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4 Gaps in the Animal Health Framework
Pages 118-132

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From page 118...
... In its analysis of the existing animal health framework, as presented in Chapter 2, and the lessons of specific diseases and disease outbreaks, as presented in Chapter 3, the committee explored the responsibilities and actions of producers, regulators, policymakers, and animal health care providers and their effectiveness in providing disease prevention and control. Based on that review, the committee found that the main barriers to successful prevention of animal disease are gaps in the animal health framework that make it vulnerable to future animal disease threats, particularly from exotic animal diseases.
From page 119...
... Examples of disease events, whether an emergent disease (monkeypox, West Nile virus, severe acute respiratory syndrome) , endemic disease (chronic wasting disease and avian influenza)
From page 120...
... Protection DoD USTR White House: OSTP, OMB Monkeypox Prairie dogs, humans HHS: FDA, CDC DHS: Bureau of Customs and Border Protection DOI: FWS USDA: APHIS, CSREES Bovine Spongiform Cattle HHS: FDA, CDC, NIH Encephalopathy USDA: APHIS, FSIS, ARS, CSREES DHS: Bureau of Customs and Border Protection DOS DoD USTR White House: OSTP, OMB Chronic Wasting Elk, mule deer, HHS: FDA Disease white-tailed deer DOI: BIA, NPS, FWS, BLM USGS: National Health Lab USDA: APHIS, ARS, CSREES EPA DoD West Nile Virus Mosquitoes, birds, DOC humans DOI DoD EPA USDA: CSREES HHS: CDC, FDA, NIH Avian Influenza Avian species, HHS: CDC humans, swine, cats USDA: APHIS, ARS, CSREES DHS: Bureau of Customs and Border Protection DOI: NWHC Severe Acute Humans, palm civets HHS: CDC, FDA Respiratory and raccoon dogs USDA: CSREES Syndrome DOI
From page 121...
... As demonstrated by the exotic Newcastle disease outbreak, the existing animal health framework in California was forced to develop and validate an effective detection tool during the outbreak, though awareness of the threat and the technology used had existed for many years.
From page 122...
... Stimulation of innate immunity is envisioned as a new strategy to achieve early initial nonspecific immune responses to pathogens; this approach could reduce pathogen load prior to specific vaccine response, shedding, and transmission in animal populations in the face of an exotic, zoonotic, or other pathogen exposure. SCIENTIFIC PREPAREDNESS FOR DIAGNOSING ANIMAL DISEASES: LABORATORY CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY Gap 3: The animal disease diagnostic system in the United States is not sufficiently robust to provide adequate capacity and capability for early detection of newly emergent, accidental, or intentionally introduced diseases.
From page 123...
... It is possible that accidental or intentional introduction of these agents could occur in any state or region, and it is unlikely that movement of 1The eight selected agents are avian influenza, exotic Newcastle disease, foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever, rinderpest, bovine pleuropneumonia, African swine fever, and lumpy skin disease.
From page 124...
... Furthermore, basic and translational research related to prevention, detection, and diagnosis of animal and zoonotic diseases is conducted through an array of government, academic, and private institutions; however, no mechanism exists to coordinate research dollars and priorities to ensure that important topics are not overlooked and to ensure the most effective use of existing research dollars. As demonstrated by SARS and many other disease outbreaks, research ties, interagency funding, and cooperation for shared research between biomedical and veterinary scientists are lacking.
From page 125...
... Development and validation of veterinary diagnostic assays utilizing state-of-the-art molecular techniques has not been a priority for federal funding prior to homeland security interests in protection against agricultural bioterrorism. Existing efforts remain limited and focused on assay development for biothreat agents and foreign animal diseases.
From page 126...
... , and only two of the facilities currently under construction will be ABSL-3 Ag biocontainment (Richard Dierks, AAVMC, personal communication, November 2004) .2 INTERNATIONAL ISSUES International Interdependence and Collaboration Gap 6: The United States is not sufficiently engaged with international partners to develop strategic approaches to preventing, detecting, and diagnosing animal diseases before they enter this country.
From page 127...
... Prior to the interim final rule (banning the import, sale, or distribution of prairie dogs and some African rodents responsible for the monkeypox outbreak) , import and movement of exotic animals was uncontrolled.
From page 128...
... In addition, veterinary graduates are not adequately prepared to deal with foreign animal diseases, public health (Hoblet et al., 2003; Walsh et al., 2003) , the food system (Hird et al., 2002)
From page 129...
... Critical areas -- including food safety, emerging and foreign animal diseases, public health, food systems, and animal agriculture in general -- are no longer being adequately addressed. This gap is further accentuated by the fact that training and continuing education are now primarily focused on companion animal practice which, in turn, has reduced the overall awareness and importance of these critical needs and weakened the current animal health infrastructure.
From page 130...
... As described in Chapter 3, the recent outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom; of SARS in Asia and Canada; and of exotic Newcastle disease, avian influenza, and BSE in the United States are reminders of the threats such diseases pose to the U.S. food supply (as well as confidence in the safety of the food supply)
From page 131...
... to undervalue efforts required to prevent animal diseases, or to recognize that losses from disease may be reflected in higher costs for food, recreation, or health care. When the public is not aware of these costs, they (consumers, business)
From page 132...
... · The number of BSL-3 facilities is inadequate, and the existing labs are not strategically located in the United States nor are they suitably equipped for research on diseases requiring biocontainment. · The United States is not sufficiently engaged with international partners to develop strategic approaches to preventing, detecting, and diagnosing animal diseases before they enter this country.


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