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Executive Summary
Pages 1-16

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From page 1...
... See Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, 2000, Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 3Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark, and Commandant of the Marine Corps James L
From page 2...
... Fleet Forces Command, will coordinate Sea Trial.8 For the Marine Corps, force development and requirements to be determined through experimentation remain the responsibility of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)
From page 3...
... Second, experimentation encompasses a spectrum of activities, such as studies and analyses, seminars and conferences, work by subject-matter experts, war games, modeling and simulations, and experiments that are small and focused, as well as large field events with live forces. The need for this range of activities in conjunction with wellstructured experimentation campaigns10 -- to investigate multiple concepts and alternative paths, explore fuzzy spaces, understand negative results, and discard and/or endorse solutions in order to "write the book" on how to achieve a transformational capability -- is a basic tenet of this study that was used by the committee to assess current Navy and Marine Corps experimentation efforts.
From page 4...
... What the committee noted was more "thinking joint" -- more collaboration on joint concept development, more experiment planning with a joint context in mind, and increasing participation in USJFCOM-sponsored joint experimentation and its attendant processes. Given these positive results, the committee believes that both Navy and Marine Corps experimentation is enabling learning and producing meaningful results directed at promising concepts and technologies in a number of key naval mission areas.
From page 5...
... with insufficient influence over the Navy experimentation program11 and its numerous participants; this insufficient influence extends to the funding and assets required and to the leverage needed for moving the results of experimentation either into acquisition or into programs of record through the requirements process. Even under the best of circumstances, when the results of experimentation provide ample evidence of the need for new capabilities, the bridges between the experimentation organization and the acquisition and requirements organizations of the Navy are fragile; they depend unduly on the exercise of coordinating skills and personal interactions.
From page 6...
... The committee also noted that spiral development -- a potential enabler for transitioning capabilities more rapidly to the fleet -- has not been explored systematically or incorporated as a fundamental method of experimentation. Recommendation 2: To strengthen the transition of experimentation results to the requirements and acquisition processes, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps should institute 12However, there are times when a personal connection is the initial enabler and the CNO can often assign or rotate key personnel to maximize benefits.
From page 7...
... Specifically, for the Marine Corps: · The Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in conjunction with the Marine Corps Systems Command, should expand early transition planning in order to include the framing of transition issues and the identification of potential funding gaps. · The Marine Requirements Oversight Council should establish a process which ensures that the successful results of experiments are adequately evaluated and competed with the programs of record in the context of cost, risk, and military value.
From page 8...
... As a result, the experimentation programs have lacked the cohesion and comprehensiveness needed to address the challenges of Sea Power 21 or to deal conclusively with questions about capabilities that will be delivered by the programs of record. Areas that need further investigation include over-the-horizon, time-critical strike; use of extended-range guided munitions for long-distance, high-volume, rapid fire support; expanded applications of network-centric capability to deployable undersea sensor arrays; mine/countermine warfare; and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to locate and identify targets.
From page 9...
... Specifically, for the Navy: · The Commander, Fleet Forces Command, with the support of the Navy Warfare Development Command, should (1) create and maintain updated experimentation campaigns that address transformation objectives while identifying actionable steps and the organizations responsible for them; (2)
From page 10...
... As requested in the terms of reference for this study, a set of specific enhancements recommended for the naval experimentation programs is provided.16 These enhancements address future challenges stemming from Sea Power 21 and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and elaborate on areas for experimentation toward future capabilities in the naval programs of record. Enhance Navy Experimentation Processes Unlike the Marine Corps experimentation program, the Navy experimentation program needs more robust methods to build experimentation campaigns.
From page 11...
... As noted above, the recent emergence of the Sea Trial Experimentation Campaign Plan is a step forward in this direction. Recommendation 4: To improve the effectiveness of its experimentation efforts, the Navy Warfare Development Command should augment its end-to-end experimentation processes by making the following key changes: · Expand the emphasis on experimentation campaigns that use a full spectrum of experimentation activities, with analysis integrated throughout the campaigns as well as applied to determine which venues are most appropriate.
From page 12...
... Specifically: · The Chief of Naval Operations, with input from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) ; the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N6/N7)
From page 13...
... It should also supplement its tools for building, validating, and verifying models; for generating scenarios and populating databases; and for collecting and analyzing data, while ensuring tools that can function and integrate within the various frameworks and environments as future experimentation campaigns are defined and executed. In addressing enhancement of its infrastructure and tools for naval experimentation, the Department of
From page 14...
... Balance Naval and Joint Experimentation As joint operations continue to leverage naval capabilities, planning is needed to link naval and joint experimentation across a spectrum of activities ranging from the earliest concept development through analyses, war games, and simulations, leading ultimately to limited-objective experiments and larger fleet experiments. Given this requirement, the committee views the current state in naval experimentation as having both limitations and opportunities.
From page 15...
... should conduct enough naval experimentation campaigns to ensure that the highest-priority naval operational concepts are adequately explored. · The CFFC and the MCCDC should design all naval experiments with full recognition that the Navy and the Marine Corps will most likely be operating in a joint context; to the maximum degree feasible, the Naval Services should partner with the other Services in experimenting with relevant assets.
From page 16...
... · The CFFC, N7, N8, and the MCCDC should examine the tradeoffs in the benefits of large, resource-intensive and less well controlled experiments against the opportunities lost by not conducting a greater number of smaller, more focused joint and/or naval experimentation activities. · The CFFC and the MCCDC should systematically develop programs of joint experimentation with the Combatant Commands and should establish a coordination mechanism to facilitate the development of such programs.


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