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5 Effectiveness of Experimentation for Future Naval Capabilities
Pages 141-180

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From page 141...
... The assessment then naturally leads to an examination of the adequacy of naval experimentation programs, processes used, and the environment and infrastructure that support experimentation. The chapter concludes with an examination of the broader relationship of experimentation within the joint context, specifically looking at the effectiveness of naval experimentation in preparing for joint operations and at the relationship between Service-unique and joint experimentation.
From page 142...
... In order to assess more recent Service-unique experimentation, the committee focused primarily on the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) sponsored fleet battle experiments1 (Alpha through India)
From page 143...
... The lessons learned from these campaigns were captured in the Marine Corps "X-files."2 To the terms-of-reference question posed at the beginning of this section, the committee responds that both Navy and Marine Corps experimentation is enabling learning and producing meaningful results directed at promising concepts and technologies in a number of key naval mission areas. However, other questions that remain to be answered in this chapter go to the heart of the matter -- which is whether naval experimentation is as effective as it can be and needs to be.
From page 144...
... However, to date it has not become a formal program of record. Marine Corps successes, based on the Hunter Warrior, Urban Warrior, and Capable Warrior campaigns, are as follows: 3In Chapter 3, see the section entitled "Synopsis of Results to Date from Fleet Battle Experiments Alpha Through India."
From page 145...
... The committee's findings with respect to the success of transitioning results of experimentation to the field are as follows: Finding for Navy: The mechanisms and processes for transitioning the results of experimentation directly to the fleet or to an acquisition program of record are inadequate, and they curtail the effectiveness of experimentation in building future naval forces. Finding for Marine Corps: The Marine Corps has been successful in transitioning nonmaterial elements of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)
From page 146...
... Other examples of successful transitions resulted from the Marine Corps Hunter Warrior, Urban Warrior, and Capable Warrior campaigns, which shaped doctrine and TTPs in the field in the following areas: · Introduction of new command relationships, · Development of the Combat Decision Range, · Construction and use of the urban Close Air Support range (Yodaville) , · Development of military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)
From page 147...
... Transitioning Results to Acquisitions and Fielded Capabilities In reviewing the experimentation efforts of the NWDC and the MCCDC, the committee concludes that there have not been any major end items of equipment that have moved directly into acquisition as a result of experimentation. Navy The Navy's process for turning concept development over to the acquisition system is viewed from within as being poor5 (discussed in more detail later in this chapter)
From page 148...
... The forward observer forward air controller system equipment, barely workable during Hunter Warrior, was improved in terms of its reliability, ruggedness, and performance during Urban Warrior; the prototype systems are now deployed with units. Meanwhile, the formal FOFAC program of record -- that is, the Target Location and Designation Handoff System (TLDHS)
From page 149...
... Second, the network-centric operations report of the Naval Studies Board recommended that the Navy and the Marine Corps apply spiral processes within the experimentation framework as a means to develop concepts and processes and to accelerate fielding capabilities.7 All of the groups delivering briefings and written materials to the committee referred to spiral development, but the term carried very different meanings. 7 Naval Studies Board, National Research Council.
From page 150...
... Nonetheless, the Naval Fires Network could be cited as an example of something that leaped quickly from concept demonstration to directed procurement. The 8Virtually all major systems have involved evolutionary development and deployment under names such as "block change" or "planned product improvement strategy." 9In Chapter 3, see the subsection entitled "A Recent Experimentation Program: Advanced Rapid Commercial Off-the-Shelf Insertion." 10The most prominent example cited is that of the Littoral Combat Ship, which is using experimentation with the high-speed vessel to determine key performance parameters.
From page 151...
... An assessment of the effectiveness of this methodology could not be made because its use is too sporadic. The committee believes that the Navy and the Marine Corps have not yet adequately explored spiral processes or spiral development, particularly in the context of experimentation campaigns, as was recommended by the network-centric operations report of the Naval Studies Board.
From page 152...
... Certain important areas are not yet adequately explored in the naval experimentation programs. Some of these are currently gaining definition.14 Many 12The concern here is not just the range of political-military scenarios but also the range of assumed circumstances (e.g., the enemy's strategy and tactics, initial conditions that may include surprise or other setbacks, the nature of both sides' allies, the real-world effectiveness of weapons and systems never used in such circumstances before, and so on)
From page 153...
... Furthermore, many of these individual areas of experimentation would fit into larger experimentation campaigns, as discussed in that context in Chapter 2. The NWDC recently drafted a Sea Trial experimentation campaign plan.17 The committee believes that this is a step in the right direction, though the plan's impact on the Navy is as yet unclear.
From page 154...
... The CNO's decision to align the NWDC under the Fleet Forces Command may prove useful in mitigating these problems, but may also result in too great a focus on the near term. The committee was troubled by the sometimes overly rapid jump from "concept development" (which is sometimes criticized as too "soft" or "conceptual," without sufficient grounding in engineering and other technical analysis)
From page 155...
... Experimentation needs to address challenges and capability improvements for the near, middle, and long term, although the respective levels of effort can and should vary substantially. For balance, there should be a stronger component of more revolutionary experimentation.19 The preceding observations lead to this finding: Finding for Marine Corps: The Marine Corps has moved from a balanced program of experimentation campaigns based on near-term, mid-term, and longterm objectives to one of experiments focused on near- and mid-term objectives.
From page 156...
... Experimentation under these new conditions or as part of support to the Special Operations Forces-related naval forces will be necessary. For instance, with more use of unmanned underwater vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and new modes of landing, it will be necessary to provide fire power
From page 157...
... Joint Forces Command, 2000, 2001, and 2002, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan, Norfolk, Va., September. Chapter 4 discusses USJFCOM developments in more detail.
From page 158...
... 22 Planning for Fleet Battle Exercise-Juliet (FBE-J) , which was conducted in 2002, was much more systematic and rigorous than planning for the previous FBEs.
From page 159...
... Finding for Navy: There are significant deficiencies in the end-to-end processes of naval experimentation. Shortfalls include the following: · Insufficient use of structured experimentation campaigns; · Inadequate breadth in exploration of concepts; · Insufficient studies and analysis, including their use to determine the best experimentation venue (games; simulations; small, focused experiments; and so on)
From page 160...
... 25In Chapter 3, see the section entitled "Synopsis of Results to Date from Fleet Battle Experiments Alpha Through India.
From page 161...
... These observations result in an additional finding. Finding for Navy: The Navy has not made effective use of resources in its experimentation program.
From page 162...
... However, the Marine Corps learned and altered its approach to experimentation. One change that it has made is more systematic preparation for field experiments (e.g., scheduling time to train personnel on new equipment and in the new concepts and procedures before experimentation begins)
From page 163...
... Development Command (NWDC) experimentation programs.
From page 164...
... The CNO also realigned the NWDC under the Fleet Forces Command so that it would be tied more closely to the fleet, reversing his predecessor's decision on the matter. These actions illustrate the CNO's interest in experimentation, his belief in its relevance to the fleet, and his continuing support for it, including the use of fleet battle experiments.
From page 165...
... These concerns result in the following finding: Finding for Navy: Continuing Chief of Naval Operations and Vice Chief of Naval Operations sponsorship, leadership, and attention are vital for the overall coordination, direction, prioritization, and execution of the naval experimentation program. Navy Culture The Navy's incentive structure is not uniformly good within the experimentation community.29 In particular, opportunities for promotion from or extended tours in the NWDC do not appear to be realized.
From page 166...
... Joint Forces Command is one alumnus of that activity. Marine Corps Leadership The Commandant of the Marine Corps has also taken measures to improve the effectiveness of experimentation.
From page 167...
... 32In Chapter 4, see the subsection entitled "The Role of Joint Experimentation in Preparing for Joint Operations."
From page 168...
... Consequently, it may be a potential source of infrastructure for experimentation, particularly in spiral development. Its adequacy to support tool interoperability and integration should be assessed as future experimentation campaigns are developed.
From page 169...
... Joint Forces Command are increasing their investments in linked computer simulations and ranges, as well as in artificial and virtual environments. As standards for interoperability among facilities and ranges are developed, the Marine Corps may need to invest in these areas to offset the projected rise in operations and personnel tempo for people and equipment.
From page 170...
... It was stressed in discussions with Shelly Gallup of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, on the basis of extensive experience in fleet battle experiments.
From page 171...
... . Elsewhere this chapter discusses the need to emphasize analytical work and experimentation activities that offer good and correct alternatives to large-scale events.
From page 172...
... However, there is a need now for a more robust set of M&S capabilities to align with the many activities involved in the Sea Trial and joint experimentation campaigns, beginning with exploratory concept development. After MC 02, USJFCOM noted that the DOD's existing M&S capabilities were inadequate to represent future operational concepts.
From page 173...
... Finding for Navy: The infrastructure and tools required for the experimentation campaigns of the future, including those for Sea Trial and joint experimentation, are inadequate. Primary shortfalls include the following: limited availability of ship platforms (compounded by the potential decommissioning of the USS Coronado)
From page 174...
... Various experimentation venues are included -- USJFCOM-sponsored experimentation activities, the Combatant Commands and cross-Service activities, as well as Naval Service activities. Building Naval Forces to Support Joint Operations Ultimately, the whole point of joint experimentation is better joint operations.
From page 175...
... Concept development is focused for the Navy and the Marine Corps, respectively, in the Navy Warfare Development Command and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. On the joint side, it occurs at the U.S.
From page 176...
... 45See Table 4.1 in Chapter 4. 46In Chapter 4, see the subsections entitled "Future Experimentation of the Joint Forces Command" and "Emerging Strategy of the Joint Forces Command for Experimentation Campaigns."
From page 177...
... Experimentation in the Combatant Commands Joint experimentation also takes place in the Combatant Commands.49 The issues involved in joint force operations are so important and large in scope that it is only natural that all Combatant Commands are involved in addressing them 47The committee repeatedly heard that the total cost of MC 02 was approximately $250 million, including the costs of the Services and of USJFCOM, but it has not been able to verify this number. 48Statement attributed to ADM Edmund Giambastiani, Commander of USJFCOM; see Anne Plummer, 2003, "Chief Says More Risks to Be Taken: USJFCOM Says No More Large-Scale Events Like Millennium Challenge," Inside the Pentagon, March 27, p.
From page 178...
... Direct Service interaction can occur in two general ways -- between Service centers involved in concept development and between deployed forces engaged in exercises and experiments. The Navy Warfare Development Command and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command have regular interactions with one another.
From page 179...
... Service experimentation programs should progress in an orderly fashion so that they can feed into and contribute to joint experimentation while also deriving benefits from the joint activities -- all the better for both Service and joint capabilities. USJFCOM has laid out a detailed and intense joint experimentation campaign.
From page 180...
... More synergistic collaboration in joint concept development is needed. Service-unique experimentation has been and could continue to be affected by large-scale joint experimentation, but no formal mechanism exists for striking a proper balance between joint and naval experimentation.


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