finally, the DOD decided to support an NRC effort to help chart a course for engaging former biological defense scientists from Russia and several other former Soviet republics in a cooperative program that would provide assurances in these areas.
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From page 51... ...
The NRC-led consultations involved a variety of meetings, most notably a scientific symposium in Kirov where the principal Russian military biological research facility is located, a workshop organized by Biopreparat near Moscow, and lengthy discussions during visits to several Biopreparat institutes. The NRC specialists gained unusual insights into past Russian activities and the future aspirations of Russian specialists.
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From page 52... ...
The program will support collaboration on the epidemiology, prevention, diagnosis, and therapy of diseases associated with dangerous pathogens that pose serious public health threats, as well as related fundamental research. The Pathogens Ini
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From page 53... ...
Also, the DOE was able to adapt one of its programs to opportunities for supporting research at former weapons institutions, and the Department of State used some of its funds to expand biological redirection activities supported through the International Science and Technology Center. Clearly, the NRC initiative to work with the DOD had spin-offs and played an important role in the development of cooperative programs in several executive departments.
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From page 54... ...
This broad examination of the long-term, biology-related capacity of Russia, being carried out in close consultation with Russian specialists, is intended to provide insights in several areas: · How can the resources that will be available within Russia to support disparate programs under the purview of several Russian ministries and other government-affiliated organizations be used more effectively in addressing the five issue areas? · How can important but underfunded Russian research and development programs be sustained over the long term, with particular attention to the problems of attracting new researchers to careers in the biosciences while also encouraging outstanding scientists who are in place to continue their careers in Russia?
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From page 55... ...
. How can international cooperative programs, motivated by both security and nonsecurity concerns, be more effective in supporting a Russian agenda in each of the five issue areas?
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From page 56... ...
, thereby overcoming the principal reason for RAS reluctance to engage in international activities in this field the RAS simply did not want to be in front of the government. Russian army ancl security forces had been involved for years in attempting to stymie Chechen activities they considered to be terrorism, but the new mandate for the FSB was broader ancl included coordination with security services of other former Soviet republics as well as coordination within the Russian Fecleration.
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From page 58... ...
DISPOSITION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE Although experts designated by the academies first met in 1996 to discuss interacademy efforts to address problems in the field of high-level nuclear waste disposal, it was not until 2002 that the NRC succeeded in persuading the DOE to support such an effort. In an unusual approach, the NRC established a committee composed of five Americans and five Russians to analyze the problems attendant in the two countries to the disposition of spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste, with special attention to the 8 The proceedings of this workshop will be published in 2003.
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From page 59... ...
. Some suggested areas for U.S.-Russian cooperation include: · assuring the current and future availability of the expert scientists, engineers, and technicians needed to work on spent nuclear fuel (SNF)
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From page 60... ...
. in a related activity, in May 2003 the academies organized a workshop in Moscow on the technical aspects of the international spent fuel storage facility that Russia plans to establish.
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From page 61... ...
In summary, whenever appropriate, greater attention should be given to preparing and disseminating persuasive documentation, in both Russian and English, to constituencies of influence. There is no doubt that a bound National Academies Press publication and its translated companion report attract far more attention than unbound letter reports, academy statements, or unbound manuscripts.
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From page 62... ...
Success should not be measured by the number of activities that are under way but rather by the quality ofthe products arising from the activities. In a broader sense, security considerations have always surrounded U.S.Russian scientific relations, initially manifested in decisions to grant or deny visas that might provide access to sensitive technologies.
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