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1 Responding to the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism
Pages 11-26

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From page 11... ... More recently, documents with primitive sketches of nuclear weapons obtained from al Qaeda camps and statements by al Qaeda leaders suggest that this terrorist network has also considered the possibilities of nuclear terrorism. At present, however, there is no publicly available information indicating that a terrorist group, operating independently of a government, has made significant strides in developing a nuclear device. Read the entire page →
From page 12... ... Thus far, the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by terrorist groups has been constrained primarily by the difficulty these groups face in obtaining sufficient quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium that could be fashioned into crude nuclear weapons.1 The protection, control, and accounting of these materials remain imperative to mitigating the threat of nuclear terrorism. Read the entire page →
From page 13... ... Department of Energy (DOE) highlighted the following MPC&A deficiencies in Russia that were attributed to the lingering Soviet legacy and to economic difficulties that continue at some sites today:4 � lack of unified physical protection standards and inadequate defenses of buildings and facilities within site-perimeter fences � lack of portal monitors to detect fissile material when leaving a site � inadequate central alarm stations and inadequate alarm assessment and display capabilities � inadequate protection of guards from small-arms fire and inadequate guard force communications � lack of material accounting procedures that can detect and localize nuclear material losses and determine when they have occurred � inadequate measurements of waste, scrap, and hold-up nuclear materials 4 NRC. Read the entire page →
From page 14... ... In Russia, where the economy is still a long way from complete recovery and where corruption within the security services has been repeatedly criticized by the Russian president, the importance of modern MPC&A systems cannot be overstated. The rapid deployment of additional security personnel to nuclear facilities following the destruction of two Russian airliners by suicide bombers and the hostage-taking at a school in Beslan near Chechnya in September 2004 underscores the heightened concern over nuclear terrorism within the Russian government. Read the entire page →
From page 15... ... Response (communications, X X interruption, neutralization) Response team X Entry-and-exit control X X (badges, biometrics, nuclear material detectors, metal detectors, explosive detectors) Read the entire page →
From page 16... ... Prevention of these catastrophes in Russia seems to be the principal concern of the Russian government. But there apparently is less concern in Russia that sub-national groups could steal weapon-usable material from Russian facilities, use the material to construct a weapon, and detonate that device in a populated area of the country. Read the entire page →
From page 17... ... Salary levels at nuclear facilities remain low, however, despite gradual improvement. Despite the significant increase in Russian technical capabilities, DOE continues to dominate the selection of MPC&A upgrade priorities and approaches at specific sites. Read the entire page →
From page 18... ... For years, DOE specialists argued that perimeter protection had only a marginal impact on security of material housed inside buildings. They have emphasized security upgrades close to nuclear materials in order to improve materials security rapidly and cost-effectively. Read the entire page →
From page 19... ... Additionally, unless Russian regulatory requirements are incorporated into the adopted approaches, the likelihood of effective indigenization is low. Both Russian and U.S. Read the entire page →
From page 20... ... This could very well serve as a model for other Russian facilities. The nuclear weapons cen ters could take on the role of general contractors implementing modifications to the MPC&A systems at such facilities." SOURCE: Senior Russian scientist, February 2005. Read the entire page →
From page 21... ... They include, as previously indicated, Russian confidence in the adequacy of existing systems, at least for the time being, and complications over foreign access to some facilities in Russia. The frequent DOE program management changes over the past decade, the replacement of experienced DOE MPC&A managers in some cases with less experienced personnel, and a tendency on the part of remaining experienced personnel to tire of the demanding workload and travel required have also impeded progress. Read the entire page →
From page 22... ... In addition to these critical successes by Russian experts and by joint U.S.Russian efforts, DOE has also advanced its own indigenization projects. In 2004, DOE prepared its first sustainability guidelines. Read the entire page →
From page 23... ... While both concepts have the same purpose -- to ensure internationally acceptable levels of safekeeping of weaponusable material for the indefinite future -- indigenization recognizes that the systems ultimately must be integrated into the Russian technical and legal culture. Indigenization is therefore a broader concept which includes the entire approach to security at both the national and facility levels and is a more desirable and achievable goal. Read the entire page →
From page 24... ... Both governments need to give strong support to material conversion and consolidation activities within the MPC&A and related cooperative programs, such as the establishment of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, constructed under the DOD CTR program, and the plutonium disposition program supported by DOE. The objective is to reduce the amount of weapon-usable material stored at Russian facilities and to consolidate the remaining material into fewer facilities and fewer locations within facilities. Read the entire page →
From page 25... ... . Greater awareness among Russian officials, managers, and specialists of the importance of protecting nuclear material by developing a strong, modern nuclear security culture should be generated through education and training programs, training exercises, and awards. Read the entire page →

From page 11...

... More recently, documents with primitive sketches of nuclear weapons obtained from al Qaeda camps and statements by al Qaeda leaders suggest that this terrorist network has also considered the possibilities of nuclear terrorism. At present, however, there is no publicly available information indicating that a terrorist group, operating independently of a government, has made significant strides in developing a nuclear device.

1 Responding to the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Pages 11-26

1 Responding to the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism
Pages 11-26