Reykjavik and Beyond Deep Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arsenals and the Future Direction of Arms Control (1988) / Chapter Skim
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6. Implications for Conventional Forces
6. Implications for Conventional Forces
Pages 46-57
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From page 46... ...
The categories of conventional weapons, such as main battle tanks, do not have the same consistent meaning as do missiles of a given size ant! range.
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From page 47... ...
a year later. In the 1950s the decision was made to rearm West Germany but only with conventional arms West Germany was not to have nuclear weapons.
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From page 48... ...
To follow that offer with the proposal that they withdraw their 130 weapons of shorter rangy whereas we have none has compounded our surprise: The Soviet proposal was quite unexpected, and there has been a great nervousness in NATO circles as to how to respond to this seeming largess. The question seems to be this: Would "double zero," which is the code word for going to zero in both shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, mean changes in conventional forces, or do we need such changes anyway and does arms control have an important role to play here?
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From page 49... ...
The unit of conventional forces is divisions. Divisions are themselves quite inexact, but on the Western side they number about 15,000 troops plus some civilian support.
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From page 50... ...
Warsaw Pact effectiveness, under various assumptions, in an engagement on the central front. Under a conservative set of assumptions, including current capabilities, he concluded that the probability of a break
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From page 51... ...
For example, "tactical air" is the term used to define the close air support to ground troops. Many people argue that our air superiority is canceled by the dense air defenses in the Warsaw Pact countries and the large number of Soviet interceptors.
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From page 52... ...
There is another general conclusion that ~ hope is implicit in what have presented; that is, the uncertainties in estimating NATO capabilities are far greater than the effects, for example, of changing the total of Soviet nuclear weapons that coulcI be targeted on Western
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From page 53... ...
If this could be put in quasi-percentage numbers, we might say that the Europeans would like to have at least a 90 percent certainty that the United States would use nuclear weapons in their defense. They feel that the likelihood is much less than that, maybe actually around 40 or 50 percent.
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From page 54... ...
In a(lclition, enlarging the area affected from the Atlantic to the Urals brought in the whole western Soviet Union, thereby reducing the logistical advantage of the Warsaw Pact. General Secretary Gorbachev added that tactical nuclear weapons should be removed at the same rate as conventional weapons ant!
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From page 55... ...
and that the NATO response to the Budapest initiative will start movement on that path. Finally, there is the alternative approach to arms control in the conventional fielcl, the operational approach, which means regulating military activities.
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From page 56... ...
With the 50 percent reduction in strategic forces, ~ think one comes to the same conclusion because, although 50 percent seems like half, it really is not because the effects of using nuclear weapons are not a linear function of the number. One reaches overkill sooner or later fairly soon so that the last 50 percent of weapons could never have the military effect that the first 50 percent used would have.
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From page 57... ...
But even with some progress in structural and operational arms control, conventional forces will remain largely invariant with respect to the state of nuclear weaponry ant! changes therein because the level of nuclear reductions that are in prospect today do not really affect the separate and important mission of the conventional forces in Europe.
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