Reykjavik and Beyond Deep Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arsenals and the Future Direction of Arms Control (1988) / Chapter Skim
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2. The Purpose and Effect of Deep Strategic Force Reductions
2. The Purpose and Effect of Deep Strategic Force Reductions
Pages 11-18
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From page 11... ...
However they might grumble about it, both the United States and the Soviet Union in fact concede to each other the legitimacy of having a deterrent force that promises an effective retaliation to an attack, but 11
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From page 12... ...
In order to associate rough numbers with these theories, our calculations estimated the array of military and economic targets that actually exist in the United States and the Soviet Union. We considered 6,000 of those targets because our initial purpose was to consider, roughly, the effects of reducing forces to 6,000 warheads.
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From page 13... ...
We examined the infrastructure of conventional and strategic forces and military-support industries in the United States and the Soviet Union and determined that beyond the first 2,000-3,000 targets, additional attacks would be of so little marginal significance that a prudent commander would not continue the attack beyond those levels. So much of the military and social infrastructure would have been destroyed that additional destruction would not have sufficient military effect to justify the expenditure of the weapons.
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From page 14... ...
In sum, then, 500-2,000 warheads delivered in retaliation covers anything that might be considered a reasonable deterrent requirement uncler any of the prevailing opinions about that requirement. With that thought, we went on to assess how forces might be reduced in a way that allowed this core deterrent requirement to be maintained by both sides while eliminating the capacity of either one to attack the forces that would conduct this retaliation.
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From page 15... ...
That assumption admittedly was unrealistically pessimistic from the victim's perspective, but it was our belief that if the victim could retaliate despite that pessimism, deterrence should be particularly secure. Our results indicated that strategic forces of 3,000 warheads for each side would support efficient deterrent requirements quite well, provided sufficient investment was made in protective measures.
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From page 16... ...
One need not engage in that debate to undertake force reductions to the level of 3,000 warheads; reductions to that level would simply remove excess capacity. We then asked whether these reductions, if accomplishecI, wouIc3 remove the existing incentives for preemption and thereby establish a more robust security regime than the current one.
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From page 17... ...
by superior Western economic power. The NATO perception and the Soviet doctrinal commitment produce an unstable situation that would appear to become all the more volatile as the discipline imposed by nuclear weapons is limited.
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From page 18... ...
. international security arrangements.
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