Reykjavik and Beyond Deep Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arsenals and the Future Direction of Arms Control (1988) / Chapter Skim
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1. Reykjavik and Beyond: Implications of Deep Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arsenals and the Future Direction of Arms Control
1. Reykjavik and Beyond: Implications of Deep Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arsenals and the Future Direction of Arms Control
Pages 1-10
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From page 1... ...
Recently, during the large meeting of dignitaries and scientists on February 14, 1987, Gorbachev stated: "There is probably no one in this hall or elsewhere who considers nuclear weapons innocuous; however, quite a few people sincerely believe them an evil necessary to prevent a greater evil war." He then continued: "We would have to admit that the nuclear safeguard is not fail-safe or of endless duration." Thus, the two leaders appear to agree on the ends in this matter, but they drastically diverge on the means. The Committee on international Security and Arms Control (CISAC)
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From page 2... ...
What this dialogue has done, however, is to stimulate more intensive deliberation within the military establishment, among the United States and its allies, and within that part of the intellectual community concerned with strategic matters on which paths might be followed toward drastic reductions of nuclear weapons systems. It is somewhat paradoxical that, whereas the arms control community has dedicated considerable effort to analyzing and generally criticizing strategic defense, little has been done to study the more customary path to arms control; that is, limiting, decreasing, and eventually eliminating certain categories of weapons.
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From page 3... ...
Last year's annual meeting seminar dealt with one facet of the problem that is at some level independent of the nature of the arsenals themselves: crisis management in the nuclear age. Today's seminar examines the path toward deep reductions of nuclear weapons.
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Progress was made on agreements for the reduction of central strategic systems, in particular with respect to the hitherto controversial issue of how to count nuclear weapons on strategic bombers. What was left were verification issues, sealaunched cruise missiles, and the incorporation of the fate of shorterrange missiles in the INF agreement.
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From page 5... ...
treaty, such as testing from fixed sites Abrogate ABM treaty in Discuss future of ABM 10 years; deploy ABM treaty in 10 years; treaty system if developed still in force FIGURE 1 The Reykjavik "score sheet." be linked to an agreement on ballistic missile defense, and shortly after Reykjavik they deepened their commitment to that linkage. Only the subsequent agreement by the Soviets to unlink consideration of INF from limits on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
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From page 6... ...
However, although this was not explicitly stated, we asserted the right to live within the treaty strictures using the so-called broad interpretation, which permits unlimited testing and development of weapons in space. Moreover, according to our position, the ABM treaty would be definitely abrogated after 10 years, whereas according to the Soviet position the continuation of the treaty after 10 years would be a subject of discussion.
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From page 7... ...
There are indeed many questions associated with deep reductions of central strategic forces. For example, there is the resulting increased role of the remaining shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
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Under the earlier definitions of deterrence, it was argued, and ~ believe reasonably, that the potential of 30 million50 million dead wouicl be adequate deterrence; yet the nuclear weapons unleashed from only a single Trident submarine against major Soviet cities would have just that effect. Flexible response leacis to somewhat larger force requirements but mainly challenges command, control, and decision-making bodies.
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From page 9... ...
Thus, one may legitimately ask: "Is the decision faced by the national leaclership whether and how to retaliate against nuclear attack really that different whether one lives within an 'unacceptable damage,' 'flexible response,' 'selective targeting,' or 'clenial of continued war-fighting' doctrine? " Even more important may be whether the willingness of national leaclers to initiate nuclear war in the face of certain retaliation IS really that clepenclent on the perceived doctrine that the opponent might follow.
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From page 10... ...
However, T sincerely hope that this seminar will play a significant role in adding an independent, reasonable voice to supplement the chorus demanding a world moving toward freedom from nuclear weapons.
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