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From page 34... ... 2.3 RISKS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff told the committee that it believes that the consequences of a terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool would likely unfold slowly enough that there would be time to take mitigative actions to prevent a large release of radioactivity. They also pointed out that since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued several orders that contain Interim Compensatory Measures that require power plant operators to consider potential mitigative actions in the event of such an attack. Read the entire page →
From page 35... ... The first speaks to the probability of terrorist attacks on such facilities; the second speaks to the consequences: • Proposition 1: Nuclear power plants (and their spent fuel facilities) are less desirable as terrorist targets because they are robust and well protected, • Proposition 2: If attacked, nuclear plants (and their spent fuel storage facilities) Read the entire page →

From page 34...

... 2.3 RISKS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff told the committee that it believes that the consequences of a terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool would likely unfold slowly enough that there would be time to take mitigative actions to prevent a large release of radioactivity. They also pointed out that since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued several orders that contain Interim Compensatory Measures that require power plant operators to consider potential mitigative actions in the event of such an attack.

Read the entire page →

From page 35...

... The first speaks to the probability of terrorist attacks on such facilities; the second speaks to the consequences: • Proposition 1: Nuclear power plants (and their spent fuel facilities) are less desirable as terrorist targets because they are robust and well protected, • Proposition 2: If attacked, nuclear plants (and their spent fuel storage facilities)

Read the entire page →

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