The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces (2004) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Pages 17-27
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 17... ...
By such means they can explore new ideas and concepts for the use of variously composed and equipped forces against diverse anticipated threats, and they can learn how to integrate such forces on a large scale in the joint and combined force environment. Innovative design and use of military systems and techniques in warfare have often led to revolutionary changes in how military forces are constituted and 17
|
From page 18... ...
, provides the underlying framework for force structure and utilization. A recent report of the Naval Studies Board on networkcentric warfare indicated the importance of experimentation to developing naval forces according to that new defining concept.
|
From page 19... ...
Actual experimenta tion by the fleet and Marine force elements is required, to learn how legacy subsystems and their components will operate together with existing or testbed versions of new subsystems and components and to devise concepts of opera tion using the new and the legacy subsystems and components in the actual operational environment. When such a development process, part of what has been called spiral development, is used, new equipment and concepts can be incorporated into the fleet and the Marine forces based on validated concepts of operation.4 The report then recommends: The spiral development approach involving design-test-design of new software and equipment and model-test-model to devise new joint concepts and their testing in fleet and Marine units should be adopted as a standard mechanism for achieving network-centric operations systems.5 While the report provided recommendations on how experimentation could contribute to building network-centric capabilities, it also expressed serious concerns about the adequacy of the Navy and Marine Corps approach to experimentation, citing a tendency to focus on a few critical events; an extreme underutilization of analysis, modeling, and simulation; and a failure to decompose broad problems into components that can be studied in appropriate ways over time.6 These same concerns are relayed through specific questions in the terms of reference for this study (see the preface)
|
From page 20... ...
Beyond these few broad examples, experimentation has been a key tool supporting advances in all forms of naval warfare; advances in gunnery, guided missiles, and naval ship propulsion; and progress in all other activities related to the shaping and operation of naval forces. A part of such force development has been the evolutionary improvement of particular equipment, platforms, and major combat and support systems as technological advances and budgetary constraints have permitted.
|
From page 21... ...
In this context the concept of spiral development supported by continual experimentation has taken on new meaning and significance for future naval forces. BROAD RANGE OF ACTIVITIES COVERED BY EXPERIMENTATION As would be expected from an activity that has assumed increasing importance in naval force planning and development, the term "experimentation" tends to be used rather loosely to cover a broad range of activities.
|
From page 22... ...
; and FORCEnet, which integrates Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing as the "operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age, integrating warriors, sensors, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force."11 This evolution of naval force strategy has created a host of issues related to integrating new technologies and operational capabilities into a new kind of naval force system. The CNO has established the organizational policy for approaching 10ADM Vern Clark, USN.
|
From page 23... ...
has aligned Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and FORCEnet with the Systems Commands by assigning implementation responsibility for these major elements of Sea Power 21 to the Naval Air Systems Command, the Naval Sea Systems Command, and the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.15 12 Navy Warfare Development Command.
|
From page 24... ...
NWDC and MCCDC also conduct experimentation that supports immediate and mid-term needs in the fleet as well as forces in the fields, and they are also responsible for coordinating their Services' participation in joint experimentation. All of these experimenta 16 Col Frank DiFalco, USMC, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Operations Center, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, "Marine Corps Role in JCDE," presentation to the committee on August 15, 2002.
|
From page 25... ...
Chapter 3, "Experimentation-Past, Present, and Future," describes Navy, Marine Corps, and other Service experimentation and the results that have flowed from such efforts. Chapter 4, "Emerging Roles in Experimentation -- The Joint Connection," discusses the movement toward joint experimentation, the benefits derived, the problems involved in conducting joint experiments using naval as well as other Services' forces, and the effects of joint experimentation on the Navy's and the Marine Corps's ability to conduct experiment programs to reinforce their own core military competencies.
|
From page 26... ...
Chapter 3 discusses what has been learned through recent experimentation programs of the NWDC and MCCDC beginning with the Navy's Fleet Battle Experiments Alpha through India, and the Marine Corps's Hunter Warrior, Urban Warrior, and Capable Warrior Campaigns. Chapter 3 also summarizes which results have transitioned, whether through concept, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
|
From page 27... ...
· Review of Service experimentation programs in preparing for joint operations. The committee reviewed Service experimentation programs as a preparation for joint operations through the perspective of balance -- how to maximize the Service participation in and influence on joint experimentation in the future while evolving core Service capabilities that are also a key to joint operations.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.